A comparative analysis of ship operational test and evaluation in the United States Navy and the Royal Australian Navy by Joseph, Kenneth William
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1992-12
A comparative analysis of ship operational test and
evaluation in the United States Navy and the Royal
Australian Navy
Joseph, Kenneth William









SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
la REPOR T SbCUR ITY CLASS IFICATION 1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGSUNCLASSIFIED
2a5 ECUm i Y CLASSI FICA TION AUTHORITY 3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release;
distribuLion is unlimited
2b. DECLAS^ IFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
4 PE R FORM I NG ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBERS 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA, USA 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA, USA 93943-5000




§ PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS
PROGRAM








1 1 . TITLE (Include Security Classification)
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SHIP OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION IN THE
UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Kenneth W. Joseph






14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)
December 1992
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the olticial
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
17. COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP operational test and evaluation, ship test and evaluation, ship acceptanc
acceptance trials
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of ship Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in the United State
Navy (USN) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). It also reviews the acceptance and introduction into servic
procedures for warships in both Navies, including the input from OT&E. This study analyses USN and RAN Sh
OT&E organisation, policy, and procedures, and then compares and contrasts the two systems. The study finds th
the RAN OT&E system, although originally based on USN OT&E philosophy, now differs in the importano
interpretation, application and focus of OT&E. It concludes that to achieve efficient and effective trials an
acceptance of the new higher risk warships currently under construction, the RAN OT&E system needs to be revise*
A model for OT&E in the RAN is proposed based on the principles derived from the USN system. Tl
recommendations include the initial conduct of OT&E in land based test sites, followed by dedicated "Whole Ship
OT&E for the first of class.
». distribution/availability of abstract
g] UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED [~J SAME AS RPT [~J DTIC USERS
&.U AME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
homas H. Hoivik




22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)
(408)646-3301
)DFC 1M1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS P^
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
SHIP OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY
by
Kenneth William Jpseph
Commander, Royal Australian Navy
Bachelor of Electrical Engineering,
University ofNew South Wales, 1976
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





This thesis provides a comparative analysis of ship Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E) in the United States Navy (USN) and the Royal Australian
Navy (RAN). It also reviews the acceptance and introduction into service
procedures for warships in both Navies, including the input from OT&E. This study
analyses USN and RAN Ship OT&E organisation, policy, and procedures, and then
compares and contrasts the two systems. The study finds that the RAN OT&E
system, although originally based on USN OT&E philosophy, now differs in the
importance, interpretation, application and focus of OT&E. It concludes that to
achieve efficient and effective trials and acceptance of the new higher risk warships
currently under construction, the RAN OT&E system needs to be revised. A model
for OT&E in the RAN is proposed based on the principles derived from the USN
system. The recommendations include the initial conduct of OT&E in land based







2. Field of Study
3. Importance of Research Effort
B. OBJECTIVES 2
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 3
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 4
E. WHY STUDY USN OT&E? 4
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW .... 5
1. Archival Research 5
2. Personal Interview Research 7
3. Research Analysis 7
G. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 7
H. ORGANISATION OFTHESIS 8
II. OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION BACKGROUND 9
A. PURPOSE OF T&E IN DEFENCE ACQUISITION 9
B. TYPES OF SHIP TEST AND EVALUATION 10
1. Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) 10
2. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E) 10
3. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) 10
4. The Difference between DT&E and OT&E 1
1
5. Operational Effectiveness and Operational Suitability 13
IV
C. AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE ENVIRONMENT 15
1. Strategy 15
2. Australian Defence Budget and Policies 16
3. U.S. Versus Australia 17
4. United States Navy Versus Royal Australian Navy 20
D. OT&E BACKGROUND SUMMARY 21
III. USN SHIP OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION 23
A. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE ACQUISITION PROCESS ... 23
B. TYPES OF USN SHIP TEST AND EVALUATION 25
1. Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) 25
2. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E) 25
3. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) 25
C. OT&E IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 26
1. Statute Requirement 26
2. OT&E Contributions at Major Milestones 27
D. US OT&E ORGANISATION 29
1. Policy Maker and Overseer 31
2. Sponsor 32
3. Developing Agency 32
4. Operational Tester & Evaluator 33
5. User 33
6. Coordinator 34
E. USN OT&E POLICY 34
1. Independence 35
2. Use of Contractors 36
3. T&E Planning 36
4. Combined DT&E and OT&E 37
5. Modeling and Simulation 38
6. Foreign Weapons Evaluation 38
7. OT&E Funding 39
8. Land Based Test Sites 39
9. Ship OT&E 40





5. Ship Acceptance and OT&E 46
G. USN OT&E PROCEDURES 46
1. From the User Requirement to the OT&E Test Plan 46
2. Assessment of Operational Effectiveness 51
3. Assessment of Operational Suitability 54
4. OT&E Reporting 56
5. OT&E Coordination 57
6. OT&E Personnel Selection and Training 58
H. USN OT&E IMPLEMENTATION - THE DDG-51 PROGRAM 59
1. Critical Issues 59
2. DDG-51 OT&E Program 60
3. 'Whole Ship' OT&E 65
I. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE OT&E ISSUES 69
1. Impact of Budget Cutbacks 69
2. Operational Realism 70
J. USN OT&E SUMMARY 71
1. Importance of OT&E 71
2. Need for OT&E 71
3. OT&E Agency Independence 72
4. T&E Delineation 72




MONTEREY CA 93943 5101
6. Clear Guidance 72
7. Summary 73
IV. RAN SHIP OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION 74
A. AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE ACQUISITION PROCESS 74
1. Development Vs. Procurement 75
2. Types of Acquisitions 76
B. AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE T&E DEFINITIONS 77
1. DoD T&E Definitions 77
2. RAN T&E Definitions 78
C. T&E IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 81
1. The Need for T&E 81
2. OT&E Contributions at Major Milestones 81
3. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation 84
D. RAN OT&E ORGANISATION 86
1. OT&E Organisation Elements 86
2. Changes to the RAN OT&E Organisation 89
E. RAN OT&E POLICY 93
1. Policy Documentation 93
2. T&E Decisions 93
3. Independence 94
4. Use of Contractors 95
5. T&E Planning 95
6. Combined DT&E and OT&E 96
7. Modeling & Simulation 96
8. Foreign Weapons Evaluation 96
9. OT&E Funding 97
10. Land Based Test Sites 97
1 1. Ship OT&E 97






G. RAN OT&E PROCEDURES 102
1. User Requirement to the Acceptance Management Plan 103
2. Assessment of Operational Effectiveness 105
3. Assessment of Operational Suitability 106
4. OT&E Reporting 108
5. OT&E Coordination 109
6. OT&E Personnel Selection and Training 109
H. RAN OT&E IMPLEMENTATION 109
1. DDG Modernisation Project 109
2. Australian Frigate Project 1 10
3. ANZAC Ship Project 1 13
4. COLLINS Class Submarine Project 114
5. OT&E Implementation Summary 1 19
I. RAN OT&E ISSUES 1 19
1. What is OT&E? 1 19
2. OT&E and Acceptance of New Combatants 121
3. The New RAN OT&E Organisation 122
J. SUMMARY 126
1. Importance of OT&E 126
2. OT&E Policy 127
3. RAN OT&E Organisation 127
4. Understanding of OT&E 127
5. Summary 128
V. USN / RAN OT&E COMPARISON 129
A. DEFENCE ACQUISITION PROCESS 129
vin
B. T&E DEFINITIONS 130
1. Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) 131
2. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E) 132
3. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) 133
C. T&E IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 135
1. The Requirement for T&E 135
2. T&E Contributions At Major Milestones 136
D. OT&E ORGANISATION 138
1. OT&E Policy Maker and Overseer 139
2. Program Sponsor 139
3. Developing Agency 140
4. OT&E Tester and Evaluator 140
5. User 141
6. Coordinator 141
7. OT&E Organisation Summary 141
E. OT&E POLICY 144
1. OT&E Documentation 144
2. OT&E Requirements 144
3. Independence of OT&E Authority 145
4. Contractor Involvement in OT&E 146
5. T&E Planning 146
6. Combined DT&E and OT&E 148
7. Modeling and Simulation 149
8. Foreign Weapons Evaluation 150
9. OT&E Funding 151
10. Land Based Test Sites 151
11. Ship OT&E 152
F. SHIP ACCEPTANCE 153
1. Ship Acceptance Policy 153
IX
2. Ship Acceptance Procedure 154
3. Ship Acceptance Summary 157
G. OT&E PROCEDURES 158
1. User Requirement to OT&E Test Plan 158
2. Assessment of Operational Effectiveness 159
3. Assessment of Operational Suitability 160
4. OT&E Coordination 161
5. OT&E Reporting 163
6. OT&E Personnel Selection and Training 164
H. OT&E IMPLEMENTATION 166
I. SUMMARY 168
VI. A MODEL FOR OT&E IN THE RAN 170
A. TEST & EVALUATION DEFINITIONS 170
1. Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E) 170
2. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E) 171
3. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) 172
4. T&E Types in Total Ship Test Program 174
B. T&E IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 175
C. RAN OT&E ORGANISATION 176
1. Policy Maker and Overseer 177
2. Sponsor 177
3. Developing Agency 178
4. OT&E Tester & Evaluator 179
D. RAN OT&E POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 181
1. OT&E Policy Documentation 181
2. Independence of OT&E Agency 181
3. T&E Planning 182
4. Combined DT&E and OT&E 182
5. Foreign Weapons Evaluation 183
6. Land Based Test Sites 183
7. Whole Ship Testing 183
E. RAN SHIP ACCEPTANCE 186
F. RAN OT&E PROCEDURES 187
1. Assessment of Operational Effectiveness 187
2. Assessment of Operational Suitability 187
3. OT&E Personnel, Training and Career Management 189
G. OT&E MODEL SUMMARY 190
VII. CONCLUSIONS 192
A. GENERAL CONCLUSION 192
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS 192
1. OT&E in the Acquisition Process 192
2. OT&E Organisation 193
3. OT&E Policy 193
4. Ship Acceptance 194
5. OT&E Procedures 195
Vni. RECOMMENDATIONS 197
A. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 197
B. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 197
1. OT&E Definitions 197
2. OT&E Documentation 198
3. OT&E in the Acquisition Process 198
4. OT&E Organisation 198
5. OT&E Policy 199
6. Ship Acceptance 200
7. OT&E Procedures 200
APPENDIX A: USN OT&E COURSE SYLLABUS 202
APPENDIX B: ACRONYM LIST 204
LIST OF REFERENCES 210
XI
VITA 216
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 217
Xll
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Numerous individuals assisted me in completing this thesis through their
advice, encouragement, expertise and proofreading skills. To each of you who so
generously shared your time and made this thesis possible, many thanks.
To Professor Tom Hoivik, my thesis advisor, thank-you for your unfailing
support, for your interest and enthusiasm, and for your inspiration and guidance that
brought this thesis from conception to fruition. To Professor Charles Calvano, my
second reader, thanks for your specialist knowledge and advice.
To Captain Dave Duma USN, Commander John Kren USN and Commander
Coleman Landers USN, thanks for your interest, your time and for sharing your
knowledge. To Matt Reynolds and Stuart Rednor, thanks for your exceptional
interest, support and advice.
To Commodore Terry Roach RAN, thanks for your guidance and advice. To
Lieutenant Nick Tate RAN, thanks for providing logistic support over a great
distance.
And finally to Commander Ian Curl RAN, who can see the way ahead so




With new frigates and submarines under construction, the Royal Australian
Navy (RAN) has embarked on its greatest combatant shipbuilding program since the
Second World War. Although these combatants are being built to proven designs
and, therefore, are considered relatively low risk, they do present a greater
operational risk than recent RAN combatant programs. In September 1991, the
Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) expressed concern that the RAN may not be capable of
adequately managing the comprehensive and complex procedures necessary to
accept the ANZAC ships and Collins class submarines into service. This focussed
attention on the acceptance procedures, and consequently on the Operational Test
and Evaluation (OT&E), of the new combatants. The United States Navy (USN) is
the world leader in the development of high technology weapons systems and have
extensive experience in their acquisition, testing and operation. As the RAN has a
similar philosophical approach to acquisition and Test and Evaluation (T&E), the
USN OT&E system forms a credible basis from which to develop an RAN OT&E
organisation, policies and procedures capable of adequately assessing the
operational effectiveness and operational suitability of the new combatants against
the user requirement.
A. SHIP TEST AND EVALUATION
The fundamental purpose of T&E in a system's development and acquisition
program is to identify the areas of technical risk to be reduced or eliminated. During
the early phases of development, T&E is conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of
conceptual approaches, to minimise design risk, to identify design alternatives, to
compare and analyse trade-offs, and to estimate operational effectiveness and
suitability. As a system undergoes design and development, the emphasis in testing
moves gradually from developmental test and evaluation, which is concerned
chiefly with the attainment of engineering design goals, to operational test and
evaluation, which focuses on questions of operational effectiveness, suitability and
supportability. The principal types ofT&E pertaining to ships as defined by the USN
are:
1. Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
DT&E is conducted to assist the engineering design and development
process and to verify attainment of technical performance specifications and
objectives.
2. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
PAT&E is testing conducted on production items to ensure systems meet
contract specifications and requirements, usually for contractual acceptance
purposes. It is a type of DT&E.
3. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
OT&E is conducted to determine a system's operational effectiveness and
operational suitability, identify system deficiencies and the need for potential
modifications to meet established OT thresholds, and develop tactics. OT&E has
three distinguishing characteristics:
• It is conducted in an operationally representative environment.
• It is conducted on production representative equipment using fleet personnel
for operation and maintenance.
• It is conducted against a threat-representative simulated enemy carrying out
threat tactics per the latest threat assessment.
The focus of DT&E is on a system meeting technical and production
specifications, while in OT&E, the focus is on assessing the actual functioning of the
system in the realistic combat environment, against the user requirement.
B. OT&E ENVIRONMENT
The U.S. places a high priority on Defence with strategies of world leadership,
global influence and self sufficiency. To achieve these strategies, the U.S. devotes a
high percentage of its Federal expenditure to Defence, and places a high priority on
Research and Development (R&D). The USN need for OT&E stems from its almost
exclusive reliance on indigenous weapons development and production. It has a
history of large, risky, developmental programs which push the state of the art in
weapons technology. To minimise technical and operational risk, the outputs of
these programs require the assessment of operational effectiveness and suitability
against the user requirement before being committed to production and subsequent
introduction into the Fleet.
Australia's Defence strategy has progressed from a position of dependence on
allies, to a positive acceptance of both self-reliance and regional influence. To
achieve its Defence goals, however, Australia devotes much less of its resources and
places less priority on R&D than does the U.S. The need for local T&E is recognised
by the Australian Government and DoD, for both indigenous and overseas systems,
however, the importance of OT&E in particular, is not specifically addressed in any
Australian T&E policy document. This lack of recognition of the importance of
OT&E is perhaps due to the RAN procuring low risk, complete ships in the past
(e.g., FFG-7 class) with the wealth of USN DT&E and OT&E behind it.
C. OT&E IN THE ACQUISITON PROCESS
The U.S. Defence system acquisition life cycle consists of progressive
development phases separated by major decision milestones, when a program is
reviewed and authorised to advance to the next stage. The USN OT&E system forms
an integral part of the U.S. DoD acquisition process. It is an empirical method of
ensuring a sufficient technical return on acquisition investment and for ensuring that
a new system is fully capable of meeting the fleet's needs. As a result, the U.S. place
high importance on OT&E, with its conduct being mandated by Congress and
incorporated in the law of the U.S. OT&E is viewed as being more important as a
basis for a decision to proceed beyond Low Rate Initial Production, than on the
introduction into service of the final production item. This is because the "big
bucks" of most Defence acquisitions are spent during the production phase. OT&E,
however, has started to play an important role also in the assessment of first of class
systems for introduction into the USN Fleet.
The USN and RAN have similar acquisition systems, however, the level of
importance of T&E, and OT&E in particular, differs greatly. The Australian DoD
prefers lower risk, proven technologies for the majority of new acquisitions. The
Australian system, therefore, places a high T&E priority on the post production
phase, with no mandatory requirement for OT&E prior to a production or purchase
decision, but requiring OT&E before the first production system is Accepted into
Naval Service (AINS). As Australia is now buying far less "off the shelf systems
from overseas, and systems are increasingly being designed and built in Australia or
adapted from overseas designs, the operational risk of these systems is increasing.
These greater risks place emphasis on OT&E leading to a production or purchase
decision where the majority of a project's funding is spent.
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D. OT&E ORGANISATION
The organisation of OT&E within the USN is complex with separate authorities
performing a number of OT&E functions, as listed in Table 1
.
TABLE 1 : USN OT&E FUNCTIONAL AUTHORITIES
OT&E Function USN Authority
Policy Maker & Overseer Director, Operational Test & Evaluation
(DoD authority)
Sponsor Chief of Naval Operations
Developing Agency Commander,
Naval Sea Systems Command
Operational Tester & Evaluator Commander,
Operational Test & Evaluation Force
User Fleet Commanders,
Ships' Commanding Officers
Coordinator Director, Test, Evaluation and Technology
Requirements
Significant characteristics of this organisation include the appointment of a
Director of OT& E (DOT&E) responsible for policy formulation, evaluation and
oversight of OT&E within the U.S. DoD, and the inclusion of a coordinator for USN
T&E. The USN also separates the OT&E and DT&E organisation structures.
Following a number of recent reorganisations, the RAN's OT&E structure is in
disarray. There is no clear OT&E, or T&E, policy maker or overseer within the
Australian DoD or the RAN. The Sponsor is not within the RAN organisation, being
part of centralised force development and user requirements organisation (HQADF)
who sponsors major RAN acquisitions, and is responsible for the initial
determination of T&E requirements. The Developing Agency (ACMAT-N), unlike
its USN counterpart, does not have a T&E office to support Project Directors. With
the disestablishment of the RAN Trials and Assessing Unit (RANTAU) in May
1992, the RAN's OT&E authority is now the Commander, Test and Evaluation
(CTE) under the Chief Staff Officer (Engineering) (CSO(E)) in the Maritime
Command. CTE is currently multifunctional, conducting DT&E and PAT&E in
addition to OT&E. This results in a lack of differentiation within CTE's organisation
between DT&E/PAT&E and OT&E. Also being placed under the in-service
engineering area of the Maritime Command, he lacks visibility and influence within
the warfare community and hence credibility in operational matters critical to
OT&E. CTE's OT&E responsibilities are overshadowed by his DT&E/PAT&E
duties. The RAN currently has no single authority who acts as a T&E focal point
within Navy Office responsible for coordination of T&E matters, however, a project
T&E manager does perform this function for his project.
In summary, the RAN and Australian DoD have reorganised over the past five
years to create a more effective and efficient user requirements organisation, and to
better accord with Program Management and Budgeting principles. However, as a
result, the RAN has no T&E, or OT&E policy maker and overseer, no OT&E
coordinator within Navy Office, and the RAN's OT&E authority is buried within the
in-service engineering management area of the Maritime Command.
E. OT&E POLICY
Where USN OT&E policy has its basis in the statutes approved by Congress,
the RAN has no such formal basis and its OT&E policy is embedded in the more
general T&E policy. Some key aspects of this policy include:
1. OT&E Policy Documentation
The USN has a hierarchy of comprehensive OT&E policy documentation
that provides clear, consistent and non-conflicting policies and guidance to OT&E
participants, and establishes the disciplined management approach to OT&E taken
by the USN. In contrast, the current RAN T&E policy documentation provides
broad T&E policy only and, other than defining OT&E, provides little policy to
guide its conduct. The RAN has adapted the more detailed USN T&E definitions to
suit its own requirements. During this process, however, the RAN lost the
distinction between the types of T&E, and often confuses OT&E with PAT&E/
DT&E. Overall, RAN T&E documentation is not comprehensive, inconsistent and
fails to provide adequate guidance.
2. Independence of OT&E Authorities
Independence of OT&E authorities is the key to the effectiveness of OT&E
in the U.S. acquisition process. OPTEVFOR, as the independent OT&E agency
within the USN, reports directly to CNO, while DOT&E provides independent
oversight and coordination of the military services' planning and execution of
OT&E, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defence. The independence of the
OT&E authorities is designed to ensure impartiality, and honest and open reporting,
subject to the minimum of political interference.
Although major acquisition decisions within the RAN are less based on the
results of OT&E, the RAN also maintains the policy that OT&E is to be conducted
by an authority independent of the development and production agencies. CTE, on
the staff of the Maritime Commander, is independent from the development and
production agencies, but not from the end user, as in the USN. The implications of
this lack of independence is that the end user may have his own aims and objectives
which conflict with the total impartiality of OT&E conduct and reporting.
3. Foreign Weapons Evaluation
The USN has a foreign weapons evaluation program which is designed to
support the evaluation of foreign weapons systems, equipment or technology in
terms of its potential to meet specific U.S. military requirements. The primary
objective of the program is to reduce the costs of research and development, while
leading to the acquisition of foreign equipment for U.S. use. Despite the most recent
Australian Government "White Paper" on Defence Policy requiring the need to be
able to determine the performance in the Australian environment of equipment of
both overseas and local origin, no DoD or RAN T&E policy specifically addresses
the evaluation of foreign systems.
4. Land Based Test Sites (LBTS)
Although used primarily for the purpose of conducting DT&E, the USN has
demonstrated that early OT&E on LBTS can give an estimation of potential
operational effectiveness and suitability, and hence identify potential operational
problems early and minimise operational risk. RAN guidance for OT&E using
LBTS includes a statement that system centres and simulators will be employed for
early stages of OT&E if available, and that OT-2 may be conducted at a land-based
test site. The use of LBTS for OT&E during the ANZAC frigate and COLLINS
submarine projects would appear to offer advantages to the RAN. However OT-2 in
support of a production decision was not conducted for either the ANZAC frigate
and Collins submarine project. Although LBTS are being developed for both
projects, they were not available before production contracts for all the required
combatants were signed. The use of these LBTS for early OT-3 also was not planned
in the original project schedules, and so the conduct of OT&E is now subject to them
being used on a non-interfering basis to the contractor. LBTS should be used for
OT&E in the RAN to give an estimation of potential operational effectiveness and
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suitability, and hence identify potential operational problems early and minimise
operational risk. This should be conducted as the first phase of OT-3 during a
dedicated period following the completion of DT&E on the LBTS.
5. Clear Delineation between T&E Types
The USN achieves a clear delineation between the different types of T&E.
OFTEVFOR conduct only OT&E, and OT&E within the USN is conducted solely
by OPTEVFOR. Thus, there appears to be good understanding in the USN of what
is, and what isn't, OT&E. USN policy also states that combined DT&E/PAT&E and
OT&E testing should only be considered when there are time and cost savings. In
addition, this combined approach must not compromise either the developmental or
operational test objectives, and separate evaluations and reports will be prepared by
DT&E and OT&E testers. The conduct of combined and concurrent DT&E,
(PAT&E) and OT&E is not addressed in RAN T&E policy, however, it is implied as
being almost a requirement. The RAN does not clearly differentiate between the
types of T&E, which leads to DT&E and OT&E often being conducted over the
same period, by the same test team. Although the RAN recognises, by definition, the
difference in objectives and methodology between the types of T&E, no limitations
or guidance as to the possible hazards of this combined testing approach are
addressed.
F. SHIP ACCEPTANCE
The purpose of ship acceptance in the USN is to ensure delivery to the Fleet of
complete ships, free from both contractor and government responsible deficiencies.
Independent verification of readiness of ships for acceptance is the responsibility of
the President, Board of Inspection and Survey (PREINSURV) who conducts
Acceptance Trials and Final Contract Trials for each individual new ship. Ship
acceptance has traditionally been based only on the successful completion of
PAT&E and material inspections that, for the first of class, culminated in approval
for Fleet Introduction. However, with the treatment of ships as a complete weapons
system, as for the DDG-51, Fleet Introduction is now based also on OT&E results.
In the RAN, Delivery (contractual acceptance) of the ship to the Government is
a contractual matter and is managed by the Project Director. This is followed by
RAN trials to assess the ship for Acceptance into Naval Service (AINS). CTE's
responsibility is to conduct the trials and report the results. An Acceptance Board
(AB) is established to provide an assessment of the ship and submit
recommendations upon which CNS can base his acceptance decision. The President,
Vice-President and Board members serve on the AB part time, and the sole function
of the AB is to advise CNS on acceptance matters. It does not conduct tests, trials or
inspections, and is essentially a board of review. Similar to the USN, the RAN also
places emphasis on PAT&E leading to AINS, although OT-3 has been included in
the trials program. However, the trials conducted as OT-3 were really PAT&E /
DT&E with minimal true OT&E content. For the first of class, OT-4 is conducted
following AINS. It comprises a series of trials and evaluations over a 12 to 24 month
period to assess operational effectiveness and operational suitability leading to
Operational Acceptance.
The AB, with its broader experience and knowledge than CTE, is generally
agreed within the RAN as being successful as a board of review of the planning and
results of T&E for individual projects, and recommending the first of class for
AINS. As an ad-hoc organisation consisting of various functional specialists
brought together part time, however, the AB suffers from a number of problems. It
requires guidance as to its role and functions, T&E philosophy and the procedures
of the acceptance process. Although the AB attempts to obtain sufficient guidance
from the T&E documentation, it has found this documentation to be unclear and
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conflicting. With only DT&E/PAT&E and the minimal operational aspects of the
OT-3 testing conducted by the RAN, the AB has tended to focus on materiel
deficiencies, rather than the performance of the first of class against the user
requirement.
G. OT&E PROCEDURES
1. Level and Extent of OT&E
The determination of the level and extent of OT&E required is a difficult
question. The fundamental cornerstone of OT&E is the user requirement, generated
through a series of documents built into the acquisition process. A requirement can
be traced from the capability need through the refining requirements documentation
to a specific objective in the TEMP, to the test plan, and ultimately to the final OT&E
report. This linkage from capability need to operational test program defines the
scope of testing necessary to evaluate the final product against the current user
requirement.
2. Assessing Operational Effectiveness
Operational effectiveness is the capability of a system to perform its
intended function effectively over the expected range of operational circumstances,
in the expected environment, and in the face of the expected threat, including
countermeasures where appropriate. The USN examines each Critical Operational
Issue (COI) and decides what needs to be known to enable each issue to be assessed.
It ensures that the appropriate environments, threats, etc. are included and that
sufficient data will be generated to address the COI and objectives. It focuses on
achieving statistical relevance and making the tests as objective as possible. The
broad scope of many operational requirements, however, makes their testing and
subsequent assessment rather subjective, making the determination of meaninzful
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and assessable quantitative Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) difficult. In addition,
a lack of resources may reduce an objective, quantitative, statistically relevant test
schedule to a more subjective, qualitative assessment. These situations require
expertise and judgement, and compromise between the authorities involved, to
make the tests as objective as possible.
The RAN has found it difficult to define exactly what is required to assess
operational effectiveness. The RAN recognises that the user requirement is the
bench mark for determining the degree to which a system is effective, and also that
operational effectiveness is best assessed by a performance demonstration by
normal operating personnel in the normal or given environment. Assessing
operational effectiveness has involved analysing each COI and then employing
modified Ship Qualification Trial or Fleet Exercise Program techniques to evaluate
them. The RAN has very little guidance on the assessment of operational
effectiveness.
3. Assessing Operational Suitability
Operational suitability is the capability of a system, when operated and
maintained by typical fleet personnel in the expected numbers and of the expected
experience level, to be reliable, maintainable, operationally available, logistically
supportable when deployed, compatible, interoperable and safe. The assessment of
operational suitability in the USN consists of an Integrated Logistic Support (ILS)
Plan review, followed by suitability testing based on the expected reliability, degree
of confidence, thresholds, etc., required to be achieved. OPTEVFOR has analysts
who design suitability tests and determine measures of suitability, and also evaluate
and analyse the adequacy of logistic suppoliability. OPTEVFOR also relies on
operational personnel to use their experience and knowledge of the system to
identify inadequate logistic support.
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Before 1987, the assessment of operational suitability, and ILS in
particular, was rather subjective and often controversial in the RAN. A new
approach was taken in 1987 to make the assessment of ILS more objective. The
RAN is currently developing a routine in-service RM&A data collection and
analysis system, however, until that is operational, the data is collected and analysed
on an 'as required' basis by CTE.
In summary, the principles of operational suitability assessment are
common between the USN and RAN. Although assessments by the RAN have
become more subjective over recent years, the assessment of RM&A is still in its
infancy. The RAN requires experienced personnel to design suitability tests and
analyse results.
4. OT&E Planning
The RAN has embraced the U.S. TEMP concept as the single executive
document for the management of T&E for major acquisitions. Although required
early in a project, recent RAN TEMPs have not been raised until after project
funding has been approved. TEMPS need to be approved earlier to enable inclusion
of post delivery PAT&E/DT&E and OT-3 in the Project budget, and OT-4 in the
Maritime Commander's budget. The authority for DCNS to release the TEMP was
based on his role as Project Sponsor. With HQADF now assuming this role, the
DCNS function in TEMP development is unclear. The TEMP approval process
requires review.
The USN T&E Coordinator responsibilities include the chairmanship of the
Test and Evaluation Coordination Group (TECG) for each major program. Some of
the functions of a TECG are the early definition of terms, measures of effectiveness,
and the acceptability criteria. In the RAN, a T&E Planning Group (TEPG) is formed
prior to TEMP development to analyse T&E requirements and estimate the
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resources required. The TEPG is similar to the USN TECG with one significant
difference. The USN TECG is chaired by the USN T&E Coordinator under the
CNO, whereas the RAN TEPG is chaired by each individual Project Director
through his T&E manager. Despite their best intentions. Project Directors are
essentially driven by cost and schedule considerations, not the overall T&E
adequacy of their project. To be truly objective, each TEPG should be chaired by the
authority responsible for ensuring the adequacy of the RAN's overall T&E program.
5. RAN OT&E Reporting
Reports provide the OT&E authority's conclusions regarding a system's
operational effectiveness and suitability, and his recommendations regarding the
systems future. The USN requires OT&E reports to be impartial, complete,
thorough and be reported solely by the OT&E authority.
Within the RAN, the OT&E Authority coordinates the issue of trials
reports, however, they are issued on completion of each segment of OT&E e.g., o/c
ASW section of OT-3 etc., usually in addition to a report at the end of the OT phase.
Quicklook reports are also routinely sent on completion of each week's testing. The
ship under test also provides a report, however, it is usually forwarded to its
operational authority and the Project, in addition to the OT&E Authority. This early
dissemination of OT&E results, before a full analysis is complete and the
implications assessed, can lead to other authorities taking hasty action on
incomplete information, and can prejudice the OT&E authority's final conclusions
and recommendations. OT&E results should indicate system deficiencies against
user requirements rather than equipment defects, so the results need to be fully
analysed and the implications assessed before being reported to a wider audience.
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6. Whole Ship OT&E
The OT-III conducted on DDG-51 was the first time the USN has
conducted OT&E on a whole ship in a multi-battle situation, in a free play
environment. The whole ship was viewed as an integrated weapons system, rather
than as a platform for weapons systems, and OT-III was conducted in a dedicated
period following Ship Qualification Trials (SQT) and Final Contract Trials.
Within the RAN, the current OT&E to support an AINS decision (OT-3) is
little more than an extended SQT period where DT&E/PAT&E is conducted with
some operational assessment. It is not considered to be adequate to assess the first
of a new ship class against the user requirement. To assess the operational
effectiveness and suitability of a ship against the user requirement with the degree
of confidence required for the Acceptance Board to support an AINS decision, a
dedicated, free play, scenario based, OT-3 period is required.
a. OT&E Training
OT&E is a specialised discipline, with its own philosophy and
methodology, and so requires a specialist approach with knowledge and experience
to make it effective. COMOPTEVFOR conducts a three day Operational Test
Directors' (OTD) course covering the major areas of OT&E. They also run irregular
segment courses which provide overviews or updates on OT&E subjects e.g.,
analysis, test plan development and threat updates.
The RAN has no training courses on OT&E, or on T&E in general. A
number of officers have completed the USN OTD course in recent years which has
improved the knowledge and understanding of OT&E within CTE's organisation
considerably. These courses have been arranged on an ad-hoc basis through
overseas visit submissions rather than as pre-requisite courses for particular billets.
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To be effective, OT&E requires experienced and knowledgable
personnel with high professional credibility within their field of expertise. To
achieve this requires selection of suitable personnel, adequate training and good
guidance documentation, and preferably a career path where serving in the OT&E
Authority is seen as career progression by such capable personnel.
H. CONCLUSION
The USN OT&E system has, by necessity, developed into a well organised,
well documented and effective, if complex, system. The RAN system, on the other
hand, suffers from confusing T&E policy documentation, a weak OT&E
organisation structure and a general lack of OT&E knowledge and appreciation. The
determination of OT&E required has traditionally not been achieved early enough
in the life of a project, and so project funding has not included the provision for
OT&E. The RAN OT&E system, although originally based on USN OT&E
philosophy, now differs in the importance, interpretation, application and focus of
OT&E. As a result of organisation changes, it now lacks the ability to effectively
manage overall T&E, let alone OT&E, at a time when the operational risk of ship
projects is increasing. To achieve efficient and effective trials and acceptance of the
new higher risk warships currently under construction, the RAN OT&E system
needs to be revised.
I. A RECOMMENDED MODEL FOR OT&E IN THE RAN
The OT&E model recommended for the RAN uses principles derived from the
USN system. By taking consideration of resource limitations, and the characteristics
and culture of the RAN, it establishes an effective OT&E organisation which is




The basis for this OT&E model are clear definitions of the types and phases
of T&E. The current Australian definitions are amended and phases of T&E are
refined to better suit the RAN environment. The following definitions of types and
phases of T&E are proposed for the RAN system:
a. Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
The DT&E definition remains unchanged as follows:
DT&E is conducted to assist the engineering design and development process,
and to verify attainment of technical performance specifications and
objectives.
DT&E consists of the three phases listed in Table 2.
TABLE 2: DT&E PHASES
DT&E Proposed RAN Description
DT-1 Validation of design concept.
DT-2 Demonstration that design meets specifications.
DT-3 Demonstration that production meets required technical
characteristics or establish standards for first of class.
PAT&EisaformofDT-3.
b. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
The definition of PAT&E is revised to recognise that it is conducted not
only during the contract period, but also during subsequent RAN testing:
PAT&E is conducted on production items to ensure systems meet technical
specifications and requirements, and is a type ofDT&E.
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PAT&E consists of the seven phases listed in Table 3.
TABLE 3: PAT&E PHASES
PAT&E Proposed RAN Description
PAT-0 Design and engineering development tests
PAT-1 Production and burn-in tests
PAT-2 Environmental qualification tests
PAT-3 System development tests
PAT-4 Harbour testing
PAT-5 Sea testing
PAT-6 Certification and Qualification Trials
c. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
The definition of OT&E is revised along USN lines, so that it more
accurately describes the purpose and nature of OT&E.
OT&E is conducted to determine a system's operational effectiveness and
operational suitability, identify system deficiencies and the needfor potential
modifications to meet established OT thresholds, and develop tactics. OT&E
has three distinguishing characteristics:
• It is conducted in an operationally representative environment.
• // is conducted on production representative equipment using fleet personnel
for operation and maintenance.
• It is conducted against a threat-representative simulated enemy carrying out
threat tactics per the latest threat assessment.
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OT&E consists of the five phases listed in Table 4.
TABLE 4: OT&E PHASES
OT&E Proposed RAN Description
OT-1 Operational assessment of the development proposal to support Full
Scale Engineering Development approval.
OT-2 Demonstration of achievement of program requirements for operational
effectiveness and suitability to support a production or purchase decision.
OT-3 Demonstration of achievement of program requirements for operational
effectiveness and operational suitability on production of ship/aircraft/
system to support Acceptance into Naval Service. Includes limited
reliability, maintainability, availability and logistic supportability
assessments.
OT-4 Demonstration of achievement of program requirements for operational
effectiveness and operational suitability on production of ship/aircraft/
system in a multi-force, multi-threat environment to support Operational
Acceptance. Includes detailed reliability, maintainability, availability and
logistic supportability assessments.
OT-5 In-service OT&E, which could include new applications, new tactics,
revised threat, etc.
2. T&E in the Acquisition Process
To ensure the progressive assessment of operational effectiveness and
operational suitability during the acquisition process, OT&E is scheduled towards
the end of each acquisition phase. The proposed T&E schedule, noting the
distinction between DT&E/PAT&E and OT&E, is shown in Figure 1. No change is
suggested to the current relationship between OT&E phases and acquisition
milestones, however, the figure separates DT&E/PAT&E from OT&E to clearly
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Figure 1: T&E in the Acquisition Process
a. Toted Ship Test Program
The Total Ship Test Program (TSTP) concept, modified from the U.S.
system, is now well established in RAN shipbuilding projects. The proposed T&E
phases can be incorporated into an amended TSTP. However, instead of being
grouped together as in the current TSTP, the DT&E and OT&E events are now
shown as separate categories of testing. Because these separate DT&E, PAT&E and
OT&E events are integrated within the overall TSTP, these trials are termed
collectively as "Integrated Tests and Trials", which is an extension of the current
RAN application of this term. Table 5 shows the proposed revised categories of ITT.
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TABLE 5: CATEGORIES OF ITT
ITT Part ITT Category T&EType Description
ITT Part 1 ITT-0* PAT-0 Design and engineering development tests
ITT-1 PAT-1 Production and burn-in tests
ITT-2 * PAT-2 Environmental qualification tests
ITT-3* PAT-3 System development tests
ITT-4 PAT-4 Harbour testing
ITT-5 PAT-5 Sea testing
ITT Part 2 ITT-6 DT-3 / PAT-6 Certification and Qualification Trials
ITT-7* OT-3 Operational T&E
ITT Part 3 ITT-8* OT^ Follow on Operational T&E
Note: * Only performed on first of class
3. OT&E Organisation
The current OT&E organisation structure is modified to enable effective
OT&E to support the acquisition process. It provides for authorities responsible for
the management, policy making and oversight, specification and conduct of OT&E.
This proposed reorganisation closely achieves the aim of DT&E/OT&E separation,































Figure 2: Proposed RAN OT&E Organisation
Ideally, the head policy maker and overseer of OT&E should be within
HQADF or DoD, along the lines of the U.S. system. A shorter term, RAN-only
solution would be to include this function within the revised Director General Naval
Policy and Warfare (DGNPW) organisation under the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff
(DCNS). The Sponsor of major naval acquisitions is the Director General Force
Development (Sea) (DGFD(Sea)) within HQADF. To be able to determine the
appropriate nature and extent of OT&E required, the Sponsor needs access to OT&E
knowledge and experience. A close relationship needs to be maintained by
DGFD(Sea) with the OT&E policy maker and the OT&E authority (Note dotted
line). To assist all RAN projects with T&E matters, an authority is required within
the Materiel Division, under the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff - Materiel) ACMAT-
N), whose responsibilities include assisting Project Directors in complying with
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policies, incorporating lessons learned from previous projects and reviewing the
T&E aspects of projects at major milestones. Although primarily a DT&E policy
authority, this office would also have an input into the OT&E process by reviewing
the TEMP, and by advising projects how to prepare for OT&E. The Director General
Naval Engineering Requirements (DGNER) is currently responsible for the design,
development, acceptance into service and through life support of ships. This
engineering policy directorate appears to be well suited to the DT&E policy and
review function.
The current OT&E Tester and Evaluator, CTE, within the Maritime
Command is multifunctional, performing both DT&E/PAT&E and OT&E. To
achieve the advantages of DT&E and OT&E separation, a revised organisation is
proposed. All CTE's current DT&E/PAT&E responsibilities, and those already the
responsibility of CSO(E), would remain with an in-service trials team under
CSO(E). CTE's OT&E duties would be removed and managed by a separate group,
Commander, OT&E (COT&E), working under an operational authority. As OT&E
is the assessment of operational effectiveness and suitability, COT&E should be
responsible to COMFLOT. Headed by a Warfare branch officer, COT&E would
manage the post delivery trials period for all ships from the MHQ perspective. He
would still manage the SQT, which, although not true OT&E, still has some
operational input which could not be met by the in-service trials team under
CSO(E).
This proposed reorganisation closely achieves the aim of DT&E/OT&E
separation with some concessions necessary to limit manpower requirements. Also,
by including OT&E managed by a Warfare Officer under COMFLOT, OT&E could
achieve visibility, credibility and influence within the RAN.
23
4. RAN OT&E Policy
a. Policy Documentation
To correct the current inconsistent and out of date T&E documentation,
a major rewrite, rather than just updating is required. This rewrite could be the
vehicle by which the T&E system within the RAN is overhauled, as before the
documentation is revised, T&E definitions and terminology need to agreed within
the RAN and DoD. Then the OT&E and DT&E organisations within the RAN need
to be resolved, and the appropriate policies decided.
b. Independence ofOT&E Agency
Given the proposed COT&E is organisationally independent from the
developing and production agencies, his procedural independence should also be
maintained to ensure impartiality and validity of testing. When OT&E is conducted,
it should not be influenced by the Project or Design Approval Authority (DAA). No
Project or DAA personnel should be present during testing. A final report only
should be issued by the Maritime Commander, with no progress or interim report
(unless the testing is unusually lengthy), to allow full analysis and evaluation of the
test results. Similarly, to ensure test validity and impartiality, contractors should not
be present during OT&E.
5. T&E Planning
Test and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMPs) would be approved early to
enable inclusion of post delivery PAT&E/DT&E and OT-3 in the Project budget, and
OT-4 in the Maritime Commander's budget. To be truly objective, each TEPG
would be chaired by the authority responsible for ensuring the adequacy of the
RAN's overall T&E program. The proposed RAN OT&E policy maker and
overseer, DGNPW, may best be suited to the chairmanship of each TEPG.
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6. Land Based Test Sites
OT&E would be conducted during a dedicated period in the LBTS
following successful DT&E, to gain an estimate of the potential operational
effectiveness and suitability of the system. This period would be planned early so as
to be included in Project schedules and funds.
7. Whole Ship Testing
To assess the operational effectiveness and suitability of a ship against the
user requirement with the degree of confidence required for the Acceptance Board
to support an AINS decision, a dedicated, free play, scenario based, OT-3 period is
proposed. This OT-3 would be conducted after the ship has completed the SQT,
Workup and Operational Readiness Evaluation to ensure that the testing is
conducted on a worked up and materially proven ship. OT-3 would be conducted of
the overall ship as a complete weapons system.
8. RAN Ship Acceptance
The AB would be convened for the first of class only, providing the
specialist expertise to interpret requirements and determine the level of acceptability
required for AINS. The AB consists of Naval Officers drawn part-time from their
normal jobs, and so the cost appears to be minimal. The AB, however, has a high
opportunity cost, which is the value of the next best alternative on which the
members could be working instead of serving on the Board. Once the first of class
is accepted the Board's task is complete. The interpretations and levels of
acceptability established by the AB then guide the Trials Authority in recommending
acceptance of each of the remaining ships. With a more comprehensive OT-3 period
proposed to be conducted, the AB members would more effectively use their
knowledge and experience in assessing the results of OT&E against the user
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requirement rather than on workmanship and materiel deficiencies. The AB should
remain as a board of review.
9. RAN OT&E Procedures
a. Assessment ofOperational Effectiveness
With the proposed inclusion of a dedicated OT-3 period, the OT&E
authority will need to develop tests for a free play, scenario based environment
specifically designed to assess the COIs against the User Requirements. The
analysis of these tests may be different from the weapons analysis currently
performed.
b. Assessment ofOperational Suitability
The assessment of operational suitability, especially for the RAN's
current combatant projects, would focus on interoperability and compatibility as
these present the highest risks with the integration of proven equipment in a unique
combination in a ship platform. RM&A data is collected and analysed during OT-3
to give an indication of performance prior to AINS, and then continued for 12
months during the OT-4 phase. The data would continue to be collected and
analysed on an "as required", rather than on a continuous basis by the Trials
Authority until the RAN develops its routine in-service RM&A data collection and
analysis system. The analysis of RM&A data is a specialist task, currently outside
the experience of most uniformed personnel. To achieve significant and valid
results, an improved RM&A analysis capability would be established.
c. OT&E Training
A formal course such as the USN Operational Test Directors Course
should be a pre-requisite for key billets within the OT&E authority until the RAN
develops enough knowledge and expertise to develop its own course. Other
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authorities also require training in OT&E. The OT&E authority should develop
acquaint courses for other personnel with a need to understand OT&E. Also to
increase the awareness of OT&E in the RAN, the OT&E authority would deliver
presentations regularly to Project Directors Courses, the ILS Management and
Acquisition Course (ILSMAC), Defence management courses, and other
appropriate acquisition courses.
The proposed change of the head of the OT&E authority to a Warfare
Officer as COT&E would provide a career path within the authority. As the
credibility of OT&E increases within the warfare community, the knowledge and
experience gained by warfare officers in this area will be seen to be of more benefit
in future warfare related positions. The proposed employment of COT&E under
COMFLOT should also be more career enhancing for warfare personnel than the
current arrangement under CSO(E).
The professionalism and knowledge of T&E personnel could be
enhanced by membership in a related professional organisation. The corporate
membership of a suitable professional organisation may be worthwhile to the RAN.
J. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the proposed OT&E model be reviewed, evaluated and
implemented in the RAN to achieve an effective OT&E system to support the
introduction of operationally effective and operationally suitable new combatants
into the RAN.
1. OT&E Definitions
It is recommended that:
a. the current definitions and phases of ship T&E be amended to better suit
the Australian Defence environment.
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b. the current TSTP be revised to show DT&E and OT&E events as
separate categories of testing, and these trials be termed collectively as
Integrated Tests and Trials (ITT).
2. OT&E Documentation
It is recommended that:
a. the RAN T&E DI(N) and ABR 1921 be revised to achieve
comprehensive and consistent T&E policy guidance.
3. OT&E in the Acquisition Process
It is recommended that:
a. OT&E be conducted, where possible, prior to the production or
purchase decision in the acquisition process to minimise risk.
b. OT-3 be separated from the DT&E /PAT&E post delivery trials.
c. OT-3 be conducted as a dedicated, free play, scenario based period after
the completion of SQT and ORE to ensure testing is conducted on a
worked up and materially proven ship.
d. OT-3 of the overall ship be conducted as a complete weapons system.
4. OT&E Organisation
It is recommended that:
a. the appointment of a DoD OT&E policy maker and overseer within
HQADF be investigated.
b. DGNPW be appointed as the OT&E policy maker and overseer within
the RAN.
c. a close working relationship on T&E matters be required between
DGFD(Sea), DGNPW and the OT&E authority.
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d. DGNER be appointed as the Materiel Division T&E agency to assist
Project Directors in complying with policies, incorporate lessons
learned from previous projects, review the T&E aspects of projects at
major milestones, and advise projects how to prepare for OT&E.
e. the current CTE organisation be disestablished.
f. an "In-service Trials" team be established under CSO(E) to conduct
CTE's current DT&E/PAT&E responsibilities, and those already the
responsibility of CSO(E).
g. Commander, OT&E (COT&E) be established as the RAN's OT&E
authority under COMFLOT, to manage OT&E and the post delivery
trials period for all ships from the MHQ perspective.
5. OT&E Policy
It is recommended that:
a. policy be developed to enable the performance in the Australian
environment of foreign equipment to be evaluated efficiently,
effectively and consistently.
b. the TEMP approval process be reviewed to ensure appropriate
authorities are consulted and approve the TEMP.
c. the TEPG be chaired by DGNPW as the authority appointed to ensure
the adequacy of the RAN's overall T&E program.
d. OT&E not be influenced by the Project or DAA, and that Project or
DAA personnel not be present during testing.
e. contractors not be present during OT&E.
f. TEMPs for non-development projects be approved before production
approval to enable inclusion of post delivery PAT&E/DT&E and OT-3
in the Project Budget, and OT-4 in MHQ budget.
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g. OT&E be conducted during a dedicated period in the LBTS following
successful DT&E, to gain an estimate of the potential operational
effectiveness and suitability of the system.
6. Ship Acceptance
It is recommended that:
a. the Acceptance Board remain as a board of review.
b. the Acceptance Board be convened for the first of class only.
7. OT&E Procedures
It is recommended that:
a. The OT&E authority develop tests for a free play, scenario based
environment specifically designed to assess the COIs against the user
requirement.
b. analysis requirements of these tests be assessed, as they may be
different from the weapons analysis currently performed.
c. experienced personnel assist in designing suitability tests and analysing
results.
d. interoperability and compatibility be a major focus during the
assessment of operational suitability, especially for the RAN's current
combatant projects.
e. an improved RM&A analysis capability be established.
f. RM&A data continue to be collected and analysed on an 'as required'
basis until the RAN develops its routine in-service RM&A data
collection and analysis system
g. OT&E reports be made solely by the OT&E authority.
h. OT&E phase reports be issued only, with no progress or interim reports,
to allow full analysis and evaluation of the test results.
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i. the USN Operational Test Director type course be a prerequisite for key
billets within the OT&E authority until the RAN develops enough
knowledge and expertise to develop its own course.
j. the OT&E authority develop acquaint courses for other personnel with
a need to understand OT&E.
k. the OT&E authority deliver presentations regularly to Project Directors
Courses, the ILS Management and Acquisition Course (ILSMAC),
Defence management courses, and other appropriate acquisition
courses, so to increase the awareness of OT&E in the RAN.
1. a Warfare Officer be appointed to head the OT&E authority.







Friday, May 15, 1992 marked the end of an era for Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E) in the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). The RAN Trials and
Assessing Unit (RANTAU), the RAN's Operational Test and Evaluation authority,
ceased to exist as an independent unit and was integrated with Maritime
Headquarters (MHQ) under the Commander, Test and Evaluation. [Ref. 56]This
marks a continuing shift in the emphasis placed on OT&E within the RAN.
2. Field of Study
The fundamental purpose of Test and Evaluation (T&E) in a system's
development and acquisition program is to identify the areas of technical risk to be
reduced or eliminated. Operational Test and Evaluation is the means to demonstrate
that a ship meets the specified user requirement before being Accepted into Naval
Service (AINS). This study analyses USN and RAN Ship OT&E organisation,
methodology, and procedures, and then compares and contrasts the two systems.
From this analysis, a model for OT&E in the RAN is proposed.
3. Importance of Research Effort
In September 1991, the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) expressed concern that
the RAN may not be capable of adequately managing the comprehensive and
complex procedures necessary to accept the ANZAC frigates and Collins class
submarines into service [Ref. 62]. With these new classes of surface and sub-surface
combatants under construction, and the RAN currently reorganising its OT&E
organisation, the RAN could benefit from a timely analysis of USN and RAN Ship
OT&E. The study is designed to assist the RAN to develop an effective and efficient
OT&E organisation.o*
B. OBJECTIVES
OT&E is conducted to determine a system's operational effectiveness and
operational suitability, to identify system deficiencies and the need for potential
modifications to meet established operational test thresholds, and to develop tactics.
It is usually conducted at the end of each phase of the acquisition process to support
a major milestone decision. The more significant of these is the OT&E conducted
on a prototype to support a production or purchase decision, and on the first of class
to support an Acceptance into Naval Service decision (AINS). OT&E is conducted
against the current user requirement and is definitive feedback to the program's
sponsor that the system has met the user requirement.
OT&E has a high level of representation within the U.S. Department of Defence
and the USN. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, has direct
responsibility to the Secretary of Defence for prescribing policies and procedures
governing the conduct of OT&E in the Department of Defence, and is a member of
the Defence Acquisition Board. The USN has a dedicated command, the
Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR)
responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for Ship OT&E.
The RAN is currently reorganizing it's OT&E authority. Prior to May 1992, the
RAN Trials and Assessing Unit (RANTAU) was responsible to the Naval Warfare
Branch, as the originator of user requirements, for the planning, conduct and
reporting of OT&E. However, RANTAU has recently been disbanded and the
OT&E component transferred to the RAN Maritime Commander - the eventual ship
"user".
Problems were experienced in the RAN with a perceived lack of high level
representation and consideration of the OT&E requirements during the early phases
of programs, with the cost and time effectiveness of OT&E, with the conduct of
OT&E and Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) concurrently, and with
differences between acceptance of an item from a contractor (Delivery) and
Acceptance into Naval Service.
The RAN is a comparatively small navy with limited resources. With large
indigenous programs including the new Collins class submarines and ANZAC class
frigates due to undertake OT&E in the near future, it is imperative that the RAN has
a cost effective and efficient OT&E organisation.
This study compares the USN and RAN OT&E systems and highlights
strengths and weaknesses of each. The methodology and procedures currently used
by each Navy for the assessment of both operational effectiveness and operational
suitability are analysed. The lessons learned from OT&E of the most recent USN
ship program, the DDG-51, and the RAN DDG Modernization and Australian
Frigate programs are reviewed. Then, using the results of this analysis, the current
RAN plan for the OT&E of the ANZAC class frigate and Collins class submarine
are reviewed. The output of the study is a model for the organisation and conduct of
Ship OT&E in the RAN.
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question posed in this thesis is "What are the fundamental
characteristics of USN ship OT&E and how may USN experience in OT&E be
applied to achieve an efficient, effective OT&E organisation for the RAN?"
However, to address the fundamental characteristics of OT&E, a number of
subsidiary research questions need to be answered. Some of the possible questions
follow. How does OT&E support the Defence acquisition process? What are the
fundamental characteristics of the USN OT&E organisation? What are the
fundamental characteristics of USN OT&E policy? What are the fundamental
characteristics of USN OT&E procedures? How is USN OT&E implemented? How
does OT&E support the acceptance of ships into the USN Fleet? How do the USN
and RAN OT&E systems currently compare? What needs to be done in the RAN to
achieve an effective OT&E system with a minimum of additional resource
requirements?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis is limited to the study of OT&E for naval warships and
submarines. Although based on the same philosophy, the OT&E of aircraft and
equipment is not addressed. Although other nations conduct OT&E (e.g.. United
Kingdom), this study is limited to the analysis of USN and RAN OT&E systems
only. This study is an overview of OT&E organisation, methodology and
procedures. It does not address specific implementation matters or details of
individual tests or trials. This study is limited to UNCLASSIFIED material only,
and the collection of RAN information was limited to written and verbal
correspondence as no personal interviews were able to be conducted with RAN
authorities. No substantial increase of RAN OT&E resources in the near future was
assumed.
E. WHY STUDY USN OT&E?
Study of the USN OT&E system could be beneficial to the RAN for a number
of reasons. Due to the RAN's long association with the USN and its purchase of U.S.
ships and equipment, it has a similar philosophical approach to acquisition and
T&E. The basis of much of the current RAN T&E policies, methods and procedures
is derived from the USN.
Technology is changing the face of modern warfare, and the USN is at the
leading edge of this movement, adapting the best of new technologies to proven
concepts and platforms. The USN strives to ensure that, as technology evolves, it is
used to best advantage. As OT&E determines a new system's operational
effectiveness and operational suitability, the need for potential modifications to
meet established OT thresholds, and develops tactics, it is a critical part of adapting
technology to modern warfare.
Being the most modern and capable naval force in the world today, the USN has
substantial weapons system acquisition, operational and combat experience. This
experience has confirmed their need for OT&E, and refined their OT&E
organisation, policies, procedures and methodology. The RAN could benefit from
this experience.
The USN are world leaders in the development of high technology weapons
systems and have extensive experience in their acquisition, testing and operation. As
the RAN has a similar philosophical approach to acquisition and T&E, the USN
OT&E system forms a good basis from which to develop an RAN OT&E
organisation, policies, procedures and methodology.
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A balanced research methodology was used following the general research
guidance outlined in Reference 1 . The research consisted of three strategies:
1. Archival Research
Archival research consisted of examining the relevant formal documents
pertaining to OT&E in both navies. This included a review of U.S. Defence
Acquisition law, followed by review of the U.S. DoD and USN official
documentation, pertaining to T&E, and to ship OT&E in particular. A similar
approach was taken in reviewing the Australian documentation. Also, a literature
search was conducted to elicit the latest published views and opinions on OT&E.
This search was conducted through two primary sources:
cl Database Search
A search was conducted with DIALOG Information Services, a
commercial information service available through the Dudley Knox Library, Naval
Postgraduate School. The DIALOG service is a computer database accessible by
modem. The search was conducted using a number of key words including
Operational and Evaluation, policy, procedures, and destroyer and frigate. A listing
of 200 recent items was provided [Ref. 2].
b. Defence Logistics Studies Information Exchange
The Defence Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), located
at the U.S. Army Logistics Management College, Fort Lee, Virginia, is a U.S. DoD
organisation that acquires, organises, stores and disseminates logistics and
management information on a DoD wide basis [Ref. 3]. A custom bibliography was
requested on the subject of ship Operational Test and Evaluation. A listing of 48
studies and reports on the subject was provided [Ref. 4].
Other sources of information included journals of professional
organisations and Defence magazines, however, the most useful guidance to
relevant publications was provided by personnel involved in OT&E. In summary,
the archival research established the current, formal organisation, methodology and
conduct of OT&E in both navies, and identified the latest public opinions on OT&E
issues.
2. Personal Interview Research
Ship OT&E is a highly specialised, evolving field of expertise. Many
developments are not published formally by DoD or in the commercially available
literature. It was necessary, therefore, not only to survey the literature on the subject,
but also to conduct interviews. This research was conducted by personal interviews,
either in person or over the phone, with key participants in the ship OT&E field.
Views and opinions were sought from authorities in both navies who either conduct,
use the results of, or are otherwise effected by ship OT&E. The list of pertinent
references as well as personnel interviewed are contained in the References section
of this thesis.
3. Research Analysis
Research analysis was then applied to the information gathered by the other
two strategies, to assess the information, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
each system, and to develop the OT&E model. This analysis consisted of breaking
down the USN and RAN OT&E systems into their component parts, in order to
determine how (and where possible, why) the systems are organised, and particular
procedures and methods used. An OT&E model for the RAN was then developed
from the results and conclusions of the research analysis. As the RAN has a similar
philosophical approach to acquisition and T&E to the USN, their OT&E system
forms a good basis from which to further develop RAN OT&E organisation,
policies, procedures and methodology.
G. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Terms important to the analysis of OT&E systems in the RAN and USN are
defined as they are introduced. A list of acronyms is included in Appendix B.
H. ORGANISATION OF THESIS
The study initially reviews the background of OT&E in Chapter II. The purpose
ofT&E in Defence acquisition is discussed and the types of T&E applicable to ships
are introduced. The U.S. and Australian strategic, economic and Defence
environments are discussed briefly and compared. Some similarities and differences
between the USN and RAN are also noted. The philosophy, organisation and
management of OT&E within the USN and RAN are then analysed in Chapters III
and IV respectively. A comparative analysis of USN and RAN OT&E systems is
included in Chapter V. As result of this analysis, a model for OT&E in the RAN is
proposed in Chapter VI. Chapter VII details the conclusions and Chapter VIII lists
the recommendations.
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II. OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION BACKGROUND
This chapter presents background information considered necessary for a better
understanding of OT&E. The purpose of T&E in Defence acquisition is discussed
and the types of T&E applicable to ships are introduced. The U.S. and Australian
strategic, economic and defence environments are discussed briefly and compared.
Some similarities and differences between the USN and RAN are also noted.
A. PURPOSE OF T&E IN DEFENCE ACQUISITION
The fundamental purpose of T&E in a defence system's development and
acquisition program is to identify the areas of technical risk to be reduced or
eliminated. During the early phases of development, T&E is conducted to
demonstrate the feasibility of conceptual approaches, to minimise design risk, to
identify design alternatives, to compare and analyse trade-offs, and to estimate
operational effectiveness and suitability. As a system undergoes design and
development, the emphasis in testing moves gradually from developmental test and
evaluation, which is concerned chiefly with the attainment of engineering design
goals, to operational test and evaluation, which focuses on questions of operational
effectiveness, suitability and supportability. [Ref. 18:p. 1-1] A primary contribution
made by T&E is the identification and reporting of deficiencies that may adversely
impact the performance capability, availability or supportability of a system.
T&E serves a number of useful functions, providing information for the
following customers:
• Developers to assist in the identification and resolution of technical
difficulties.
• Decision makers responsible for making the investment decision to procure
a new system and for deciding on the most effective use of limited resources.
• Operational users to support the development of effective tactics, doctrine
and procedures. [Ref. 18: p. 1-1]
B. TYPES OF SHIP TEST AND EVALUATION
The principal types of T&E pertaining to ships are:
1. Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
DT&E is conducted to assist the engineering design and development
process and to verify attainment of technical performance specifications and
objectives [Ref. ll:p. 3].
2. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
PAT&E is testing conducted on production items to ensure systems meet
contract specifications and requirements, usually for contractual acceptance
purposes. It is a type of DT&E [Ref. 1 l:p. 5].
3. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
OT&E is conducted to determine a system's operational effectiveness and
operational suitability, identify system deficiencies and the need for potential
modifications to meet established operational thresholds, and develop tactics [Ref.
1 l:p. 5A]. OT&E has three distinguishing characteristics:
• It is conducted in an operationally representative environment.
• It is conducted on production representative equipment using fleet personnel
for operation and maintenance.
• It is conducted against a threat-representative simulated enemy carrying out
threat tactics per the latest threat assessment.
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4. The Difference between DT&E and OT&E
DT&E is focused on a system meeting technical and production
specifications, while in OT&E, the focus is on assessing the actual functioning of the
system in the realistic combat environment, against the user requirement. Figure 1






of System DT&E OT&E




Figure 1: DT&E and OT&E Comparison
DT&E is planned and monitored by the developing agency and is normally
initiated by the contractor. It includes the T&E of components, sub-systems and
hardware and software integration, as well as preproduction and production
qualification testing. OT&E, on the other hand, is conducted by an organisation that
is independent of the developer, on the complete system in as operationally realistic
an environment as possible, with hostile forces representative of the anticipated
threat and with typical users operating and maintaining the system. Table 1
highlights the differences between DT&E and OT&E.
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TABLE 1: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DT&E AND OT&E [Ref. 18:p. 3-5]
DT&E OT&E
Controlled by Program Manager Controlled by Independent Agency
One-on-One Tests Many-on-Many Tests
Sterile Controlled Environment Tactical Environment with Operational
Scenario
Contractor Involvement No Contractor Involvement
Trained Experienced Operators Users Recently Trained on System
Specific Performance Measurements
and Goals
Operational Effectiveness and Operational
Suitability Performance Measurements
To further highlight the difference between DT&E and OT&E, this
anecdote, originally from the Air Force Manual 55-43, 1979 and reprinted in the
U.S. Defence Systems Management College Test and Evaluation Guide [Ref. 18:p.
3-3] is an account of what is probably the first operational test and evaluation:
The test and evaluation of aircraft started with the contract awarded to the
Wright brothers in 1908. This contract specified a craft which would lift two
men with a total weight of 350 pounds, carry enough fuel for a flight of 125
miles, and fly 40 miles per hour in still air. The contract also required that
testing be conducted to assure this capability. What we now call DT&E was
satisfied when the Wright brothers (the developer) demonstrated that their
airplane could meet those first contract specifications. However, no immediate
military mission had been conceived for the Wright Flyer. It was shipped to
Fort Sam Housten, Texas where Captain Benjamin D. Foulois, the pilot, had
orders to "teach himself to fly". He had to determine the airplane's
performance, how to maintain it, and the kind of organisation that would use
it. In the process, Captain Foulois subjected the Wright Flyer to test and
evaluation in operational conditions. Foulois soon discovered operational
deficiencies. For example, there was no seat on the airplane. During hard
landings, Foulois' 130 pound frame usually parted company from the airplane.
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To correct the problem, Foulois bolted an iron tractor seat to the airplane. The
seat helped but Foulois still toppled from his perch on occasion. As a further
improvement, Foulois looped his Sam Browne belt through the seat and
strapped himself in, Ever since then, contoured seats and safety belts - a
product of this earliest "operational" test and evaluation - have been part of the
military airplane.
5. Operational Effectiveness and Operational Suitability
A system's operational effectiveness and operational suitability are the
fundamental objects of OT&E. The USN and RAN definitions (which are possibly
derived from the USN) for these terms are similar.
a. Operational Effectiveness
(1) USN Definition. Operational effectiveness is the capability of the
system to perform its intended function effectively over the expected range of
operational circumstances, in the expected environment, and in the face of the
expected threat, including countermeasures where appropriate [Ref. 1 l:p. 8].
(2) RAN Definition. Operational Effectiveness is the capability of the
system to perform its intended function to the required standard, over the
expected range of operational circumstances, in the expected environment, and in
the face of the expected threat including countermeasures [Ref. 44:p. A-l].
A subtle difference between these definitions is in the description of the
assessed standard. The USN uses the term "effectively", meaning to do the job
regardless of meeting specification, whereas the RAN uses the term "to the required
standard", meaning to meet the specification.
b. Operational Suitability
(1) USN Definition. Operational suitability is the capability of the
system, when operated and maintained by typical fleet personnel in the expected
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numbers and of the expected experience level, to be reliable, maintainable,
operationally available, logistically supportable when deployed, compatible,
interoperable, and safe[Ref. 1 l:p. 9].
(2) RAN Definition. Operational suitability is the capability of the
system, when operated and maintained by operational personnel in the expected
numbers and of the expected experience level, to be reliable, maintainable,
operationally available and logistically supportable [Ref. 44:p. A-2] in the specified
environment within a specified time period. [Ref. 38:p. 14A-3]
The relationship of operational effectiveness and operational suitability























Figure 2: Questions Addressed in OT&E [Ref. 18:p. 3-6]
14
C. AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE ENVIRONMENT
The recently publicly released "Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990's"
[Ref. 5] has not identified a specific military threat to Australia in the foreseeable
future. It does, however, identify significant uncertainties concerning the future
shape of the Australian strategic environment.
1. Strategy
Australia's national strategic policy has evolved over recent decades. It has
come from a position of defence dependence on allies through concentration on the
immediate needs of self defence to a positive acceptance of both self-reliance and
regional influence [Ref. 5:p. 3]. The latest Australian Defence Corporate Plan [Ref.




Self reliance accords priorities to meeting credible levels of threat in
Australia's area of direct military interest [Ref. 6:p. vii]. Regional cooperation
ensures strategic stability and security in the region, while strong alliances express
common security interests and provide avenues for defence access and strategic
influence. Close defence relations with the U.S. remain central to the policy of
defence self-reliance. Although Australia does not depend on the U.S. for protection,
it derives significant benefits from close collaboration through access to advanced
technology, training and exercises, and intelligence. These benefits give Australia a
level of capability that would be difficult and more costly for it to achieve alone.
[Ref. 8:p. p 5]
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2. Australian Defence Budget and Policies
To achieve its defence goals, Australia's defence budget for 1992-93 is $A
9.8 billion. This accounts for about 9% of Federal outlays and is equivalent to 2.4%
of the expected GDP. [Ref. 8:p. 23] Australia is placing emphasis on capital
investment, devoting 27.3% of its defence budget. It intends to maintain capital
investment at about $A 2.5 billion per year, of which about $A 2 billion is on capital
equipment. Along with this significant investment in new capabilities, Australia is
now buying far less "off the shelf from overseas, with systems increasingly being
designed and built in Australia, or adapted from overseas designs. [Ref. 8:p. 17] As
a result, Australian is now building frigates and submarines due to enter service in
the mid 1990's.
The Australian Government's forward estimates indicate that the Defence
Budget will be reduced by 0.5% in 1993-94 and then maintained at this level in real
terms in 1994-95 and 1995-% [Ref. 8:p. 24], Over the four years to 1996, reductions
of up to 6,600 permanent military personnel (about 10% of total force) and 1785
Defence civilians (about 8%) are anticipated [Ref. 8:p. 14].
The area over which the Australian Defence Force (ADF) needs to operate,
the importance of denying an adversary freedom in the sea and air approaches,
Australia's limited population base and the characteristics of the northern Australian
area, place a premium on technologically advanced systems rather than manpower
intensive forces. As the costs of local development and production of
technologically advanced systems are high, development emphasis is placed on
those areas unique to Australia or where particular skills have ongoing relevance to
a range of defence capabilities. [Ref. 5:pp. 28, 38]
In summary, Australia is contributing to its strategic goals and ensuring that
the ADF remains a formidable military force in regional terms, by maintaining
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priority on capital investment. The focus is towards a smaller and more technology
oriented force, with a more streamlined and effective organisation. Therefore,
Australia needs to ensure that its more technology advanced systems are
operationally effective and operationally suitable for the missions required of them.
3. U.S. Versus Australia
Of a similar physical size but much larger population, the U.S. is an
economic and military superpower compared to Australia. Table 2 compares some
significant characteristics of the two nations.
TABLE 2: U.S. VS. AUSTRALIA 1991/92 [Ref. 10]
1991 Statistics U.S. Australia
Area 3,021,295 sqm 2,966,151 sqm
Population 251.8 million 17.1 million




Debt $US 828.5 billion $US 125.0 billion
Defence Budget






Total Armed Forces 1,913,750 67,900
Spending on Capital
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The "National Military Strategy of the United States" [Ref. 7] affirms
that U.S. Defence policy is built upon four key foundations:
(1) Strategic Deterrence and Defence. The significant political
instabilities in the former Soviet Union and the threat posed by the increasing
numbers of potentially hostile states developing weapons of mass destruction
requires that the maintenance of a modern, fully capable and reliable strategic
deterrent remains the first defence priority.
(2) Forward Presence. The day to day presence of U.S. forces in
regions vital to U.S. national interests is key to averting crises and preventing war.
In addition to forces based overseas and afloat, forward presence includes periodic
and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises,
security and humanitarian assistance, port visits and military to military contacts.
(3) Crisis Response. The capability to respond to regional crises on
short notice is a key demand of U.S. strategy. This response may range from a single
discriminate strike to the employment of overwhelming force to defeat a regional
aggressor.
(4) Force Reconstitution. Reconstitution is required to preserve a
credible capability to forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily
with the U.S. It involves forming, training and fielding new fighting units if required
at short notice. It also involves maintaining technology, doctrine, training,
experienced military personnel and innovation necessary to retain the competitive
edge in decisive areas of potential military competition.
This strategy is founded on the premise that the United States will
provide the leadership needed to promote global peace and security [Ref. 7:p. 6]. It
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does, however, reflect the shift from containing the spread of communism and
deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy which is regionally
oriented and capable of responding decisively to future challenges [Ref. 7:p. 1].
Although the U.S. and Australian strategic policy elements may not be directly
comparable, the U.S. places a greater emphasis on Defence with strategies of world
leadership, global influence and self sufficiency, while Australia places emphasis on
regional influence and self-reliance.
To achieve these goals, the U.S. devotes a considerably higher
proportion of its Federal expenditure to Defence, than does Australia. It also spends
a considerably greater percentage of its Defence Budget on R&D. U.S. policy is to
maintain world leadership in key Defence technologies, by continuously improving
the process of indentifying and introducing new technologies [Ref. 9]. Although
R&D is conducted with emphasis on those areas unique to Australia, lower risk,
proven technologies are preferred for the majority of new Australian Defence
acquisitions.
b. Similarities
Like Australia, the U.S. current projections for FY 92-95 show a
continued reduction of the Defence Budget by about 2% per annum. Additionally,
with the recent change to a Democratic Administration under President Clinton,
further reductions in Defence expenditure can be expected. During this period of
budget and trade deficits and urgent domestic needs, the U.S. military strategy will
be implemented within a significantly reduced Defence budget, and so places a
premium on efficiency without compromising effectiveness [Ref. 7:p. 4].
As does Australia, the U.S. relies on technological superiority to offset
quantitative disadvantages, to minimise risk to its forces, and to enhance deterrence
and the potential for swift, decisive termination of conflict [Ref. 7:p. 10]. The U.S
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also realises it can meet the challenges of the foreseeable future with a much smaller
force than it has had in recent years [Ref. 7], and that implications of a 25% force
cut by 1995 may be possible [Ref. 10]. Despite these funding and program cutbacks,
the U.S. is also building new surface combatants and submarines. The first DDG-51
"Arleigh Burke" completed testing and the first SSN-21 "Seawolf is under
construction.
A significant similarity between the U.S. and Australia is one of
culture. Both nations have predominantly Caucasian, English speaking populations,
a democratic system of government, close economic, military and political ties, and
share similar cultural values and ideology.
Despite being significantly larger than Australia in economic and
military terms, and, consequently, having a different Defence strategy, the U.S. is
similar to Australia in many areas. These include reducing budgets and size of the
Defence force, a requirement for advanced technology, and a need for efficiency
while maintaining effectiveness. But perhaps above all, a similar culture which
promotes a relative ease of communication and assimilation of ideas, concepts,
procedures and methodologies between the two nations.
4. United States Navy Versus Royal Australian Navy
A similar contrast applies to the navies of both nations. As Table 3 shows,
the USN is far larger and more capable than the RAN. However, there are number
of similarities. Although the RAN had its origins in the Royal Navy and with British
systems, since the 1960's the greater influence on the RAN has been from the USN.
The purchase of three modified Charles F. Adams (DDG-2) class destroyers from the
U.S. in the mid 1960's heralded an increasingly close relationship between the two
navies. The purchase of four Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class frigates from the
U.S. in the early 1980's, and the local construction of two more of the class in
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Australia, continued this relationship. Although the RAN's needs no longer support
the purchase of current U.S. ship types, many new systems and equipment are still
purchased through the USN. Ongoing support for these U.S. ships currently in RAN
service, and Australia's emphasis on interoperability with allies, ensure a continuing
close association. The RAN shares with the USN much common equipment and
weapons, compatible operational procedures, similar logistic support systems and
defence acquisition procedures.








Patrol (inc. Coast Guard) 30 15
Mine Warfare 24 2
Amphibious 65 1
Support & Misc. 162 12
Total Ships: 581 46
Major Ship DDG-51 class destroyers ANZAC class frigates
Acquisition Programs SSN-21 class submarines COLLINS class subs.
D. OT&E BACKGROUND SUMMARY
OT&E forms a fundamental part of minimising risk in the weapons system
acquisition process and in future system operations. It is conceptually different from
DT&E, being focussed on assessing the operational effectiveness and operational
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suitability of the system in a realistic combat environment, with respect to the user
requirement.
Australia is placing emphasis on capital investment for Defence, particularly for
the RAN, with new frigates and submarines presently under construction. In
response to budget reductions the current focus of the RAN is towards a smaller and
more technology oriented force, with a more streamlined and effective organisation.
The U.S. and Australia have a number of similarities, perhaps the most
important, a similar culture which promotes a relative ease of communication and
assimilation of ideas, concepts, procedures and methodologies between the two
nations. The USN is a world leader in the development of high technology weapons
systems and has extensive experience in their acquisition, testing and operation.
With new frigates and destroyers due to enter service in the mid 1990s, the RAN
has an urgent need for an efficient, effective OT&E system to ensure the operational
risk of these new combatants is minimised, and the combatants meet the current
requirements of the RAN.
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III. USN SHIP OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
This chapter describes the USN OT&E system. It explains the OT&E
relationship and importance to the U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) acquisition
process, the specific OT&E policies and methods employed in ship OT&E and why
the OT&E of ships is different from other systems. The USN system of ship
acceptance and the input of OT&E into the process is also described. The OT&E of
the DDG-51 class destroyer, the latest class of warship to undergo OT&E, is used as
an example of the implementation of USN OT&E policies. The workings of the
USN system are well documented and the OT&E system can be traced from the
statute requirements of Congress, through DoD directives to implementation by
Navy specific instructions.
A. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The USN OT&E system forms an integral part of the US DoD acquisition
process. In 1987, the Defence system acquisition process underwent revision in an
attempt to make it less costly, less time consuming, and more responsive to the needs
of the operational community. The Defence system life cycle consists of five phases
of the acquisition process:
Concept Exploration/Definition
Demonstration/Validation




As Figure 3 shows, these phases are separated by major decision points
(milestones) when a program is reviewed and authorised to advance to the next stage
in the cycle, that provide a basis for progressive decisionmaking associated with
program maturation. T&E results and planned T&E play an important part and are
rigorously assessed as part of the milestone reviews [Ref. 18:p. 1-3]. These
milestones are:
Milestone O - Concept Studies Approval
Milestone 1 - Concept Demonstration Approval
Milestone II - Development Approval
Milestone IIA - Low Rate Initial Production
Milestone III - Full Rate Production
Milestone IV - Major Modification Approval (as required)
CONCEPT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTION MAJ°R
STUDIES DEMONSTRATION apppovai appdovai MODIFICATION
APPROVAL APPROVAL tmcu al ai-j-kuval APPROVAL
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Figure 3: U.S. Acquisition Process for Major Programs
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B. TYPES OF USN SHIP TEST AND EVALUATION
The USN Instruction on Test and Evaluation [Ref. 11] defines the principal
types of T&E pertaining to ships as follows:
1. Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
DT&E is conducted to assist the engineering design and development
process and to verify attainment of technical performance specifications and
objectives [Ref. 1 l:p. 3]. DT&E is conducted in three major phases.
2. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
PAT&E is testing conducted on production items to ensure systems meet
contract specifications and requirements, and is a type of DT&E [Ref. 1 l:p. 5]. The
USN regard trials of new ships conducted by the Board of Inspection and Survey
(INSURV) and shipyard industrial testing at PAT&E [Ref. 32: p. 2-5]. Two phases of
ship PAT&E are defined:
• Ship Construction Tests and Trials consist of all testing conducted on the ship
during construction, including INSURV's Acceptance Trials.
• Ship Post-Delivery Tests and Trials are the conventional tests and trials,
including INSURV's Final Contract Trials, that commence after ship
delivery and continue to the end of the SCN obligation or work limiting date.
3. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
OT&E is conducted to determine a system's operational effectiveness and
operational suitability, identify system deficiencies and the need for potential
modifications to meet established OT thresholds, and develop tactics [Ref. 1 l:p.
5A]. OT&E has three distinguishing characteristics:
• It is conducted in an operationally representative environment.
• It is conducted on production representative equipment using fleet personnel
for operation and maintenance.
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• It is conducted against a threat-representative simulated enemy carrying out
threat tactics per the latest threat assessment.
OT&E is subdivided into two major categories:
• Initial OT&E (IOT&E) (OT-I and OT-II) which is up to and including
OPEVAL (final phase of OT-2).
• Follow-on OT&E (FOT&E) (OT-III and OT-IV) which is all OT&E after the
final phase of OPEVAL.
C. OT&E IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
According to the Honorable Gerald A. Cann, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Research, Development and Acquisition:
Test and evaluation is the major control mechanism in the acquisition process
for assessing system performance against system requirements. Navy decision
makers rely on solid testing results, both developmental and operational, to
provide the analytical groundwork for forming judicious program
decisions. [Ref. 12]
This statement by the USN's senior acquisition executive, highlights the
importance of T&E within the USN. Program advance from one phase to the next is
not by the calendar of planned schedule, but by actual resolution of critical
operational issues and achievement of pre-set thresholds verified by T&E [Ref.
1 l:p. 2]. The importance of OT&E, in particular, to the progressive assessment of
programs is such that its use has been mandated by the U.S. Congress and
incorporated into the laws of the United States.
1. Statute Requirement
The requirement for adequate OT&E of Defence programs has strong
congressional support and is mandated by law. The law includes the provision of a
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the Department of Defence,
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appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate [Ref. 16]. The law also addresses specific areas of OT&E reporting and
conduct to ensure the Congress is kept informed, and the testing and reporting are
impartial [Ref. 17]. By including the requirement that a major Defence acquisition
program may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production (i.e. for Milestone III
- Full Rate Production Decision) until Initial OT&E of the program is completed.
Congress ensures that OT&E is an integral part of the acquisition process.
2. OT&E Contributions at Major Milestones
T&E progress is monitored by the Office of the Secretary of Defence
(OSD) throughout the acquisition process. For major Defence acquisition programs,
the Director, T&E and the Director, OT&E within OSD render independent
assessments to the Defence Acquisition Board, the Defence Acquisition Executive
and Secretary of Defence at each major milestone. These T&E officials also assess
the T&E results for less than major defence acquisition programs that are
specifically designated by OSD as OSD T&E Oversight Programs. The assessments
are based on the following T&E information: [Ref. 18:p. 2-5]
• The Test & Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) and more detailed supporting
documents developed by responsible Service activities.
• Service operational test agency reports and briefings.
• Developmental test and evaluation data.
a. OT&E prior to Milestone I
During the Concept Exploration / Definition Phase prior to Milestone I,
laboratory testing, modeling and simulations are conducted to demonstrate and
assess the capabilities of key subsystems and components. The test and simulation
designs are based on the requirements documented in the Mission Need Statement
(MNS). The Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTA) monitors concept
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exploration T&E to gather information for future test and evaluation planning and
to provide effectiveness and suitability inputs desired by the Program Manager. The
OTA also conducts operational assessments, as feasible, to assess the operational
impact of candidate technical approaches and to assist in selecting preferred
alternative systems concepts. [Ref. 18:p. 2-5]
b. OT&E prior to Milestone II
During the Demonstration/Validation phase prior to Milestone II,
concepts approved for demonstration and validation form the baseline that is used
for detailed test planning. The OTA conducts early operational assessments to
identify the best approach, indicate the risks and solutions for this phase of
development, examine operational aspects of the systems development, and
estimate potential operational effectiveness and suitability. This OT&E phase is an
assessment only, with no actual testing being conducted. Typical operational and
support personnel are used to obtain a valid estimate of the user's capability to
operate and maintain the system. The user of the system monitors test and evaluation
during the concept Demonstration and Validation phase. Among the most important
products of user monitoring are the attainment of early orientation and training,
demonstrations of system performance and valid operational test assessments of
systems maintainability and supportability. [Ref. 18:p. 2-7]
c. OT&E prior to Milestone III
The objective of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) phase prior to Milestone III, is to design, fabricate and test a preproduction
system that closely approximates the final product. T&E activities intensify during
EMD, culminating in OPEVAL, and make significant contributions to the overall
acquisition decision process. [Ref. 18:p. 2-9] OT&E conducted prior to the
production decision is for the following reasons:
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• Estimate the operational effectiveness and suitability of the system.
• Identify operational deficiencies.
• Recommend and evaluate changes in production configuration.
• Provide information for developing and refining logistics support
requirements for the system and training, tactics, techniques, and doctrine.
• Provide information to refine operation and support cost estimates, and to
identify system characteristics or deficiencies that can significantly impact
these costs.
• Determine whether the technical publications and support equipment are
adequate.
• Estimate the survivability of the system in the operational environment.
a\ OT&E after the Production Decision
OT&E activities continue after the production decision in the form of
Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) consisting of OT-III and OT-
IV. It is accomplished to verify the operational effectiveness and suitability of the
production system and to determine if deficiencies identified during initial OT&E
(OT-III) have been corrected. A second phase of FOT&E (OT-IV) may be conduced
by the user to refine doctrine, tactics, techniques and training programs over the life
of the system. [Ref. 18:p. 2-10]
D. US OT&E ORGANISATION
Major participants in the US OT&E process are listed in Table 4.The US OT&E
community consists of a mix of service and OSD offices responsible for planning,
programming, budgeting and evaluating operational tests. Figure 4 gives an outline
of the OT&E organisation.
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TABLE 4: USN OT&E FUNCTIONAL AUTHORITIES
OT&E Function USN Authority
Policy Maker & Overseer Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DoD)
Sponsor Chief of Naval Operations
Developing Agency Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
Operational Tester & Evaluator Commander, Operational Test & Evaluation Force
User Fleet Commanders, Ships' Commanding Officers
Coordinator Director, T&E and Technology Requirements
The US OT&E community consists of a mix of service and OSD offices
responsible for planning, programming, budgeting and evaluating operational tests.


























Figure 4: U.S. OT&E Organisation
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1. Policy Maker and Overseer
The Director of OT& E (DOT&E) is the principal OT&E official in the
Department of Defence and the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defence on
OT&E. He is responsible for policy formulation, evaluation and oversight of OT&E
within DoD. With status comparable to an Assistant Secretary of Defence, DOT&E
is independent of other DoD officials and reports directly to the Secretary of
Defence and additionally to Congress. His responsibilities include the following
[Ref. 13:p. 7-4]:
• Monitoring and reviewing all OT&E within DoD.
• Designating observers to be present during preparation for and conduct of the
testing portion of OT&E.
• Controlling joint OT&E and coordinating OT&E conducted by more than
one Military Department or Defence Agency.
• Analysing the results of major system acquisition OT&E. For major systems
and DOT&E oversight programs, reporting to SECDEF and to Congressional
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees that OT&E is adequate and
confirms effectiveness and suitability for combat systems tested.
• Making recommendations to SECDEF on all budgetary and financial matters
pertaining to OT&E, including facilities and equipment.
• Approving OT&E plans for major Defence acquisition programs and
DOT&E oversight programs.
The office of DOT&E was established because, although each of the
Services have had their own OT&E agencies, Congress perceived that operational
testing was not as objective as it should be. It wanted a layer of oversight over the
procurement process, especially OT&E. As a result, DOT&E also has reporting
requirements to Congress as well as the Secretary of Defence. [Ref. 19]
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2. Sponsor
The Program Sponsor is responsible for acquisition program requirements
and related system thresholds. The requirements are determined based on continuing
assessments of current and projected capabilities in the context of changing military
capabilities and national Defence policy. Within the USN, the Sponsor works for the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). For major warship programs the sponsor is N8 -
Warfare Requirements. Under the new USN organisation, increasing importance is
given to the Fleet and Type Commanders in determining requirements and
allocating priorities. Besides generating the user requirement, the Sponsor also has
a review function in the OT&E process. [Ref. 20]
3. Developing Agency
When a program achieves Milestone 0, a program office is formed to
manage the acquisition of the system. For ships and ship systems, this office may be
established within the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) or is affiliated with
a Program Executive Officer, being 'double hatted', with responsibilities to both the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), and to
NAVSEA. The program office is responsible for the conduct of DT&E in
preparation for OT&E. To assist all NAVSEA programs with T&E matters,
NAVSEA has established its own T&E office (SEA 60) whose purpose is to [Ref.
23]:
• Assist Program Managers in complying with policies and incorporating
lessons learned of the past.
• Review T&E aspects of programs at major milestones
• Keep COMNAVSEA and PEOs appraised of overall posture of T&E.
• Influence OSD and Navy T&E policy.
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Although primarily a DT&E policy authority, this office also has an input
into the OT&E process by reviewing the TEMP, and by conducting OT&E readiness
reviews of NAVSEA programs.
4. Operational Tester & Evaluator
The Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) is the USN's
sole independent operational test agency responsible for the planning and conduct
of OT&E. COMOPTEVFOR reports directly to the CNO, and is separate and
distinct from the developing, procuring commands and the user. Results of
OPTEVFOR evaluations are reported directly to CNO and to DOT&E.
OPTEVFOR's mission is to test and evaluate weapons systems, ships aircraft, and
equipment in the anticipated operational environment and against the anticipated
threat: to develop and validate procedures and tactics employing these weapons
systems, ships, aircraft and equipment: and when directed by the CNO, to assist
developing agencies in the accomplishment of DT&E [Ref. 14:p. 1]. OPTEVFOR
involvement in early phases of research and development includes inputs to the Test
and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), observing development testing, and
conducting those phases or operational testing necessary to provide CNO with an
early and independent operational assessment [Ref. 13:p. 7-5].
5. User
The Commanding Officer and crew of the ship under test, and his Fleet and
Type Commanders are the ultimate users of the system. The personal assessment of
the Commanding Officer of the ship under test is sought by OPTEVFOR during the
conduct of OT&E [Ref. 15:p. 44].
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6. Coordinator
CNO has responsibility for ensuring the adequacy of the Navy's overall test
and evaluation program. T&E policy and guidance are exercised through the
Director, Test, Evaluation and Technology Requirements (N091). This organisation
also acts as a T&E Focal Point and Coordinator, responsible for coordination of
T&E matters in the designated Programs, System Commands and Department of the
Navy. [Ref. 13:p. 7-5]
E. USN OT&E POLICY
USN OT&E policy has its basis in the statutes approved by Congress. This
policy is refined in the DoD acquisition Directive 5000. 1 [Ref. 25] and DoD
Instruction 5000.2 [Ref. 24]. The essential T&E elements in these directives are then
further detailed in OPNAV Instruction 3960. 10C [Ref. 1 1] and other subordinate
instructions. This hierarchy of documentation establishes the disciplined
management approach to OT&E taken by the USN.
Basically, USN test and evaluation programs are structured to [Ref. 24:p. 8-2].
• Provide essential information for assessment of acquisition risk and for
decision making.
• Verify attainment of technical performance specifications and objectives.
• Verify that systems are operationally effective and suitable for intended use.
• Provide essential information in support of decision making.
OT&E programs, in particular, are structured to determine the operational
effectiveness and suitability of a system under realistic combat conditions and to
determine if the minimum acceptable operational performance requirements as
specified in the Operational Requirements Document have been satisfied. U.S.
OT&E policy requires[Ref. 24:p. 8-5]:
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• Threat representative forces be used whenever possible.
• Typical users to operate and maintain the system under conditions simulating
both combat stress and peacetime conditions.
• Production or production representative articles be used for the dedicated
phase of OT&E that supports the full rate production decision.
The ultimate uses of information obtained through OT&E are feedback to the
Developing Agency on the operational strengths and weaknesses of the system, and
inputs for decisions to proceed with production and fleet introductions. A number of
key factors of note are highlighted in USN OT&E policy:
1. Independence
The fundamental DoD Directive on Defence acquisition [Ref. 25:p. 1-8]
requires an independent operational test activity. Each Military Department is
required to establish an independent operational test and evaluation activity. This
activity is required to:
• Be separate and independent from the materiel-developing and procuring
agency and the using agency.
• Be responsible for planning and conducting operational tests, reporting
results, and providing evaluations of each tested system's operational
effectiveness and suitability.
• Report directly to the head of the DoD Component, except that the Secretary
of a Military Department may delegate responsibility for supervising this
activity to the Service Chief concerned.
Acquisition managers are not to influence or attempt to influence the
objectivity and completeness of test results presented to decisionmakers by the
independent operational test activity. Independence is necessary so that there is no
question of impropriety. The testing and reporting agency has nothing to gain or lose
by whatever they say. As major acquisition decisions hinge on the results of OT&E,
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independence is necessary to ensure that the reports on which those decisions are
based are not self serving. [Ref. 19]
2. Use of Contractors
The use of system contractors in support of OT&E conducted to support a
decision to proceed beyond low rate initial production (Milestone III) is restricted
by law [Ref. 17] to ensure impartiality of testing. No person employed by the
contractor for the system being tested may be involved in OT&E, unless contractors
are planned to be involved when the system is deployed in combat.
3. T&E Planning
Test and evaluation planning is considered by the USN to be fundamental
to the conduct of OT&E. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) is the
controlling T&E document and is considered by some to be the single most
important document associated with an acquisition program. The TEMP is directive
in nature and defines and integrates test objectives, critical issues, system
characteristics, test responsibilities resource requirements and test schedules. An
approved TEMP constitutes direction to conduct the specified T&E.[Ref. 15:p. 6-1]
Drafted by the Program Manager (PM), the TEMP's main purpose is to
combine the PM's DT&E and COMOPTEVFOR's OT&E into one integrated
master plan. [Ref. 1 l:p. 11] OPTEVFOR draft Part Four on OT&E and provide
OT&E resource requirements for Part Five. The TEMP is then co-submitted by both
the Program Manager and COMOPTEVFOR. For ship programs, the TEMP is
reviewed by the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare), the
Director, T&E and Technology Requirements, and the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition). The TEMP is ultimately approved
at the DoD level by the Director, OT&E and the Under Secretary of Defence for
Acquisition, Director Test and Evaluation.
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Approval of the TEMP constitutes establishment of a contract between the
requirement-setter and the PM which is essential to formal and accountable program
execution, and between the requirement-setter and the OT agency, upon which
COMOPTEVFOR will independently evaluate system operational effectiveness
and suitability. An approved TEMP is required at Milestone I and is updated for each
subsequent milestone and when significant program changes occur. The TEMP also
serves several secondary purposes:
• It allows all involved to see exactly what hurdles the system must clear.
• It allows the PM to make good projections of COMOPTEVFOR's OT&E
costs, which must be funded.
• It allows fleet, range, simulator and target schedulers to plan for the required
services.
4. Combined DT&E and OT&E
The USN has a policy that combined DT&E and OT&E testing should only
be considered when there are time and cost savings [Ref. 24:p. 8-3]. However, this
combined approach must not compromise either the developmental or operational
test objectives. Also a final independent phase of operational testing and evaluation,
termed "OPEVAL", is required for beyond low rate initial production decisions
[Ref. 24:p. 8-4].
"Combined testing" refers to a single test program conducted to support
both DT&E and OT&E objectives. The advantages of combined testing are the
shorter time required for testing, and cost savings by eliminating redundant
activities. These need to be weighed against the limitations of the additional
extensive coordination required and the less than optimum environment and
coverage for OT&E that may occur. Early involvement of OT&E personnel during
system development increases their familiarity with the system and permits
identification of operational concerns early in the program.
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The U.S. has extensive experience with combined testing, some successful
and some unsuccessful, and they conclude that it is possible to have combined test
teams involved throughout the testing process. The DT&E and OT&E teams can
share mutually beneficial data, as long as the test program is carefully planned,
evaluated and reporting activities are conducted separately. [Ref. 18:pp. 17-1 - 17-
4].
5. Modeling and Simulation
DoD directives encourage the use of simulation and modeling to assist in
projecting operational effectiveness and operational suitability prior to Milestone II,
but limit their use in subsequent OT&E to that of supplementing OT&E test data.
The use of modeling and simulation can increase the efficiency of the T&E process,
reduce the time and cost, provide otherwise unattainable and unmeasureable data,
and provide more timely and valid results. Although simulations are not a substitute
for live testing, USN OT&E policy recognises that it is useful to augment tests by
simulating non-testable events and scenarios, and for overcoming resource
limitations. Simulation can also be used to extend test results, to improve the
statistical sample, or to determine overlooked or directly unmeasured parameters.
[Ref. 18: pp. 16-1-16-8]
6. Foreign Weapons Evaluation
The US DoD has a foreign weapons evaluation program which is designed
to support the evaluation of a foreign nation's weapons system, equipment or
technology in terms of its potential to meet a specific U.S. military requirement. The
primary objective of the program is to reduce the costs of U.S. research and
development, while leading to the acquisition of foreign equipment for U.S. use
[Ref. 18:p. 21-1]. From the OT&E viewpoint, the USN 'try-before-buy policy' is
still maintained, despite the early phases of OT being unable to be achieved.
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COMOPTEVFOR may be directed to assess the adequacy of any previously
conducted OT&E and to provide recommendations on the need for additional U.S.
T&E prior to procurement [Ref. 27:p. 6]. Obtaining pertinent test and evaluation
data from foreign governments and manufacturers is necessary to preclude
duplication and reduce costs.
7. OT&E Funding
Congress mandates that the costs of initial OT&E required to achieve a full
production decision shall be paid from funds available for the system being tested
[Ref. 17]. Funding associated with T&E (including instrumentation, targets and
simulations) are identified in the system acquisition cost estimates, acquisition plans
and the TEMP [Ref. 18:p. 18-11]. The Program Manager plans, programs, budgets
and funds the costs of all resources identified in the approved TEMP for all T&E
through OT-III. OPTEVFOR estimates the costs to conduct OT&E and the program
manager budgets and funds these costs. OT&E costs include test articles,
expendables, targets, data collection and reduction and OPTEVFOR program
related costs. The Program Manager does not fund fleet operating costs for T&E
support, which includes fuel and aircraft, The operating costs for OT-II and III, and
all costs for OT-IV, except procurement costs and OPTEVFOR costs, are funded by
the Fleet CINCs.[Ref. ll:p. 21] OPTEVFOR internal man-hours, and computer
hours actually expended are not charged to individual programs.
8. Land Based Test Sites
A Land Based Test Site (LBTS) is a facility that duplicates, simulates or
stimulates the employment of a system's planned operational installation and
utilization, primarily for the purpose of conducting DT&E. LBTS are often used to
test system integration and overall performance. [Ref. ll:p. 12] COMOPTEVFOR
advises the CNO on the adequacy of LBTS for the conduct of OT&E. LBTS test data
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is normally used to support Milestone IIA decisions and not the more stringent
Milestone III. Except where approved by CNO, OT&E intended to support
production decisions will be performed in the operational environment in preference
to the LBTS.
9. Ship OT&E
a. But Ships are Different
The accomplishment of ship T&E varies considerably from the normal
test cycle due to the lengthy period for design, engineering and construction of a
major ship, and because ship T&E includes both that conducted on the ship platform
itself, as well as that conducted on the equipment and systems to be installed on the
ship.
Ship acquisitions are low volume, high cost programs, and so, while
subject to the same basic DoD and USN T&E policies applied to other systems, their
procurement requires special T&E processes. If ships were procured the way other
Navy systems are, the lead ship of the class would be used as a prototype for
conducting T&E prior to approving the construction of the follow-on ships. Because
of the time associated with the design and construction of a ship and the fact that few
technical or operational risks are associated with the ship platform itself, the
prototyping approach in not necessary.
In a typical ship acquisition program, it can take about five years
between the contract award for the lead ship and the time the ship is itself ready to
conduct at-sea operational testing. To delay the construction of the follow-on ships
would have a significant impact on the shipbuilding program's costs and schedule.
This longer schedule would substantially increase shipyard costs in return for a
negligible reduction in the risk of the ship not meeting operational requirements. A
significant time lag between the production of the lead and follow-on ships would
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force a shipbuilder to let most of his experienced workers go and rehire and retrain
others when construction resumed. Moreover, the significant cost savings available
through quantity procurement of many of the ships' equipments would not be
realised if there was a time lag in production between the lead and follow-on
ships. [Ref. 29] Also, from a contracting standpoint, a significant amount of lead
time is required so that equipment will be available when needed for construction.
Much of the long lead equipment is contracted before there is a ship available to
test. [Ref. 19]
b. Policies and Principles
Congress accepted these practicalities of ship OT&E and amended the
law to recognise the special case of ship OT&E [Ref. 30]. Because the development
and construction period for a major ship normally precludes completion of initial
OT&E on the lead ship prior to the production decision for follow-on ships,
successive phases of IOT&E are accomplished as soon as practicable to reduce risk
and minimise the need for modification to follow-on units.
(1) The OT-I phase is an Early Operational Assessment (EOA) and is
an evaluation of technologies, of processes, of plans and procedures, and design
details to see if there any high risk areas that have a potential to cause cost overruns
or degrade performance.
(2) The OT-II phase for a shipbuilding program is an extension of this
concept, except that it occurs in a time frame where landbased testing facilities or
mock-ups of sections exist. Operability and suitability can be assessed, though not
necessarily on a production representative item.
Ship acquisition programs, therefore, usually have IOT&E between
Milestones II and III, which consist of individual weapon systems testing and
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system integration at land based test sites. A total ship OPEVAL is impractical in all
cases except programs where a lead ship is constructed as an R&D effort involving
a major technological advance in hull or machinery design [Ref. 28].
F. SHIP ACCEPTANCE
1. Policy
The purpose of ship acceptance in the USN is to ensure delivery to the Fleet
of complete ships, free from both contractor and government responsible
deficiencies [Ref. 35:p. 1]. Ship acceptance has traditionally been based only on the
successful completion of PAT&E and material inspections, and for the first of class,
has culminated in approval for Fleet Introduction. However, with the treatment of
ships as complete systems, as for the DDG-51, Fleet Introduction was based also on
OT&E results.
2. Definitions
Reference 35 provides the major definitions for the acceptance process:
• "Acceptance" is defined as the legal act of accepting custody of a new
construction ship by the Navy upon delivery of the ship by a private builder.
• "Delivery" is defined as the actual assumption of custody by the Navy
incident to acceptance. The date of delivery from a private shipyard is also
the date of acceptance.
• "Fleet Introduction" is more a concept than a specifically defined milestone l .
It signifies approval by the Secretary of the Navy that a ship class meets the
operational effectiveness, operational suitability, safety and material
standards for service use.
1. Conversation between Captain Tobin, USN. Surface Division. Board of Inspection and Survey,
and the author, 27 October. 1992.
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3. Responsibilities
Independent verification of readiness of ships for acceptance is the
responsibility of the President, Board of Inspection and Survey (PREINSURV) who
conducts Acceptance Trials and Final Contract Trials for each individual new ship
[Ref. 1 1
:
p. 10]. Based upon its findings, the Board recommends acceptance or final
settlement of the contract. The Board identifies material conditions which represent
departures from the General Specifications and deficiencies that substantially reduce
the ship's fitness for naval service and/or degrade its ability to perform its primary
mission. [Ref. 34:p. 1] These deficiencies are noted in the Ship's Log, but may not
necessarily be corrected.
A ship is normally accepted by the Commander, Naval Sea Systems
Command. The preparation and presentation of a ship for acceptance trials is the
responsibility of the Supervising Authority, normally the Supervisor of Shipbuilding
(SUPSHIPS). Users also have a say in the acceptance process. A ship's prospective
Commanding Officer submits progress reports and can request changes be made
which are essential to safety or the ship's mission. The Type Commander monitors
the construction and acceptance process to ensure "customer" input is provided,
conducts a pre-commissioning habitability inspection and makes an acceptance
recommendation to the Fleet Commander who, in turn, makes his recommendation
on the request to deliver the ship. [Ref. 35: pp. 2 - 6]
4. Procedure
The procedure for ship acceptance and introduction to the Fleet is outlined
in Figure 5. The Total Ship Test Program outlines two phases of this process [Ref.
32:p. 2-6]:
• Ship Construction Tests and Trials consisting of all testing conducted during
construction, including Acceptance Trials.
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• Ship Post-Delivery Test and Trials include final contract trials that




















Figure 5: Traditional Ship Acceptance Schedule and Milestones
This procedure includes the following activities and milestones:
a. Delivery I Acceptance
Acceptance Trials are conducted by the INSURV Board when all work
has been completed. These trials are conducted at sea and in port when the following
prerequisites are met [Ref. 35:p. 11]:
• Successful completion of builders trials.
• All installed equipment operable and capable of meeting performance
specifications.
• Habitability items complete.
• Completion of surveys not requiring remote ranges.
• Installation and checkout tests completed.
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• All applicable naval certifications completed.
• Completed test reports and certifications available for inspection by the Trial
Board.
On successful trial completion, and on the recommendation of
PREINSURV, COMNAVSEA accepts the ship on behalf of the USN from the
contractor.
b. Final Contract Trials
Final Contract Trials are trials and materiel inspections conducted at
sea and in port by the INSURV Board to determine if builder responsible
equipments are operating satisfactorily [Ref. 35:p. E3]. It involves operation of all
combat systems, and the propulsion system at full power. On completion,
PREINSURV submits a technical assessment of readiness for OT&E to CNO, and
to COMOPTEVFOR when tasked by CNO [Ref. 1 1 :p. 10].
c. Fleet Introduction
The successful completion of Final Contract Trials on the first ship of
the class traditionally results in a recommendation for Fleet Introduction by
PREINSURV to CNO. The Secretary of the Navy then approves Fleet Introduction
of the ship class on the recommendation of CNO. In contrast, Fleet Introduction of
systems is traditionally recommended by OPTEVFOR after successful completion
of OT&E. However, for the DDG-51 class, where the ship was viewed as a complete
system, Fleet Introduction was recommended by both PREINSURV and
OPTEVFOR2after the completion of OT&E. Figure 6 show the acceptance and
schedule milestones used for DDG-51.


















Figure 6: DDG-51 Ship Acceptance Schedule and Milestones
5. Ship Acceptance and OT&E
OT&E has traditionally not had an input into the ship acceptance process in
the USN, with no involvement in Delivery, Acceptance or Fleet Introduction. It
primarily focussed on the ship's systems rather than the ship as a whole, and was
fundamental to the Fleet Introduction of these systems. With the view of the DDG-
51 as a complete system, successful completion of OT&E is now a prerequisite for
the Fleet Introduction of all new warship classes.
G. USN OT&E PROCEDURES
Procedures are the methodology by which policy is carried out. This section
discusses the procedures adopted by the USN in implementing OT&E policy.
1. From the User Requirement to the OT&E Test Plan
The determination of the level and extent of OT&E required is a difficult
question. For their multiwarfare capable ships, the USN focuses on the mission
warfare areas to determine what is appropriate [Ref. 19]. The fundamental
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cornerstone of OT&E is the user requirement, generated through a series of
documents built into the acquisition process. The procedure involves progression
through the following documents (Figure 7):
Mission Need Statement (MNS)
Cost And Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA)
Operational Requirements Document (ORD)
Top Level Requirement (TLR)
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
OT&E Test Plan (OT&E TP)
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Figure 7: Progressive Definition of OT&E Documentation
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a. Mission Need Statement
Acquisition programs are based on identified mission needs that are
generated as a direct result of continuing assessments of current and projected
capabilities in the context of changing military threats and Defence policy. A broad
statement of mission need, expressed in terms of an operational capability, not a
system-specific solution, is identified in a Mission Need Statement (MNS).[Ref.
24:p. 3-2]
b. Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
A cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) may be
undertaken to evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action to
satisfy the requirements of the MNS. The COEA looks at other alternatives e.g., are
a lot of little ships or a few big ships needed to do the mission? The most suitable
alternative is selected, e.g., a lot of little ships are required, and they need to do these
things. It also develops the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for assessing the
operational effectiveness of the alternatives.
c. Operational Requirements Document
From the MNS and COEA is developed the Operational Requirements
Document (ORD) that contains the performance (operational effectiveness and
operational suitability) and related operational parameters for the proposed concept
or system. It contains the system performance objectives and minimum acceptable
requirements to meet the requirements of the MNS. The MOEs used in the ORD and
the technical parameters, are designed to support those same MOEs that were
developed in the COEA[Ref. 19].
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d. Top Level Requirement
For some ship acquisition programs. Top Level Requirements are
prepared after the MNS and ORD. This is necessary because of the length and
complexity of the ship design process. The TLR states the high level requirements
for the ship. For example, the TLR for the DDG-51, Section 2.11a Operational
Directions, under Mission, Warfare Areas states:
Simultaneous action in Strike Warfare, Antisubmarine Warfare, Antisurface
Warfare and Antiair Warfare required. The combat system shall provide for
rapid, accurate and efficient employment of the ship's weapons.
e. Test and Evaluation Master Plan
The TEMP is developed from the ORD, and TLR if produced, and is
the controlling T&E document that defines and integrates the test objectives, and
Critical Operational Issues (COI) based on the ORD. For example, the DDG-51
TEMP [Ref. 31. p. IV-2] highlights the COI of Combat System Performance as
follows:
Will the combat systems support simultaneous action against threats in Antiair
Warfare (AAW), Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW), Antisurface Warfare
(ASUW), and Strike Warfare (STW) missions during independent or
combined operations as a unit of a Battlegroup, Surface Action Group,
Underway Replenishment Group or Amphibious Task Force?
This COI is addressed as a specific objective for OT-IIIA [Ref. 31:p.
IV-11] which is to:
Determine the capability of the integrated DDG-51 combat system to detect,
track, localise and engage threat representative targets in a multiwarfare
environment (STW, ASW, ASU and AAW).
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From this specific objective, a test procedure is outlined by
OPTEVFOR. The level and extent of testing is based on the level of confidence to
be assessed. It is usually a compromise between the extent of testing and funding
available, agreed between the PM and OPTEVFOR with DOT&E oversight. The
TEMP is viewed as a contract between the Developer, the Sponsor, OPTEVFOR
and OSD, through DOT&E, as what is committed to be done and funding is
available. Any change to the TEMP must be approved by all signatories. The TEMP
identifies limitations to the scope of testing which may include threat replicators
e.g., when a MIG-29 threat aircraft is needed during testing, but an F-14 will be
used. [Ref. 19]
/ OT&E Test Plan
This specific objective is then followed through to the OT&E Test Plan,
developed by COMOPTEVFOR. The test plan contains "E" tests that assess
operational effectiveness and "S" tests that assess operational suitability.The test
plan then addresses how this will be done, by breaking it down into more specifics,
AAW, EW, CAP, CIWS. Under DDG Test E-l Combat System Performance, the
Test Plan states:
To determine the capability of the integrated DDG-51 combat system to
detect, track, localize and engage threat representative targets in a
multiwarfare environment (STW, ASW, ASU and AAW).
g. Summary
A requirement can, therefore, be traced from the mission need to the
ORD, through to a COI and specific a objective in the TEMP, to the test plan and
ultimately to the final OT&E report by OPTEVFOR. This linkage from mission
need to operational test program defines the scope of testing. If a ship has a number
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of mission areas and there are MOEs to evaluate the performance in those mission
areas, then a test program is developed around those MOEs.
2. Assessment of Operational Effectiveness
In assessing operational effectiveness, OPTEVFOR examines each COI
and related operational effectiveness objective, and decides what needs to be known
to enable each objective to be assessed [Ref. 15:p. 9-1]. For example, the objective
may be "to determine the sonar's capability to detect, classify, and track... in the
natural acoustic environment." OPTEVFOR may decide the following measures of
effectiveness are needed to assess the overall objective:
Probability of detection
Detection range
Probability of correct classification given detection
Probability of classifying a threat as a nonthreat
Time between detection and classification
Classification Range
Probability of establishing a track, given detection
Time between detection and track establishment
Range at track establishment
Percent of time tracks are held
They ensure that the appropriate environments, threats, etc., are included
and that sufficient data will be generated to address the COI and objectives.
OPTEVFOR initially determines the requirements and resources necessary to
conduct the test. This is achieved by making a list of environments and other
conditions under which the system will operate, and associating them with the
various threats. This can be achieved by constructing a test design matrix of which
Table 5 is an example.
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The letters indicate missile firing runs in alphabetical order of priority. The
columns are the environment in which the firing is scheduled. [Ref. 15:p. H-l] Then
the actual resources available are reviewed to determine which test objectives must
be eliminated due to lack of funding.
Even though the operational test program is linked to mission need through
the COEA, ORD and TEMP, there are a number of difficulties in developing
appropriate OT&E tests. Many operational requirements are not very specific,
meaning the testing and subsequent assessment of those requirements may be very
subjective, and critical definitions need to be agreed before testing commences.
52
a. Qualitative Vs. Quantitative Assessment
The broad scope of many operational requirements makes their testing
and subsequent assessment rather subjective, making the determination of
meaningful and assessable quantitative MOEs difficult. Also a lack of resources
may reduce an objective, quantitative, and statistically relevant test schedule to a
more subjective, qualitative assessment. These situations require expertise and
judgement, and compromise between the authorities involved, to make the tests as
objective as possible. As an example, an antisurface warfare mission may require
the ability to sink another ship, but the test program does not include this provision.
The test program has to be designed so that it will provide confidence
that the ability can be demonstrated without actually sinking a ship. Similar
situations are encountered in all the warfare areas, and additionally with ship
survivability. One objective is to achieve statistical relevance. DOT&E works
closely with the USN to help determine how many test assets are required to achieve
a certain degree of confidence that a test objective has been met. A test may need to
be repeated a number of times to gain statistical relevance. However, if this is not
possible, or the direct proving of an ability is not possible (as in the surface warfare
example), then the test needs to be designed so that what is observed in the test
program is projected to be what would be observed in reality.
OPTEVFOR indicates the statistical significance of a result as follows:
• "Determine" means a statistically significantly result with a specified level of
confidence.




Another difficulty in assessing operational effectiveness is in defining
the meaning of the requirement and the measures of effectiveness. This is
particularly applicable to whole ship testing which may incorporate a specific
equipment requirement in addition to an overall ship requirement. For example, the
definition of a "Detection Opportunity" for a sonar, may differ from what is an ASW
"Detection Opportunity" for the ship, given the other ASW related sensors that may
be available. Agreement between authorities and the MNS is required for the whole
ship versus individual systems. [Ref. 21]
3. Assessment of Operational Suitability
The assessment of operational suitability in the USN is more standardised
than for the assessment of operational effectiveness. OPTEVFOR identifies 14
















Software supportability has only recently been added by OPTEVFOR. It
relates particularly to totally intensive computer systems, termed "software
intensive systems". It determines if a program manager has established adequate
software support for his system. [Ref. 21] Not all these suitability issues need be
addressed for a particular system. The nature and use of the system, and the phase
of OT&E will determine the issues to be assessed.
a. Suitability Assessment Procedure
Early in the acquisition program, OPTEVFOR reviews the Integrated
Logistic Support Plan (ILSP) against the ORD. The ILSP is a key acquisition
document which defines the various methods used to provide the required range of
logistic support for the system. Following ILSP review, OPTEVFOR determines the
suitability tests required based on expected reliability, degree of confidence,
thresholds, etc. required to be achieved. These determine the scope and length of the
assessment. An onboard assessment at sea is conducted, during which
questionnaires of crew members may be used and maintainability demonstrations
are performed, usually using pre-faulted modules. Reliability, maintainability and
availability (RM&A) data is collected and sent to the normal inservice analyst of
RM&A data, the Naval Weapons Analysis Centre (NWAC) for analysis. In later
OT&E, OPTEVFOR also uses data from the inservice maintenance management
system (3M) and the individual system logs. [Ref. 21]
Not only does OPTEVFOR have specialist analysts for effectiveness
issues, it also has suitability analysts who design tests and determine measures of
suitability. They also evaluate and analyse the adequacy of logistic supportability.
OPTEVFOR also relies on operational personnel to use their experience and
knowledge of the system to identify inadequate logistic support.
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4. OT&E Reporting
a. Reporting by COMOPTEVFOR
COMOPTEVFOR's evaluation report provides the CNO with
conclusions regarding a system's operational effectiveness and operational
suitability, and his recommendations regarding the systems future, i.e., fleet
introduction, further development, additional OT&E, etc. The report also contains
the test results and evaluation criteria to substantiate the conclusions and
recommendations. [Ref. 15:p. 12-1] A report covers a complete OT&E phase (e.g.,
OT-IIA), relating the test results to the COIs and addressing the objectives stated in
the TEMP. COMOPTEVFOR requests comments from the Commanding Officer of
the ship under test ship. These comments are sent only to OPTEVFOR. All
operational test data is considered to be the owned by OPTEVFOR until the Final
report is signed. Quick-look and interim reports are usually sent only if the testing
could not be completed or when directed by the CNO. Although the final report may
be a surprise to other authorities, the USN appears to favor this reporting procedure
to ensure that:
• the conduct of OT&E remains impartial and is not influenced by the program
manager or contractors during testing and analysis.
• OPTEVFOR's conclusions are based on a complete and thorough analysis.
• OT&E results and analysis are reported through one authority only.
b. Reporting by DOT&E
The reports rendered by DOT&E address whether the OT&E
performed was adequate and whether the OT&E results confirm that the system
actually tested is operationally effective and operationally suitable. In the past it
used OPTEVFOR reports as basis and provided their own judgement. Following
General Accounting Office (GAO) criticism that DOT&E overall assessments
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consistently presented a more favorable presentation to the Congress of test
adequacy and system performance than was warranted by the facts [Ref. 36: p. 31],
it now does an independent analysis from the raw test data collected by
OPTEVFOR. As DOT&E does not have any specialist analysis staff, it hires an
independent contractor who works exclusively for DOT&E, to do the analysis.
Experienced operators at DOT&E then make the assessment. DOT&E's written
report to Congress is based now on OPTEVFOR reports and its own independent
analysis. [Ref. 21]
5. OT&E Coordination
The USN recognises the importance of coordination between authorities in
the successful achievement of T&E. The USN T&E coordinator is responsible to the
Director, Test, Evaluation and Technology Requirements (N091). He is essentially
the OPNAV area coordinator for Navy T&E, providing a primary contact point for
all parties and setting up T&E briefings and meetings. His responsibilities include
the chairmanship of the Test and Evaluation Coordination Group (TECG) for each
major program. [Ref. 37] TECGs are used for complex, multifaceted programs
which require extensive T&E coordination. Membership of a TECG includes the
Program Manager, the Sponsor, COMOPTEVFOR, a logistics coordinator and
others as appropriate (such as a PREINSURV representative). TECG
recommendations are considered for inclusion in the TEMP. [Ref. 1 l:p. 15] Some of
the functions of a TECG are the early definition of terms, measures of effectiveness
and how these are to be measured, and the criteria for acceptable or not acceptable.
Of note is the formation of a TECG does not imply a joint test team approach. Each
T&E agency remains fully and solely responsible for conducting and reporting the
types and phases of T&E for which it is accountable.
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6. OT&E Personnel Selection and Training
OT&E is a specialised discipline, with its own philosophy and
methodology. The U.S. community involved with ship OT&E select and train their
military personnel. Although some personnel may develop into OT&E specialists,
no career path in OT&E is consciously provided, and no naval personnel currently
serving in DOT&E have served previously in OPTEVFOR.
a. OPTEVFOR
There are no special selection requirements for detailing military
personnel for service as Test Directors in OPTEVFOR, although broad ship
operations experience and combat system knowledge are preferred. OPTEVFOR is
functionally organised along warfare lines, so specialists in each warfare area are
preferred. Most Test Directors are of Commander rank, reporting to Captain level
section heads. For particular programs, OPTEVFOR makes use of subject area
experts, either resident or borrowed from a non-interested party. OPTEVFOR
conducts an intensive four day OperationaJ Test Directors (OTD) course covering
the major areas of OT&E. Further details of this course are included in Appendix A.
They also run adhoc segment courses which provide acquaints or updates on OT&E
subjects e.g., analysis, test plan development and threat updates. To assist their
personnel in managing OT&E, OPTEVFOR publishes the OT&E Director's Guide
which documents its philosophy and methodology. [Ref. 21]
b. DOT&E
Military personnel assigned to DOT&E are selected by background and
expertise, and are preferably war college graduates with joint experience. They are
interviewed by their potential immediate superior, and by DOT&E himself, before
their appointment is confirmed. DOT&E is platform, rather than functionally
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organised, so specialist surface warfare, aviators and submariners are preferred.
Although DOT&E does not conduct courses for new personnel, a one month
handover is usually required. It does, however, publish a comprehensive staff
orientation guide and some personnel have attended the OPTEVFOR OTD course.
[Ref. 19]
H. USN OT&E IMPLEMENTATION - THE DDG-51 PROGRAM
The objective of the DDG-51 Program is to build the next class of destroyer to
replace the aging 'Coontz' (DDG-37) and 'Charles F. Adams' (DDG-2) classes. The
first of the class, the USS ARLEIGH BURKE has recently completed OT-III. It is
the latest USN surface warship to undergo OT&E, thus serving as the most recent
example of the implementation of USN OT&E policy and procedures. The DDG-51
Program is under the management of the AEGIS Shipbuilding Program Manager
(PMS 400) and is sponsored by the AEGIS Program Sponsor (N865G). PMS 400 is
chartered to provide comprehensive direction and program management for all
aspects of system development, ship acquisition and lifetime support preparation. In
this task, PMS 400 has the traditional USN responsibilities of a ship acquisition
program manager and also bears broadened responsibilities for the fleet introduction
and lifetime support of the DDG-51 class ships. [Ref. 33 :p. 1]
1. Critical Issues
The Critical Operational Issues for the DDG-51, as defined in the TEMP,
are subdivided into effectiveness and suitability issues. [Ref. 31:p. IV-2] The
effectiveness issues for DDG-51 are:
• Combat System Performance
• Mobility System Performance

















2. DDG-51 OT&E Program
These COIs were assessed in a multi-phased OT&E program as shown in
the schedule in Figure 8.i&"
a. Initial OT&E
OT-II was split into two major system areas. Propulsion System and
Combat System and was conducted at Land Based Test Sites.
(1) OT-IIA Propulsion System Testing was conducted on the DDG-51
Propulsion System at the Gas Turbine Ship Land-Based Engineering Site
(GTSLBES), Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station (NAVSSES), Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. It is an Engineering Development Model that includes the Machinery
Control System, Data Multiplex System and the engines, reduction gears, thrust
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bearings and propulsion-related auxiliaries of the complete DDG-51 system. A
water brake was used to simulate the propeller. The GTSLBS was exercised in a
simulation of the operational environment of DDG-51class ships. Casualty control
drills, maintenance demonstrations, and individual ship propulsion events were
conducted during 424 hours of test operations.These included full power runs and
emergency crash astern maneuvers. The system was assessed to be potentially
operationally effective and potentially operationally suitable. [Ref. 31:p. IV-5]










































Figure 8: DDG-51 Integrated Test Program Schedule [Ref. 31]
(1) OT-IIB Combat System Testing was conducted at the Combat
System Engineering Development Site (CSEDS) Moorestown, New Jersey.
Following a philosophy of build a little, test a little, OT-IIB was conducted in three
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phases. OT-IIB-1 was conducted in Jun 1986 on a partial configuration in an early
stage of development and integration to support the program Milestone IIIA
decision. The capability in all mission areas could not be evaluated with only search,
detection and tracking of AAW targets conducted. No engagements of air targets
were conducted. Twelve raids of multiple aircraft were conducted, of which eleven
were in an ECM environment, including various jamming modes and chaff.
Dynamic Test Targets (DTT) were also introduced to evaluate system performance.
COMOPTEVFOR concluded that the combat system demonstrated the capability to
control, integrate, and display information required for tactical decisions on AAW
targets and recommended approval of the DDG-51 Combat System for limited fleet
introduction. [Ref. 31:p. IV-4]
(2) The second phase (OT-IIB-2) was conducted in September 1988
when the CSEDS represented an operational prototype replicating planned human
factors, sensors, information processing and weapons system installations in the real
DDG-51. Assessment of capability in all mission areas was conducted. Thirty-four
raids of manned aircraft were conducted, of which two only were in a clear
environment. Additionally DTTs were also introduced to represent antiship missiles
and surface hostile threats. Threat submarine evaluations, both active and passive
were conducted as were Link 1 1 operations with aircraft, surface ships and shore
stations. Non firing engagements with both Harpoon and Tomahawk were also
conducted. Operational Suitability data were collected during the period. On test
completion, COMOPTEVFOR recommended continued development of the
Combat System and the conduct of an additional phase of OT-II at CSEDS prior to
sea trials.
(3) The third phase (OT-IIB-3) was conducted in August 1990
following further development of the Combat System. The testing was
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comprehensive of the total Combat System's capabilities. COMOPTEVFOR noted
that performance was notably improved since the conduct of OT-IIB. They assessed
the system as being potentially operationally effective and potentially operationally
suitable, and recommended continued development of the Combat System. [Ref.
31:p. IV-6]
OT-IIB-2 and OT-IIB-3 were conducted to support continued limited
production. DDG-51 crew members participated in the OT-II testing, both at the
GTLBES at NAVSSES and in CSEDS testing.
b. Follow On OT&E
(1) OT-IIIA was conducted for a 28 day period in early 1992 on board
USS ARLEIGH BURKE. Air, surface and subsurface targets were presented in
single and multithreat environments. Simulated firings against manned aircraft and
live firings against threat-representative targets in operationally realistic scenarios
were conducted in order to evaluate the performance of the integrated combat
system and the capability of the mobility and support systems to support the ship's
mission. The performance of all the ship systems designed for operation with other
Navy units was also evaluated. Suitability tests, off-ship support and maintainability
demonstrations were also conducted. [Ref. 31:p. IV-9]
(2) OT-IIIB is planned to be conducted in a DDG-51 class ship to
demonstrate correction of deficiencies identified during OT-IIIA and to include
previously untested systems.
(3) OT-IV will be conducted in a DDG-51 class ship to demonstrate
correction of deficiencies, to complete deferred or incomplete OT&E, and to
evaluate major computer software revisions as well as the DDG-51 class
performance in battle group operations.
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c. Timing ofOT-III
Table 6 shows the Post Delivery Schedule of DDG-51. Of interest is the
timing of OT-III within the ship's program. Note that OT-III is scheduled
immediately after DT-III testing and before the Workup (REFTRA and FLEETEX).
This has the disadvantage of OT&E not being conducted on a fully worked up ship
with the crew still Developmental Testing oriented. This may have prejudiced the
OT&E results.
TABLE 6: USS ARLEIGH BURKE - POST DELIVERY SCHEDULE [Ref. 33:p. 5]
Time Activity
D + 1 month Mobile Training Team / Training Readiness Evaluation
D + 2m Light Off Examination / Fast Cruise / Commissioning / Port Visit
D + 3-4m Combat Systems Ship' s Qualification Trials (CSSQT)
D + 5m DT-III (Demonstrate ship performs as designed)
D + 6m Final Contract Trials / OT-III
D + 7m OT-III / Operational Propulsion Plant Examination
D+8-10m Post Shakedown Availability (PSA)
D+ 11 m Refresher Training (REFTRA)
D+ 12 m Fleet Exercise (FLEETEX)
D+ 13 m Upkeep (Maintenance Period)
D+ 14 m OT-IV (Backup Events)
D+ 15m FLEETEX / Battle Ready
D+ 16m Pre Overseas Movement / Deploy
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3. 'Whole Ship' OT&E
OT-III conducted on the DDG-51 was unique in that it was the first time the
USN has conducted OT&E on a whole ship in a multi-battle situation, in a fairly free
play environment. Previous ship OT&E, e.g., on the "Aegis" class cruisers (CG-47),
was essentially a combat system test based on a proven hull, where the rest of the
ship and hip integration were not tested. DOT&E have been instrumental in
intensifying efforts to create an operational environment.
a. OT&E Program Development
Following the guidance contained in the OTD manual [Ref. 15],
OPTEVFOR developed a test design matrix. This matrix mapped the Top Level
Requirements to the Schedule of Events (SOE). The TLRs were general and related
to the warfare areas of AAW, ASW, ASUW and STW. The purpose of the matrix
was to ensure that all TLRs were covered by an operational test. In the event that test
resources became unavailable or a system casualty occurred, the matrix provided a
reference of what had been accomplished, what remained to be accomplished, and
the feasibility of completing the test objectives if OT was to continue. In the
evaluation period, the "as-run SOE" was laid out chronologically, identifying events
by mission areas. By examining the as-run table, individual mission areas were
identified for analysis and periods of multiwarfare could be identified to look at
synergistic effects. [Ref. 21]
b. Integration ofEngineering and Combat System Events
Whole ship testing includes engineering and technical problems
combined with combat system activity. The OPTEVFOR Operational Test Director
controls the program and controls injection of incidents. A balance must be achieved
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between engineering incidents and related degradation of the combat system to
ensure the overall aim of the test is achieved.
c. Operational Realism
The OT&E emphasised operational realism by testing the ship as
though in war, with a full political background to set tone and flavor. The situation
consisted of an overall 28 day mission consisting of individual, but interlinked,
scenarios. The scenarios were developed to examine the ship's capability to operate
as a fleet asset and to stress the installed combat systems' capabilities against the
threat. They were designed to provide a realistic threat in an operational
environment and an element of surprise to provide realistic tests to support
completion of the OT&E objectives and resolutions of the COIs. The Commanding
Officer, Combat Information Centre team and the ship's crew were allowed to
respond to the tactical situation as they perceived it.[Ref. 31:p. IV-9] To enforce
realism, operational message traffic flow at the same rate that could be expected in
a conflict was maintained and Damage Control incidents were introduced.
d. Limitations to Scope of Testing
Despite the efforts for realism, certain practical considerations, time
restrictions and resource constraints limited the scope of operational testing. These
were [Ref. 31:p. IV-10]:
• Targets and ECM did not fully replicate the threat in numbers and
characteristics thus precluding fully threat representative raids.
• The CIWS, ESM and ECM were not tested using drone targets. Manned
aircraft were used for ESM and ECM tests and a towed target was used for
CIWS firings.
• The number of missiles available precluded reengagements and multiple
salvo engagements in some scenarios.
• The geographical location of test ranges and their facility and equipment
66
limitations precluded fully threat representative target presentations, target
density and open ocean geometries.
• The duration of the operational testing precluded determination of reliability
and other suitable parameters, forcing the use of development testing data
where credible and applicable.
• Operations were not conducted in all weather, temperature, humidity, and
wind and sea conditions.
e. DDG-51 OT&E Analysis
The OT&E of DDG-51 highlighted a number of overall
considerations. [Ref. 21]
(1) Interfaces. Interfaces are important to consider in whole ship
testing, particularly individual systems with their own TEMPS and test plans. Whole
ship OT&E looks at whole mission system and ship performance e.g., not just sonar
performance but ASW system performance. Problems occur with concurrent sub-
system and whole ship testing due to different critical issues and objectives of
testing which create conflicts during testing. One overall test plan resolving these
issues is required.
(2) Statistical Significance. Some tests, e.g., Tomahawk firing, can
only be done once. To achieve results of statistical significance, a number of
simulation runs were conducted using new and varied scenarios. The one firing was
then used to verify the simulation. This demonstrates the use of simulation to extend
the test results.
(3) Qualitative vs. Quantitative. Effort was made throughout DDG-51
OT&E to use quantitative thresholds based on quantitative numbers, whereas,
previous OT&E of the AEGIS class cruisers (CG-47) qualitatively assessed all
COIs.
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(4) Operationally Realistic Scenarios. To improve the measurement of
AAW mission performance against a threat representative target in a threat
operational scenario, particularly in the light of the "Iranian Airbus" issue, AAW
scenarios now do not necessarily include everything that flies is hostile. To add to
the operational flavor, a political situation and Rules of Engagement (ROE) are used
during OT&E. These ROEs change due to the political situation or opposing force
actions e.g., switching on fire control radar. This level of testing adds to the analysis
problem e.g., having to cross the Electronic Warfare detection of a Fire Control
radar to the aircraft, with the subsequent need for overall exercise analysis.
(5) Crew Stress under Battle Conditions. The DDG-51 OT&E
program include the measurement of crew stress under battle conditions, both
during the land based and at sea testing. They observed that the land based level of
operator performance was significantly better than at sea. The USN is continuing to
pursue methods to take measurements to determine how much of the performance
degradation from land based testing to at sea testing is a result of the personnel. The
man machine interface, the concept of human factors and operational stress are a
great contributor to overall system performance. One objective of the OT&E
program was to keep the crew busy during the test period.
(6) System Problems vs. People Problems. One aim of OT&E is to
assess the human factors relating to system performance which involves assessing
the adequacy of training, ease of use, etc. It does not include the performance
assessment of an individual. This can sometimes be difficult when people form a
vital part of the system. OPTEVFOR stress they are not drilling the crew, but
demonstrate how the system (which may include people in the loop) responds. It is,
therefore, important for the crew to be 'worked up" to normal fleet standards prior
to OT&E.
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(7) Independent Third Party Data. OT&E needs to be conducted on a
range or with another ship/aircraft to get independent third party data to be able to
reconstruct the evolution. The philosophy of testing is that the item under test is
immediately suspect so if data from this system is required, then it needs to be
verified. It may be sample verified so that 100% duplication is not required.
(8) Program Manager Perception. Although many program managers
may see OT&E as an annoyance and unnecessary burden to their program, PMS 400
sees OT&E as an independent assessment to demonstrate that its on the right track
and doing the right thing. [Ref. 22]
I. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE OT&E ISSUES
U.S. DoD authorities involved in ship OT&E see a number of macroscopic
issues relating to OT&E in the USN today.
1. Impact of Budget Cutbacks
a. Acquisition Strategy
As a result of budget cutbacks, the Secretary of Defence is developing
a new acquisition policy for systems that don't go into a long protracted production
phase. A prototyping acquisition strategy may be implemented where one of kind is
built and the technology is either put on the shelf, or into limited production to keep
defence industry active. More emphasis may be placed on R&D than on production.
Questions arise as to how OT&E fits into an acquisition strategy that does not lead
to production, and should more reliance now be placed on DT&E and less on
OT&E. [Ref. 19] Current thinking is that more importance may be placed on
modeling and simulation to estimate operational effectiveness and operational
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suitability of advanced technical demonstrators, to minimise the operational risk if
production and deployment is required in an emergency.
b. OT&E Conduct
Questions arise also of how OT&E is to be conducted in a reduced
budget environment. With reduced production runs, the relative cost of OT&E in
relation to overall program cost will increase. This may not be seen as acceptable
and pressure may be applied to reduce the absolute cost of OT&E. The breadth of
assessment may be diminished using less test assets. There may be also a possibility
of a central OT&E agency. With DOT&E becoming an increasingly aggressive
participant in OT&E, testing in the future could be directed exclusively by
DOT&E. [Ref. 19]
c. Increasing Modeling and Simulation
Modeling and simulation (M&S) capabilities are going to play a larger
role in contributing to the OT process. Although M&S will never replace operational
testing, it will be able to supplement actual testing to a greater degree in certain
areas. Technological advances in M&S may make these tools now more of a
candidate to be used for OT&E. Typically M&S is more of a study or analysis or
developmental type tool, but are rapidly developing capabilities that will offer
advantages to the OT process. [Ref. 19] [Ref. 21]
2. Operational Realism
Following GAO criticism of lack of realism [Ref. 36] and the "whole ship'
OT&E concept, test scenarios can be expected to be more realistic in the future. To
obtain the maximum benefit from operational tests, they will also need to be more
quantitative. This may include the development of integrated multiwarfare ranges to
support whole ship testing. [Ref. 19] [Ref. 21]
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J. USN OT&E SUMMARY
1. Importance of OT&E
OT&E is the "final exam" in the U.S. DoD acquisition process, an
empirical method of ensuring that sufficient technical return is made on acquisition
investments and that a new system is fully capable of meeting the Fleet's needs prior
to production [Ref. 12]. As a result, the U.S. place high importance on OT&E. The
requirement for the conduct of OT&E is mandated by Congress and incorporated in
the laws of the U.S. OT&E is viewed as being more important as a basis for a
decision to proceed beyond LRIP, than on the introduction into service of the final
production item. This is because the "big bucks" of most Defence acquisitions are
spent during the production phase. OT&E, however, continues to play an important
role in the assessment of systems for Fleet Introduction and has increased its
importance in the assessment of complete ships for Fleet Introduction.
2. Need for OT&E
The USN need for OT&E stems from the almost exclusive reliance by the
U.S. on indigenous weapons development and production. They have a history of
large, risky, developmental programs which push the state of the art in weapons
technology. The outputs of these programs require the assessment of operational
effectiveness and suitability before being committed to production and subsequent
introduction into the fleet. The U.S. has been involved in a number of military
conflicts which demonstrate the need for operationally effective and suitable
systems. The lessons learned from Vietnam, and Gulf operations including the USS
STARK and USS VINCENNES incidents, highlighted problems which DT&E
alone may not identify.
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3. OT&E Agency Independence
Independence is the key to the effectiveness of OT&E in the U.S.
acquisition process. OPTEVFOR is the sole independent OT&E agency within the
USN, reporting directly to CNO, and DOT&E provides independent oversight and
coordination of the military services' planning and execution of OT&E, reporting
directly to the Secretary of Defence. OT&E agency independence is designed to
ensure impartiality, honest and open reporting, with a minimum of political
interference.
4. T&E Delineation
The USN have a clear delineation between the different types of T&E.
OPTEVFOR conduct only OT&E, and OT&E within the USN is conducted solely
by OPTEVFOR. Thus, there appears to be good understanding in the USN of what
is, and what isn't, OT&E.
5. Whole Ship OT&E
Whole ship OT&E is conducted in a dedicated period following CSSQT
and Final Contract Trials, and consists of fully assessed free play, multi-threat
scenarios. The whole ship is viewed as an integrated warfare system, rather than as
a platform for warfare systems.
6. Clear Guidance
The requirement for OT&E, and its organisation and methodology are well
documented within the USN, providing clear guidance to acquisition and operations
personnel. Also, training in OT&E is provided, further improving the capability and
understanding of personnel involved with OT&E.
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7. Summary
The USN OT&E system has, by necessity, developed into a comparatively
well organised, well documented and effective, if complex, system that meets the
requirements of the U.S. Defence acquisition process.
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IV. RAN SHIP OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION
The recent disestablishment of the RAN's independent Operational Test and
Evaluation authority, the RAN Trials and Assessing Unit (RANTAU), and its
subsequent integration with Maritime Headquarters (MHQ), marks a continuing
shift in RAN OT&E policy. This chapter describes the RAN OT&E system, its
relationship with the other categories of T&E and its role in the RAN ship
acceptance process. As RAN T&E documentation does not yet reflect the
disbanding of RANTAU, the OT&E system is described as it was prior to May
1992, and then the new organisation will be introduced.
A. AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Acquisition of major capital equipment for the Australian Defence Force ( ADF)
is managed by the Capital Procurement Organisation (CPO) within the Department
of Defence. The defence system life cycle consists of the following phases:
Conceptual
Demonstration and Evaluation
Full Scale Engineering Development
Production
In Service
Similar, but not identical, to the U.S, system, these phases are generally
separated by the following milestones:
• Program Initiation
• Full Scale Engineering Development
• Production Approval
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• Preliminary Acceptance (PA)/ Delivery
• Acceptance into Naval Service (AINS)
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Figure 9: Australian Acquisition Process for Major Programs
1. Development Vs. Procurement
The completion of all acquisition phases applies only to indigenously
developed systems. Systems procured overseas generally undergo only those phases
from Milestone 3 onwards. Due to the RAN's small size and limited requirements,
it is not practical or achievable to develop all required systems locally. In many
cases, systems with the fundamental capabilities required by the ADF are available
overseas, however, some of these systems require additional development,
adaptation or integration to meet Australian specific requirements. Many of these
systems require only minimal adaptation (e.g., in their communications fit), while
others are more extensive (e.g., ANZAC class frigates and COLLINS class
submarines). This leads to different types of system acquisition programs.
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2. Types of Acquisitions
The following are the principal ways Australia acquires defence
capabilities [Ref. 6: p. 86]:
a. Indigenous Design and Development
Local research and development can be undertaken to meet special
local requirements, or as consequence of research undertaken to maintain the
technology base. The new system is subject to all phases of the acquisition process.
b. Local Development and Production
Naval Adaptation programs in which an overseas design is purchased,
but then undergoes modifications to meet specific RAN requirements. Some
engineering development work may be needed.
c. Local Production ofOverseas Designs
In some cases, the requirements of the ADF can be met most cheaply
and expeditiously by existing overseas systems where there is no economic or
technical prospect of a local competitor. The system may be built locally, where it
would be subject to Production Approval.
d. Import ofOverseas Equipment
Non development programs, where systems are purchased "off-the-
shelf from a foreign source, without modification, are subject to the acceptance
milestones only.
Each of these types of acquisition differ in their technical and operational
risk and hence T&E requirements. In general, Australia has a policy of buying low
risk, operationally proven systems, which may be modified to meet local
requirements.
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R AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE T&E DEFINITIONS
The categories of ship T&E used in the Australian DoD have been derived from
the U.S. DoD instructions, but interpreted to accord with Australian requirements
[Ref. 38:p. 14-1]. There is a hierarchy of documents pertaining to T&E within the
DoD and RAN.
1. DoD T&E Definitions
At the DoD level, the Australian Capital Equipment Procurement Manual
(CEPMAN 1) [Ref. 38] defines the types of T&E applicable to the Australian DoD
as follows:
a. Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
DT&E assists the development specification, design and procurement
process and to verify the attainment of development specifications.
b. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
PAT&E is to assist the development of a procurement specification and
to verify compliance with its requirements. It is generally associated with a
production activity and normally forms the basis of qualified acceptance of the
equipment.
c. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
OT&E is to assist the development of an operational capability
specification and to measure compliance with its requirements. CEPMAN 1 also
defines a sub-grouping within the OT&E classification - the Operational Evaluation
(OPEVAL). An OPEVAL covers tests and evaluation on production representative
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baseline equipment using the maintenance and support personnel and equipment for
normal operational use and aims to:
• Demonstrate operational effectiveness and suitability
• Provide data to assist in the development of tactical aspects of the equipment.
• Verify data, handbooks and documentation covering the operation of the
system.
2. RAN T&E Definitions
These DoD definitions are further refined by the RAN. The Defence
Instruction for RAN Test and Evaluation Policy [Ref. 44] defines the types of T&E
as follows:
a. Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
DT&E denotes that T&E conducted in order to demonstrate the
progressive achievement of design requirements and to show that the article will
meet its technical specifications. DT&E is divided into three phases as shown in
Table 7.
TABLE 7: PHASES OF DT&E [Ref. 44:p. 2]
T&E Type Description
DT-1 Validation of design concept
DT-2 Proving design
DT-3 Demonstration that production meets required technical
characteristics
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b. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
PAT&E denotes that T&E conducted by or on behalf of the
procurement agency to determine whether contracted provisions have been
satisfied. PAT&E is divided into two sections with a total of eight phases as shown
in Table 8.
TABLE 8: PHASES OF PAT&E [Ref. 44:p. 2]
PAT&E Part T&E Type Description
Part 1 PAT-0 Design and engineering development tests
PAT-1 Production and burn-in tests
PAT-2 Environmental qualification tests
PAT-3 System development tests
PAT^ Harbour testing
PAT-5 Sea testing
Part 2 PAT-6 Operational and Qualification Trials
(conducted with OT-3)
PAT-7 Follow on Operational T&E
(conducted with OT^)
c. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
OT&E is that T&E conducted to estimate the operational effectiveness
and suitability by an authority independent of the development and production
agencies. OT&E is divided into five phases as shown in Table 9. Of note is that
Certification/Qualification trials are included in OT-3. These trials consist of
Communications, Emitter and other individual system certifications. These trials
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also include a five to seven week Combat System Ship Qualification Trial (CSSQT)
that:
• Demonstrates the maintainability and operability of those equipments/
systems that are included in the CSSQT program through accomplishment of
equipment/system Planned Maintenance System (PMS), aircraft/balloon
tracking exercises, practice missile firings and culminating in live firing
exercises.
• Provides training and familiarisation to ship personnel in the maintenance
and operation of the installed equipments/systems that are included in the
CSSQT program.
• Identifies design problems in the equipment/system installed.
• Identify any deficiencies that may exist in the CSSQT support elements, i.e.,
documentation, logistics, test equipment or training.
TABLE 9: PHASES OF OT&E [Ref. 44:p. 2]
T&EType Description
OT-1 Operational assessment of the development proposal
OT-2 Demonstration of achievement of program requirements for
operational effectiveness and suitability of a prototype
(OPEVAL) to support proceeding to full production
OT-3 Demonstration of achievement of program requirements for
operational effectiveness and suitability on production of ship/
aircraft/system, normally in independent operations using normal
Fleet personnel. Certification/Qualification TVials include
limited reliability, maintainability, availability and logistic
supportability assessments.
OT4 Demonstration of achievement of program requirements for
operational effectiveness and operational suitability on
production of ship/aircraft/system using normal Fleet personnel
in a multi-force, multi-threat environment, Includes detailed
reliability, maintainability, availability and logistic supportability
assessments.
OT-5 Follow-on OT for assessment after modernisations, new
applications or defect rectifications after OT-4
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C T&E IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
1. The Need for T&E
The most recent Australian Government "White Paper" on defence policy
[Ref. 6: p. 70] states:
We need to be able to determine the performance in our own environment of
equipment of both overseas and local origin and to modify and adapt overseas
equipment as necessary to improve its performance in our likely theatres of
military operations.
Also, the guidance for Australian defence acquisition [Ref. 38:p. 14-1]
recognises that:
The evaluation of military weapons systems and their individual component
systems is essential to this policy. Analysis of the results of testing performed
as part of the Test and Evaluation (T&E) of a capital equipment project may
assist in the identification of problem areas, allow timely corrective action to
be taken, and reduce the element of risk in major decisions.
So the need for local T&E is recognised by the Australian Government and
the DoD, for both indigenous and overseas systems. The responsibility for T&E of
a system rests with organisations with responsibility for the design approval,
certification or procurement of equipment, who have the authority and responsibility
to conduct (or require the conduct of) T&E. All project requirements are coordinated
by the Project Manager, who considers whether or not T&E can be conducted within
available project resources. [Ref. 38:p. 14-2] However, the importance of OT&E in
particular, is not specifically addressed in any of these T&E policy documents.
2. OT&E Contributions at Major Milestones
OT&E in the RAN may be conducted during each phase in the acquisition
process, but it is not essential to a local system meeting a development or production
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milestone, or the local production or purchase decision of an overseas system. It is
however, required before a system achieves Acceptance into Naval Service or
Operational Acceptance. The phasing of T&E during the acquisition process is
































Figure 10: Test & Evaluation in the Acquisition Process [Ref. 44: p. B-l]
The contribution of OT&E to the acquisition milestones includes:
a. OT&E prior to Program Initiation
No role is documented for OT&E in the Conceptual Phase.
b. OT&E prior to Engineering Development Approvol
During the Demonstration and Evaluation Phase, an operational
assessment of the development proposal (OT-1) may be conducted. The results of
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which may contribute to the decision to undertake Full Scale Engineering
Development.
c. OT&E prior to Production Approval
Towards the end of the Full Scale Engineering Development Phase, a
demonstration of achievement of program requirements for operational
effectiveness (OT-2) and suitability of a prototype (OPEVAL) to support
proceeding to full production. This phase may include system/software assessment
at a Land Based Test Site [Ref. 44:p. 2]. The results of OT-2, if conducted, may be
used to support a local production or purchase decision.
d. OT&E prior to Preliminary Acceptance
No role is documented for OT&E in the Production Phase.
e. OT&E prior to Acceptance into Naval Service
Although Figure 10, indicates an OT-3 phase prior to AINS, no specific
requirement is documented in RAN policy for the conduct of OT-3 prior to AINS.
The prerequisites for AINS detailed in Reference 41 p 15.11, are described in terms
of PAT&E Part 2, and make no mention of OT&E. At the working level, however,
the RANTAU Standard Operating Procedure for OT&E [Ref. 53] includes the
conduct of OT-3 prior to AINS, and the results of OT-3 have usually been
considered in the AINS decision.
/ OT&E prior to Operational Acceptance
For first of class ships it will not normally be possible to trial and
evaluate all aspects of the operational performance and maintainability prior to
AINS. Therefore, the first of class usually undergo follow-on OT&E (FOT&E) after
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AINS, leading to Operational Acceptance [Ref. 44:p. A-l]. This OT-4 Phase
consists of:
• Evaluating the ship as part of a force during an exercise, in order to develop
standard operating procedures and tactics, and to explore the limits of
capability, etc.
• Evaluating the maintainability and stores support for equipments and systems
to determine whether or not the complement t, stores allowances,
documentation are adequate. [Ref. 41:p. 15.14]
g. OT&E Contributions post Operational Acceptance
OT-5 is follow-on OT&E for assessment after modernisations, new
applications or defect rectifications after OT-4 [Ref. 44:p. 3].
The OT&E contributions to the Acquisition Milestones are by no means
definitive. There is no documented requirement for the conduct of OT- 1 and/or OT-
2 prior to a production or purchase decision of major acquisitions. The decision to
conduct OT&E being the responsibility of the Sponsor, Project Manager and the
Defence Acquisition Committees. RAN T&E policy documentation almost
exclusively focuses on the post production acceptance phases. Even during the
acceptance phase, however, the requirement for OT-3 is clouded in definition
differences between policy documents. The RAN appears to have its focus on
Production Acceptance Testing, possibly because most systems procured in the past,
were already in service with a large parent Navy. Tactical development was not
necessary because the tactics also were acquired with the system.
3. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation
As defined previously, Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation
(PAT&E) is the testing conducted to demonstrate that systems meet contract
specifications and requirements: also that items/systems are properly installed and
operable onboard the ship. The objective of PAT&E is to confirm that the contractor
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has met contractual obligations, and hence the Commonwealth may correctly take
delivery of the ship. [Ref. 41 :p. 14-2] Much emphasis is given within the RAN to
PAT&E, known under various terms including Inspections, Tests and Trials (ITT),
Harbour Acceptance Trials (HATs) and Sea Acceptance Trials(SATs). In recent years
the RAN has adopted the U.S. Total Ship Test Program (TSTP) concept, initially
with the modernisation of the DDGs, and now in the testing of the locally produced
FFG-7 class, under the Australian Frigate Project. The adoption of the TSTP by the
RAN included the redefinition of the test phases. Where the U.S. system included
only PAT&E, the RAN has included elements of DT&E and OT&E, in addition to
PAT&E, and gave them PAT designations.
a. Integrated Test Package
Under the TSTP, the program and content of the formal ITT required
by the contract is usually designated the Integrated Test Package (ITP). Although in
the Australian system, Government testing is also included. The categories of ITT
testing are listed in Table 10.
TABLE 10: CATEGORIES OF ITT [Ref. 41:p. 14.3]
PAT&E Category T&ET>pe Description
Part 1 PAT-0 Design and engineering development tests
1 PAT-1 Production and burn-in tests
2 PAT-2 Environmental qualification tests
3 PAT-3 System development tests
4 PAT-4 Harbour testing
5 PAT-5 Sea testing
Part 2 6 PAT-6 Ship Operational and Qualification Trials
7 PAT-7 Follow on Operational T&E
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b. Overlap ofPAT&E and OT&E
PAT&E Part 2 covers the period from Preliminary Acceptance to the
AINS and equates to PAT-6. The Project Director has responsibility for the program
and its funding and RANTAU is responsible for the detailed schedule of events and
the provision of test and trials resources. Testing includes:
Ship's staff familiarization, shakedown and safety drills
Installation and testing of specialised equipment
Tempest test
Harbour trials of weapons, communication and combat data systems, etc.
Ship Qualification Trials
Degaussing and Noise Ranging
However, some of these testing activities are also included as part of
OT-3, and both PAT-6 and OT-3 are conducted by the same authority (RANTAU),
during the same period, and using the same T&E personnel. Similarly, the PAT-7
phase equates to OT-4.
D. RAN OT&E ORGANISATION
The RAN community responsible for planning, programming, budgeting and
evaluating OT&E forms an integral part of the more general T&E organisation.
OT&E in the RAN is not treated as being special or unique, and no organisation
deals solely with OT&E. The RAN organisational structure has changed over the
past few years which has impacted on the structure of the OT&E community.
1. OT&E Organisation Elements
The functional elements of an OT&E organisational structure include:&*




• Tester and Evaluator
• User
• Coordinator
a. Policy Maker and Overseer.
There is no clear OT&E policy maker within the Australian DoD or the
RAN. The Chief of Capital Procurement within DoD has a role in the formulation
of capital equipment procurement policy for the guidance of Service Materiel
Divisions. The CPO manual [Ref. 38] addresses T&E, but more in the form of
guidance rather than policy. The Director General of Naval Warfare (DGNW) in the
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS) Division, drafted the RAN Test and Evaluation
Policy Defence Instruction [Ref. 44]. DGNW however, is now defunct with the
result that Test and Evaluation policy for Navy is presently in a state of flux, with
no office having assumed the responsibility [Ref. 50].
b. Sponsor
The sponsor is responsible for monitoring operational requirements and
warfare concepts, the development of concepts for operations for naval warfare
systems, and the raising of staff targets and requirements as required. He/She is also
responsible for the subsequent trials and continuing overview to ensure that the
equipment meets the requirement. Originally the responsibility of DGNW, this
function for major acquisitions was assumed by the Director General Force
Development (Sea) in Headquarters, Australian Defence Force (HQADF). This
centralised force development and user requirements organisation produces the
Naval Capability Proposals (NCP). The decision to subject an acquisition to T&E is
initially decided by the sponsor and detailed in the capability proposal [Ref. 44: p. 1]
87
c. Developing Agency
When a project is approved, a project office is formed within the
Materiel Division responsible for acquisition of the capital equipment to meet the
approved NCP. The nature and extent of the T&E to be conducted will be decided
by the Project Director in consultation with the Design Approval Authority and
RANTAU and detailed in the TEMP [Ref. 44:p. 1]. The Project Manager, in
consultation with operational, technical and maintenance authorities, is to fully
investigate the necessity for, and likely scope of. Defence T&E [Ref. 38:p. 14-5].
a\ Operational Tester and Evaluator
The RAN Trials and Assessing Unit (RANTAU) was the RAN's
OT&E authority with a mission to provide an independent evaluation, audit and
training service in response to current and future Maritime Force requirements.
Located in North Sydney, near the main Fleet Base, the trials related functions of
RANTAU included[Ref. 43:p. 1]:
• Conduct of operational effectiveness and operational suitability trials on
ships and facilities under construction, modernisation, conversion or
extended refit in support of AINS.
• Conduct test and evaluations, investigations and inspections of selected
equipment when tasked.
• Audit and witness selected Harbour Acceptance Trials (HATS), Sea
Acceptance Trials (SATS) and Test Procedures which have operational
implications for ships and facilities (now known as PAT 4 and 5).
• Conduct Ship Qualification Trials.
RANTAU, although the OT&E authority, also conducted PAT&E on
behalf of Project Directors and/or the Maritime Commander. With the
disestablishment of RANTAU in May 1992, the trials functions were transferred to
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the Commander, Test and Evaluation (CTE) under the Chief Staff Officer
(Engineering) in the Maritime Command.
e. User
The Maritime Commander, and the individual ships' Commanding
Officers and crews are the ultimate users of a ship, RAN T&E documentation,
however, does not address their involvement in T&E. The Commanding Officer of
a ship under test usually provides RANTAU with his opinions on the ship's
performance at the conclusion of a trials period.
/ Coordinator
The Director of Naval User Requirements (DNUR), under DGNW,
once acted as the Navy Office representative for RANTAU within Navy Office,
Canberra. He provided a coordination/liaison role between RANTAU and the
Materiel Division, by attending project meetings and highlighting T&E
requirements.
2. Changes to the RAN OT&E Organisation
The OT&E organisation within the RAN has changed dramatically over the
past few years. Figure 1 1 illustrates the OT&E organisation in 1987. The Director,
RANTAU (of Captain rank) was directly responsible to the Assistant Chief of Naval
Staff - Development (ACDEV-N). Also under ACDEV-N, the Director General
Naval Warfare (DGNW) sponsored all major acquisitions, and gave T&E policy
direction. Under DGNW, the Director of Naval User Requirements (DNUR),
provided RANTAU representation and performed an OT&E coordination role
within Navy Office. Thus the OT&E authority was responsible to the developer of



















Figure 11: RAN OT&E Organisation circa. 1987
By 1990, the structure outlined in Figure 12 had developed. With the
centralisation of military policy development and resource planning, the
Development Division within the RAN was disbanded. DGNW, with reduced user
requirement responsibilities, moved under the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS),
The emerging HQADF now became the Sponsors for major acquisitions. The
Director General Force Development (Sea) (DGFD(SEA)) having particular
responsibility for "Sea" Capability Proposals [Ref. 54]. DGNW, however, retained
responsibility for T&E policy within the RAN. RANTAU was also transferred under
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DCNS. As the sponsorship of major acquisitions was now held by HQADF, the
OT&E authority was now no longer responsible to the developer of the user


















Figure 12: RAN OT&E Organisation circa. 1990
By the end of May 1992 (Figure 13), RANTAU was disestablished and its
trials functions were transferred to the Maritime Commander as the Commander
Test and Evaluation (CTE) under the Chief Staff Officer (Engineering) (CSO(E)).
DGNW was dissolved and his now reduced functions were assumed by the Director
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Naval Warfare (DNW) under the newly created Director General Naval Policy and

















Figure 13: RAN OT&E Organisation post May 1992
So, as a result of reorganisations over the past five years, the RAN has no
T&E, let alone OT&E, policy maker and overseer. It also has no OT&E coordinator
within Navy Office and the RAN's OT&E authority is buried within the in-service
engineering management area of the Maritime Command. The OT&E authority,
however, remains independent from the developing and production agencies.
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E. RAN OT&E POLICY
RAN OT&E policy is embedded in the more general T&E policy.
1. Policy Documentation
The following documents outline the RAN T&E policy:
a. Capital Equipment ProcurementManual (CEPMAN 1)
Australian DoD T&E policy has its basis in the Capital Equipment
Procurement Manual (CEPMAN l)[Ref. 38], the aim of which is to assist project
managers in assessing the need for T&E in a project and to provide guidelines for
its conduct. The document provides broad T&E policy and, other than defining
OT&E, little policy is provided as to its conduct.
b. DI(N) LOG 82-1, RAN Test and Evaluation Policy
The top level T&E policy document for the RAN is the Defence
Instruction (Navy) on RAN Test and Evaluation Policy [Ref. 44]. Its purpose is to
issue policy for the conduct of T&E in capital procurement and modernisation
projects in the RAN.
c. ABR1921
ABR 1921 [Ref. 41], contains T&E and acceptance policy applicable to
ships building, undergoing modernisation, conversion or extended refit. Although it
refers to OT&E under PAT&E Part 2, it does not address OT&E specifically.
2. T&E Decisions
RAN T&E policy [Ref. 44: p. 2] states that the decision to subject an
acquisition to T&E is initially decided by the Sponsor and detailed in the Capability
Proposal. The nature and extent of the T&E is then decided by the Project Director
in consultation with the Design Approval Authority and RANTAU. Any conflict
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over the requirement, nature and/or extent of the proposed T&E is resolved by
DCNS and ACMAT-N for operational and design matters respectively. However, in
practice, the nature and extent of T&E is broadly decided by the Sponsor, and the
Project Director is responsible after consultation with the DAA and the Trials
Authority [Ref. 45].
3. Independence.
The independence of a testing authority is recognised in general terms in
CEPMAN 1 [Ref. 38] which recognises that independent verification and validation
(IV&V) is an important means of providing early detection of problems, and that it
can have value and credibility. However, it implies that "independence" means
independent from the Defence Department, i.e., contractors. With respect to OT&E,
CEPMAN 1 compromises the independence of an OT&E authority by stating that
the Design Approval Authority (DAA), which is part of the Developing Agency, is
responsible for the assessment of the acceptability of the product design as a basis
for Acceptance into Service. It provides for the DAA being involved in offering
support to trials establishments (as required) during OT&E in order to provide DAA
advice to the Project Manager on the suitability of the product for Acceptance into
Service. [Ref. 38:p. 14-7] This appears to be more applicable to services other than
the RAN, as the DAA within Navy does not advise the PM on the suitability for
AINS.
The RAN T&E Policy DI(N) [Ref. 44:p. 3] is more clear when it states
OT&E is to be conducted progressively by an authority independent of the
development and production agencies (usually RANTAU). With the demise of
RANTAU and the transfer of OT&E responsibilities to CTE on the staff of the
Maritime Commander, independence from the development and production
agencies is maintained.
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4. Use of Contractors
Although the Australian definitions of OT-3 and OT-4 (Table 9) includes the
requirement that the system should be demonstrated "using normal Fleet
Personnel", the documentation makes no policy statement regarding contractor
personnel involvement in system operation or maintenance, during OT&E. It has
been RAN practice (e.g., in the DDG Modernisation Project) to have contractors
onboard resolving technical problems during the SQT period, which is included as
part of OT-3 in the RAN.
5. T&E Planning
The RAN uses the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) as the single,
executive, long range planning document for T&E in a project. The TEMP is to be
raised in draft form as early as practicable. Based on the USN format, it is the
ultimate responsibility of the project sponsor because it is the primary tool to ensure
the user requirement is met. However, during the period when there is a full time
Project Office, TEMP coordination is normally carried out by the T&E Manager in
the Project Office. RANTAU (now CTE) as the OT&E authority provides the OT&E
input. The TEMP is endorsed by all affected organisations and is released jointly by
the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS), and the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff-
Materiel (ACMAT-N), as the Developing Agency. If any issues remain unresolved
at this level, the TEMP will be resolved by the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS). [Ref.
44:pp. 4-5] The authority for DCNS to release the TEMP was based on his role as
Project Sponsor. With HQADF now assuming this role, the DCNS function in
TEMP development is unclear.
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6. Combined DT&E and OT&E
Although not specifically addressed as such, combined DT&E, (PAT&E)
and OT&E is implied as being condoned and almost mandatory within the RAN.
The T&E DI(N) [Ref. 44:p. 3] states that OT-3 and OT-4 will incorporate the
requirements of PAT-6 and PAT-7 Inspection Tests and Trials as described in ABR
1921. It also states that OT-3 will be conducted during Ship Qualification Trials. No
limitations or guidance as to the possible hazards of this approach are addressed.
7. Modeling & Simulation
The use of models and simulation (M&S) in OT&E are not addressed by
the RAN documentation, and their application to OT&E has been limited.
Simulation and stimulation were used extensively during DT&E by both the
Submarine Warfare Systems Centre (SWSC) and the Combat Data System Centre
(CDSC) for the Submarine Weapons Update Program (SWUP) and DDG
Modernisation respectively. However, Major combatant OT&E applications of
M&S within the RAN have been limited to the DDG Modernisation Project. M&S
developed by the Maritime Systems Division of the Defence Science and
Technology Organisation were used by RANTAU for the evaluation of the upgraded
combat and weapons systems in the Modernised DDGs.
8. Foreign Weapons Evaluation
Despite the most recent Australian Government "White Paper" on Defence
Policy [Ref. 6:p. 70] requiring the need to be able to determine the performance in
the Australian environment of equipment of both overseas and local origin, no DoD
or RAN T&E policy specifically addresses the evaluation of foreign systems.
Although, almost all of the systems procured by the RAN in recent years are
96
"foreign" in origin, the RAN documentation focuses on the T&E process for the
progressive evaluation of locally developed systems.
9. OT&E Funding
OT&E is funded separately within a project and is estimated and bid for by
RANTAU to Project Directors. [Ref. 44: p. 6]
10. Land Based Test Sites
The guidance for OT&E using land based test sites includes a statement that
system centres and simulators will be employed for early stages of OT&E if
available [Ref. 44:p. 4], and that OT-2 may be conducted at a land-based test site
[Ref. 44:p. 3].
11. Ship OT&E
The RAN recognises that some major acquisition projects will be treated
differently to others in so far as protracted construction time usually precludes T&E
of a prototype before the decision to proceed to production. The degree of technical
risk will be assessed in each case and, where considered sufficient, the decision
taken to use land-based test sites and/or prove a particular system in another
platform. When this occurs, DT-2 and OT-2 shall be conducted at the test site and
the "whole ship" evaluation undertaken as soon as practicable after delivery.
F. RAN SHIP ACCEPTANCE
1. Policy
The decision to accept a new or modified ship into the RAN is vested in the
Chief of Naval Staff (CNS). An Acceptance Board is established to provide an
assessment of the ship and submit recommendations upon which CNS can base his
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acceptance decision. The assessment of a ship leading to an acceptance decision has
two distinct components [Ref. 41 :p. 15.7]:
• Determining where the ship as built and tested does not meet the Agreed Ship
Characteristics, contracted performance specifications and approved support
standards.
• Deciding whether those Agreed Ship Characteristics, performance
specifications and support standards accord with current policies standards
and practices.
The Acceptance Board (AB) is an independent body established by CNS to
make recommendations for CNS's acceptance into RAN service of new
construction or modernised ships, submarines, aircraft, and, where directed, new
systems, installations and equipment. Usually established for each new ship type
and only for first of class, a Board is composed of a President, a Vice President (VP),
and additional members selected from appropriate specialist areas. The President,
VP and Board members serve on the Board part time. The Board is administered by
the Director, RANTAU (now CTE) who is an ex officio member, assisted by a full
time Secretary. [Ref. 42:pp. 1-3] The AB's sole function is to advise CNS on
acceptance matters, and it is essentially a board of review.
The RAN divides acceptance into three phases:
• Preliminary Acceptance
• Acceptance into Naval Service
• Operational Acceptance
2. Definitions
The "Delivery Commissioning and Acceptance" chapter of Reference 41
provides the definitions for the acceptance process:
• "Delivery" occurs when the ship is contractually delivered from the
98
contractor's ownership to the Government.
• "Preliminary Acceptance" is an assessment by the RAN to determine if the
ship has reached both material and support status sufficient to safely and
effectively proceed with the Navy trials and evaluation program. It usually is
concurrent with Delivery.
• "Acceptance into Naval Service" (AINS) signifies the acceptance of the ship
as a fully operational unit of the Fleet, based on operational performance and
support levels obtained at that time.
• "Operational Acceptance" is carried out only on the first of class to
supplement the AINS assessment using additional operational and support
experience gained with the Fleet to refine the vessel and Naval
Requirements.
3. Responsibilities
Delivery of the ship to the Government is a contractual matter and is
managed by the Project Director. Once delivered, the process is one of 'offer and
accept' whereby the ship is offered by the Project Director to CNS for acceptance.
RANTAU's responsibility is to conduct the Acceptance Trials and report the results.
The Acceptance Board does not conduct tests, trials or inspections, but may witness
them if required. [Ref. 42] The Acceptance Board roles are as follows:
• Be satisfied that a comprehensive and properly supervised series of
inspections, tests, trials and evaluations have been carried out to the point
where assessments can be made on current suitability for operational service
on the basis of the approved current requirements.
• Assess the ship, aircraft or equipment, by examining reports of materiel
inspections, operational trials and evaluations, attending trials as required
and calling for such other tests or evaluations as necessary.
• Be satisfied that current, relevant and approved documents when
promulgated describe the required operational characteristics against which
the item for acceptance can be tested and evaluated for operational
suitability, operational effectiveness and supportability in service.
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4. Procedure
The completion process for a warship entering service is outlined in Figure
14. This process may be divided into two distinct parts:
• Those events leading to and culminating in delivery / preliminary acceptance.
















Figure 14: RAN Ship Acceptance Schedule and Milestones
a. Delivery I Preliminary Acceptance
Delivery of the ship to the Government is a contractual matter and is the
prerogative of the Project Director acting on behalf of ACMAT-N and the
Commonwealth of Australia [Ref. 41 :p. 15.3]. Immediately prior to delivery, the AB
will advise CNS whether the ship has reached a materiel and support status suitable
for Preliminary Acceptance. Preliminary Acceptance assures CNS that the vessel is
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considered safe for a Naval crew to take control of the vessel from the contractor and
conduct outstanding RAN trials of equipment at sea or undertake specific trials for
AINS assessment. [Ref. 41 :p. 15.10]
b. Acceptance into Naval Service
Acceptance into Naval Service is essentially the acceptance/transfer of
the ship from the acquisition part of the Navy (ACMAT-N) to the inservice
operations and support areas, as having met the user requirement. The AINS
assessment is carried out on completion of the Post Delivery Availability (PDA)
Trials Period, at which point the ship should be in a materiel state ready for
operational service. Post delivery trials leading to AINS include the SQT period,
with harbour and sea elements. While the PD is responsible for the PAT&E
program, RANTAU is responsible for the detailed planning and witnessing of the
trials program consulting with the PD. During these trials, the PD may provide a full
time trials coordinator onboard to assist the Commanding Officer and the other trials
authorities. [Ref. 41:pp. 15.10 - 15.12] On completion of the trials period, the AB
will advise CNS whether the materiel and support state of the ship is sufficient for
it to enter service as an operational unit of the Fleet, and hence it can be accepted
into naval service [Ref. 42:p. 4].
c. Operational Acceptance
For a first of class ship it will normally not be possible to trial and
evaluate all aspects of the operational performance and maintainability prior to
AINS without the duration of the PAT&E Part 2 program becoming excessive and
because certain aspects can only be evaluated in the operational environment. This
follow-on T&E period is conducted following AINS and is compiled by RANTAU
in consultation with the Naval and Maritime Headquarters Staff. It comprises a
series of trials and evaluations to assess operational effectiveness and operational
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suitability. [Ref. 41 :p. 15.14] Typical examples of these activities in the FOT&E
program are:
• the evaluation of the ship as part of a force during an exercise, in order to
develop standard operating procedures and tactics, and to explore the limits
of capability, etc.
• evaluation of the maintainability and stores support for equipments and
systems, to determine whether or not the complement, stores allowances,
documentation, etc. are adequate.
Typically, the Follow-on T&E program will last from 12-24 months,
depending on the class of ship. At the end of this period RANTAU compiles a report
in consultation with Maritime Headquarters Staff, the ship and other authorities as
appropriate, indicating:
• The results of the trials and evaluations
• Whether any changes are recommended to the proposals by the PD for
correcting deficiencies which were extant at the end of PAT&E Part 2 trials.
• What additional items, if any should be added to the list of deficiencies and
what action is proposed to overcome them.
The AB assesses the results and provides the overview to ensure the
program is comprehensive. This assessment serves to confirm or modify the
assessment at AINS.
G. RAN OT&E PROCEDURES
Procedures are the methodology by which policy is carried out. This section
discusses the procedures adopted by the RAN in implementing OT&E policy.
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1. User Requirement to the Acceptance Management Plan.
The development of the user requirement, and its subsequent progression
through to the OT&E test documentation (Figure 15) is through the following
documents:
Operational Concept Paper (OCP)
Defence Force Capability Proposal (DFCP)
Required Operational Characteristics (ROC)
Approved Ship Characteristics(ASC)
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
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Figure 15: Progressive Definition of OT&E Documentation
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a. Operational Concept Paper (OCP)
The strategic basis of papers (DOA-87 [Ref. 6] and ASP-90 [Ref. 5])
provide endorsed Government policy guidance for force structure planning. These
documents identify ADF roles and establish broad priorities for capability
development. From this guidance. Operational Concept Papers are produced by
HQADF to identify the way ahead for specific force structure issues. [Ref. 54: p. A-4]
b. Defence Force Capability Proposal (DFCP)
Against the background of an OCP, a Defence Force Capability
Proposal (DFCP) is developed by HQADF. The DFCP is the document against
which specifications are produced and ultimately the proposed solution is evaluated
as being suitable for service use. [Ref. 54:p. A-5]
c. Required Operational Characteristics (ROC)
To meet the overall requirements of the DFCP, more specific
requirements may be described in the Required Operational Characteristics.
d. Agreed Ship Characteristics (ASC)
More detailed requirements, usually for ship programs, are developed
into the Agreed Ship Characteristics (sometimes termed Approved Ships
Characteristics). Other subordinate performance documentation may be developed
also.
e. Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
For a new ship design, the standards against which the ship is assessed
are those derived from the then approved DFCP, ship characteristics and policies.
These standards are developed into a TEMP which details the responsibilities for the
specification of requirements, objectives, criteria and conduct of T&E, together with
the schedule of activities, resources and key contractual dates. The most important
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part of the TEMP is the statement of Critical Operational Issues (COI) which are
either of high technical risk or vital to the continuing development process. These
issues may not be dependent on thresholds, but should cover all areas that affect the
systems capability to accomplish its mission in a combat related environment. [Ref.
44:p. 5]
/ Acceptance Management Plan (AMP)
The Trials Authority develops management plans for the trials it
conducts. Where those trials lead to AINS, the management plan is termed the
Acceptance Management Plan. The AMP takes the COIs from the TEMP and details
the tests and trials necessary to evaluate them to support an AINS decision.
Similarly a Follow on OT&E (FOTE) Management Plan may be produced detailing
the trials for the OT-4 phase. The detailed trials plans are developed from these
management plans.
g. Summary
As in the USN, the hierarchy of requirements documentation in the
RAN provides the linkage from capability requirement to operational test program
necessary to evaluate the Final product against the user requirement.
2. Assessment of Operational Effectiveness
The RAN has found it difficult to define exactly what is required to assess
operational effectiveness. The RANTAU guidance on the conduct of OT&E [Ref.
53] recognises that the user requirement is the bench mark for determining the
degree to which a product is effective. Also that operational effectiveness is best
assessed by a performance demonstration by normal operating personnel in the
normal or given environment. But otherwise provides very little guidance on the
assessment of operational effectiveness. Techniques employed involve analysing
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each COI and employing modified Ship Qualification Trial and Fleet Exercise
Program techniques to evaluate them. Use has also been made of simulation,
weapon analysis and exercise analysis. The lack of suitable range facilities has also
limited the assessment of operational effectiveness.
This lack of operational effectiveness assessment capability in the RAN is
due to most systems being acquired from large parent Navies. Consequently, the
RAN has seldom had the need to assess operational effectiveness for itself. The
Submarine Project is acquiring a variety of ranges for DT&E applications, e.g., the
measurement of signatures, manoeuvreing characteristics, weapon control
characteristics, etc. These ranges may also be suitable to support OT&E.
3. Assessment of Operational Suitability
The assessment of operational suitability in the RAN has been
controversial, particularly the assessment of supportability. This quote from the then
Director of Naval Integrated Logistic Support Management [Ref. 40] in 1987
highlights a particular viewpoint:
While there are clearly visible yardsticks by which production or weapon
system performance can be measured, the success of logistic planning is to an
extent invisible. Shortcomings in the assessment and provision of support will
only become evident due to operational failure. All that RANTAU or the Ship
Acceptance Board can do is make a subjective judgement as to whether all
necessary ILS elements have been addressed and ensure that an acceptable
follow on logistic support and enhancement process has been set in place.
Before 1987, the assessment of ILS, a subset of operational suitability, was
rather subjective. The assessment of supportability, for example, consisted of a
review of allowance lists by experienced technical specialists where potential
deficiencies were highlighted. The ILS community were concerned that the onboard
spares allowances developed by detailed logistic support analysis, were being
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subject to a relatively simplistic, qualitative assessment. Similarly the assessment of
Reliability Maintainability and Availability (RM&A) was superficial with only
those defects noted during the operational assessment period (from five to seven
weeks) being analysed. A new approach was taken in 1987 to the assessment of
operational suitability, and to ILS in particular. The assessment process has
continued to be refined with the areas in Table 1 1 now assessed:









Integrated Logistic Support including:
Maintenance Planning
Supply Support
Support and Test Equipment
Technical Data and Documentation
Manpower and Personnel
Training and Training Devices
Facilities
Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transport
Computer Support
Configuration Control
a. Suitability Assessment Procedure
Safety is assessed by inspection and observation during system
operation. Human factors, interoperability and compatibility are assessed by
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observation during operational effectiveness testing. The assessment of ILS is
conducted in two phases:
( 1
)
ILS Structural Review. Conducted prior to operational testing, this
review assesses if the ILS intended to provided will support the ILS policy of the
Project. It consists primarily of a review of the ILS Plan and discussions with the
functional areas handling the support.
(2) ILS Operational Review. During the operational testing period, the
ship's ILS related documentation and records are reviewed, maintainability
demonstrations are performed and a supportability assessment is conducted. The
supportability assessment still consists of a review of the allowance lists by
experienced technicians, but now it also includes an analysis of spares usage and
availability, from the time records are commenced to the end of the operational
testing.
RM&A is assessed by the collection and analysis of data during the OT-
3 phase of operational testing to give an indication of performance prior to AINS,
and then continued for 12 months during the OT-4 phase. The RAN is currently
developing a routine in-service RM&A data collection and analysis system,
however, until that is operational, the data is collected and analysed on an *as
required' basis by the Trials Authority.
4. OT&E Reporting
RANTAU coordinates the issue of trials reports which are issued on
completion of each segment of OT&E e.g., o/c ASW phase of OT-3 etc. Afinal trials
report is issued to the AB for inclusion in their AINS report.
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5. OT&E Coordination
A T&E Planning Group is formed prior to TEMP development under the
leadership of the T&E manager for the project. Foundation members of the TEPG
are the Project Director, Project Sponsor, the Design Approval Authority and
RANTAU, with other parties seconded/called upon as required. [Ref. 44:p. 5] The
TEPG analyses T&E requirements and estimates resources required to meet the
requirements.
6. OT&E Personnel Selection and Training
Although OT&E is a specialised discipline with its own philosophy and
methodology, the RAN has no training courses on OT&E, or on T&E in general. A
number of officers have completed the USN Operational Test Directors Course in
recent years which has improved the knowledge and understanding of OT&E within
CTE's organisation considerably. These courses have been arranged on an ad-hoc
basis through overseas visit submissions rather than as pre-requisite courses for
particular billets. No special selection criteria is involved for posting OT&E
personnel or project T&E managers. Although some personnel may develop into
OT&E specialists, no career path is consciously provided.
H. RAN OT&E IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of OT&E policy within the RAN maybe demonstrated by
reviewing examples of ship OT&E conducted to date, and that planned for ships due
to enter service in the near future.
1. DDG Modernisation Project
The RAN has three DDGs built in the USA to a modified "Charles F.
Adams" (DDG-2 class) design. These ships underwent a major modernisation and
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refit over the period 1987-1991. The major modernisation occurred with the ships'
combat system, command and control system, sensors and weapons, with the aim of
increasing the 'supportability' of the systems rather than increasing the ships'
capability [Ref. 39]. The upgrade was similar to that undertaken on a small number
of USN DDGs. Most of the systems were imported and installed locally, however,
the combat system operational program was developed in Australia. The risk of the
project failing to meet operational requirements was low, but the RAN needed to
quantify the operational effectiveness and operational suitability of the modernised
DDG.
OT&E consisted of an OT-3 assessment during a normal SQT period, prior
to workup and the Operational Readiness Evaluation. This was followed by an OT-
4 phase, termed a Combat System Evaluation (CSE), for the first of class. This OT-
4 was event based and was completed over a 12 month period, integrated with the
normal ships program. Procedures developed during the OT&E for the DDG
Modernisation included the use of the Combat System Trainer (CST) van for
simulating complex AAW engagements, the use of system modelling and analysis
by the Weapons Systems Research Laboratory (WSRL), and the use of new ILS and
RM&A data collection and assessment procedures.
DDG Modernisation was a low operational risk project. The OT&E
followed the established RAN policy, however, it was the first to actually implement
an OT-4 period to more fully assess operational effectiveness and operational
suitability leading to OA.
2. Australian Frigate Project
Two US FFG-7 class frigates, known as Australian Frigates (AF), are being
built in Australia. The frigates, FFG-06 and FFG-07, are being built to the HMAS
DARWIN FFG-04 (USN FFG-44) configuration baseline except that the AN/SQS-
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56 sonar is replaced with the Australian Mulloka sonar. Changes to the configuration
were kept to a minimum commiserate with safety and operational improvements
approved for incorporation into FFG-04.[Ref. 51:p. ix] All the identified equipment/
system differences between HMAS DARWIN and the AFs had undergone T&E
prior to installation in FFG-05.
As the AFs have an almost identical configuration to the last FFG-7 class
purchased from the U.S., the major risk was in the production, not in the operational
effectiveness and suitability of the finished product, hence OT&E was limited to an
OT-3 period. The objective of OT&E for the AFs is to ensure that the user
requirements have been met, and to provide an estimate of operational effectiveness
and suitability in the RAN operating environment prior to release of the ship to
operational service. The OT&E comprises an OT-3 period, which assesses the AF
against the baseline established by HMAS DARWIN, including any approved
changes. [Ref. 51 :p. 10] The scope of OT-3 includes a Light Off Examination, Test
Procedures, CSSQT and Post PSA Trials. OT-3 is being conducted on each ship and
involves:
Installation Inspections
Harbour Phase System Qualification Trials
Sea Phase System Qualification Trials
Communications System Operability Trials





As the significant operational difference in the AFs is the Mulloka sonar, an
Operational Performance Demonstration (OPD) was planned to determine if the AF
can fulfil it's ASW roles and functions with the Mulloka sonar. One week of trials
was planned during the OT-3 period to ensure that the Mulloka sonar system had
been correctly installed and met its operational performance characteristics. This
period was found to be insufficient, primarily due to technical problems, and a
"mini-OPEVAL" is now planned to quantify the system's performance. [Ref. 61 :p.















Figure 16: Australian Frigate Acceptance Schedule
The TEMP, governing all tests, trials, and evaluations up to AINS, was
produced as an Australian Frigate Addendum to the U.S. FFG-7 Class TEMP. A Post
Delivery Test and Trials Plan [Ref. 52] was produced to serve as an advance
planning document and an implementation plan.
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An Acceptance Board was established, initially for FFG-05 only. The
PDT&T Plan includes the requirement that the AB is responsible for providing the
Final Contract Trials agenda and conducting the trials[Ref. 52:p. 3-17], which is not
in accordance with RAN AB policy. In its report at AINS, the AB considered that the
application of the AB process was worthwhile and recommended that it should be
followed for FFG-06, which is contrary to RAN policy of establishing the Board for
first of class only. The Board also noted that acceptance documentation was
contradictory and unclear. [Ref. 61 :p. 2]
The AF is a low operational risk project, except for the addition of the
Mulloka sonar. The OT&E followed the established RAN policy, however, it failed
to plan an OT-4 period to more fully assess operational effectiveness and operational
suitability of the Mulloka sonar. An OPEVAL to fully assess the performance of the
sonar has now been included.
3. ANZAC Ship Project
Australia and New Zealand are cooperating in the building of the ANZAC
frigate. Essentially a Blohm and Voss MEKO 200 design incorporating a
combination of European and US equipment, the design is classified as low risk,
although modifications to the design were necessary to meet Australian
requirements and to facilitate construction in Australia. [Ref. 58]
a. ANZAC Ship OT&E
OT&E for the ANZAC ships is currently planned to include:
(1) OT-2 during which RANTAU may witness specific contractor
testing, and elect to conduct initial operational evaluation using the facilities
provided as part of the Combat System Support Centre, a LBTS established initially
for the conduct of DT&E, and then to provide in-service system support.
113
(2) OT-3 consisting of a series of trials conducted to provide an initial
assessment of the operational effectiveness and suitability of the ANZAC ship
against the user requirement culminating in AINS. OT-3 will test the critical
operational issues and will involve sea trials in an operational environment and a
Ship Qualification Trial (SQT). OT-3 will be conducted on each ship.
(3) OT-4 consisting of a follow-on series of trials conducted to further
assess the operational characteristics of the ANZAC ships, particularly as an
integrated unit in ASW, ASUW, AAW and utility roles. This will be conducted on
the first of class only and includes participation in two major exercises with multi-
threat environments, and appropriate freeplay.[Ref. 57] Both OT-3 & 4 will also
involve an RM&A assessment over a two year period.
Although only in the early stages, the planned OT&E for the ANZAC ship
follows the established RAN policy, with the OT-3 period combined with the SQT,
being conducted prior to AINS. The ship class has a higher operational risk than
either the modernised DDG or the AF.
4. COLLINS Class Submarine Project
In 1987 the Swedish Kockums Type 471 design was selected to meet the
requirements for the RAN's new submarine. The six boats will be the first
submarines to be constructed in Australia and will have a unique equipment fit.
Work on Submarine 01 began in February 1990, with the launch planned for
1993.[Ref. 60] Post delivery T&E activities, proposed by CTE, to be conducted by
the RAN are outlined in Table 12.
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Subject of ITT / T&E
CAT 6 DT-3 First of Class Trials - Submarine 01
OT-3 OPEVAL- Submarine 01
PAT-6 Submarines 02 to 06
CAT 7 OT^ Submarines 01,02 and 03 (possibly)
o. CAT 6 Testing
CAT 6 testing consists of Safety and Operational Work-ups, First of
Class Trials, Operational Certification Trials, and OPEVAL.
(1) First of Class Trials (DT-3). These trials will establish the actual
performance of the COLLINS design and the in-service safe operating limits and
conditions for the class.
(2) PAT-6. These trials will be the Operational Certification Trials
conducted after delivery in support of AINS of the particular submarine. The criteria
will be based on applicable thresholds in the Agreed Ship Characteristics and the
results of First of Class Trials with submarine 01. The principal events in PAT 6
include:
Safety and operational work-up
Manoeuvreing trials
Weapon handling and discharge
Combat system operation, including weapon firings
Signature measurements
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(3) OT-3. These trials are planned to evaluate the first of class only,
after delivery, conducted in order that, in conjunction with the results of PAT&E
Part 2, a recommendation for AINS may be made. OT-3 includes an ILS and RM&A
assessment, and an OPEVAL of four to six weeks during which the submarine will
be tasked to conduct a series of operations representative of the mission profiles
against simulated threats and targets of interest. These trials may be reduced after
experience with the first submarine.
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Figure 17: HMAS COLLINS - Proposed CAT 6 Schedule [Ref. 49]
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Of note is that the OPEVAL is planned to be conducted following the
completion of DT-3, work up and the Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE). So
it will be conducted on a materially proven and operationally worked up submarine.
b. CAT 7 Testing
CAT 7 testing, comprising OT-4 exclusively, will consist of:
(1) Long Term RM&A and ILS Evaluation. This will determine with
greater statistical confidence, the Reliability, Maintainability and Availability of the
submarine class, and assess the implementation of ILS items.
(2) Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) Testing. Some MOEs will
require determination by statistically significant numbers of tests. However, to
minimise resource requirements the tests will be constructed to allow the total test
time and asset requirements to be minimised. To accommodate other scheduling
limitations, this phase will probably occur in a number of stages.
(3) Major Exercise. This phase assesses the performance of the
submarine in the roles required of it during a major exercise.
(4) Operational Deployment. This phase evaluates the performance of
the submarine and the support infrastructure during an operational deployment and
maintenance period in a foreign port.
The proposed CAT 7 schedule is detailed in Figure 18.
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Figure 18: HMAS COLLINS - Proposed CAT 7 Schedule [Ref. 49]
c. Use ofLand Based Test Sites
The submarine project includes the construction of a combat system
simulator and propulsion system simulator, both for system development and
training applications. Some OT&E activities may be conducted by CTE on these
systems at the land based test sties on a non-interfering basis to the contractor. [Ref.
59:p. 20]
d. Collins Class Submarine OT&E Summary
Funding provision for RAN T&E up until AINS has not been included
in the overall financial budgeting for the New Submarine Project [Ref. 59:p. ii]. To
assist in the progressive development of the TEMP and to plan and agree those
activities that will be required for AINS and OA, a TEPG has been established. The
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detailed planning, preparation, execution and reporting of RAN T&E activities is the
responsibility of a subordinate T&E Working Group.
The Collins class submarine possibly has the highest operational risk of
all current major RAN combatant projects. Consequently the increased need for
OT&E has been recognised by CTE. The planned OT&E program demonstrates a
departure from the usual RAN OT&E policy, and reflects a growing awareness
within CTE of the need to separate DT and OT activities, and to include a dedicated
OT-3 period after the usual SQT and ORE.
5. OT&E Implementation Summary
These examples of RAN implementation of ship OT&E policy illustrates a
number of key issues:
• The operational risk of ship projects within the RAN is increasing as the new
RAN combatants have a unique weapons systems configuration.
• OT&E is not generally conducted to support the production or purchase
decision of ships.
• The RAN relies on the results of a combined SQT and OT-3 period to provide
a basis for AINS.
• ILS and RM&A assessments are becoming more effective and credible.
• Modeling and simulation is increasingly being used to assist OT&E.
• Funding of ship OT&E is not being included in original project estimates.
• Acceptance and T&E documentation is contradictory and unclear.
I. RAN OT&E ISSUES
1. What is OT&E?
Although the term "OT&E" in the RAN is defined, and the hierarchy of
Defence and RAN documentation addresses OT&E, the policy for the conduct of
OT&E in the RAN is not specific and is included with general T&E policy.
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Combined with a lack of distinction between DT-3, PAT-6 and OT-3, this leads to the
few specific OT&E policy statements often being contradictory and unclear.
a. Independence ofthe OT&E Authority
OT&E is specified in RAN T&E policy [Ref. 44:p. 3] as being
conducted by an authority independent of the developing and production agencies,
and the results of OT-3 support an AINS decision. However, CPO Manual [Ref.
38:p. 14-7] states that the Design Approval Authority (part of the developing
agency) offers support to trials establishments during OT&E in order to provide
advice to the Project Director on the suitability of the product for Acceptance into
Service. This leads to conflicts between the DAA and the Trials Authority during
the conduct of OT&E.
b. Confusion between DT-3, PAT-6 and OT-3
RAN T&E policy [Ref. 44:pp. 2-3] explains the T&E phases in the
procurement process and then includes a note stating that OT-3 and OT-4 will
incorporate the requirements of PAT-6 and PAT-7 Inspection Tests and Trials as
described in ABR 1921 (Reference 41). ABR 1921 however, defines many tests as
being PAT&E, that RANTAU [Ref. 43] define as OT&E. Also DT-3 is shown as
being conducted during the same period, however, the philosophy, aims, objectives
and methodology of DT&E, PAT&E and OT&E are totally different. Perhaps this
overlap or "blurring" of definitions arose because RANTAU was not only the RAN
OT&E authority, but also the RAN T&E authority who conducted aspects of DT&E
and PAT&E in addition to OT&E. With a large part of its workload devoted to
conducting trials following the routine refit of combatants, RANTAU conducted
HATS and SATS which were understood to be PAT&E and then went on to conduct
the more operational Ship Qualification Trial (SQT) which was perceived to be
OT&E. The SQT period, however, is rarely a free play environment, makes limited
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use of countermeasures, and is conducted prior to the crew being fully worked up.
Also contractors are often still onboard making final adjustments to systems and
assisting the crew with operation and/or maintenance. The SQT is essentially a
PAT&E function which may include some components of the operational
effectiveness and suitability aspects of OT&E.
The problem with this "blurring" of definitions goes beyond the
semantics. The results of OT-3 are used to support an AINS decision, but as it is
really PAT&E, it assesses more the ability of the ship to meet technical or Fleet
standards. It does not truly assess the operational effectiveness and operational
suitability of a new ship against the user requirement. Therefore, a ship is not truly
subject to OT&E against the user requirement before it is granted AINS.
This lack of distinction between T&E types also confuses Project
Directors and other Defence managers. It leads to a lack of consideration of the
importance of OT&E, and hence the need to consider OT&E funding early in a
Project. It also leads to confusion over T&E management responsibilities. It
confuses the role of the Acceptance Board, which is really assuming a quality
control function over what is essentially PAT&E testing, rather than it's members
using their knowledge and experience in assessing the results of true OT&E against
the user requirement.
The difference in terminology used by different documents and
authorities also creates confusion. For example, the term OPEVAL is defined [Ref.
38:p. 14A-2], but terms such as mini-OPEVAL [Ref. 61], Operational Performance
Demonstration [Ref. 51] and (Ship) Operational Trials [Ref. 41] [Ref. 44] are not.
2. OT&E and Acceptance of New Combatants
With the construction of new frigates and submarines, the RAN has
embarked on its greatest shipbuilding program since the Second World War.
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Although these combatants are being built to proven designs and, therefore, are
considered relatively low risk, they do present a greater operational risk than recent
RAN combatant programs. In September 1991, CNS expressed concern that the
RAN "may not be adequately placed" to properly manage the comprehensive and
complex procedures necessary to accept the ANZAC ships and Collins class
submarines into service [Ref. 62], This has focussed attention on the acceptance
procedures and consequently on the OT&E of the new combatants.
3. The New RAN OT&E Organisation
RANTAU ceased to exist as an organisation on May 15, 1992. The rationale
leading to this decision is important as it is indicative of the level of understanding
of OT&E within the RAN.
a. Background
RANTAU was established in 1966, and originally administered by
Navy, but later by the Defence Scientific and Technical organisation. In 1982
control of RANTAU was returned to Navy with the stated purpose of conducting
operational testing and evaluation, conducting inspections and providing
operational assessment data.[Ref. 46:p. 1] Functional and operational responsibility
for RANTAU was transferred from the DCNS Division of Navy Office to the
Maritime Commander on 31 July 1991 concurrent with the introduction of the
Program Management and Budgeting System(PMBS). The Director of RANTAU
was made responsible to the Maritime Commander for the management of
RANTAU.
b. What DidRANTAU Achieve?
As a result of this change in the organisational structure (a change due
fundamentally to financial funding and accounting requirements) there was a need
l^o
to question what RANTAU achieved overall, and whether its tasking should be
amended to more accurately reflect the needs of the Maritime Commander in
maintaining, and where necessary improving, the operational capability of the
Maritime Force. A study was directed [Ref. 46] to:
• focus on the tasks required to be undertaken to assess the operational
effectiveness of Maritime Force units and the Force as a whole.
• study any aspects of RANTALTs current employment which were
inappropriate given its functional and operational responsibilities to the
Maritime Command.
The results of this study [Ref. 47] found that only about 20% of the
work carried out by the RANTAU Trials Unit was carried out for the Maritime
Commander. This consisted of SQTs, and HATS and SATS. The large majority
(80%) of the work done by the Trials Unit was found to be done on behalf of the
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff - Materiel (ACMAT-N) in accordance with ABR
1921 (Reference 41). The report stated that the work conducted for ACMAT-N
included:
assisting with the writing of the TEMP for every project.
installation inspections as part of PAT&E Part 1.
heavy involvement with PAT&E Part 2.
the conduct of OT&E for most projects.
support for the post delivery acceptance into Naval Service (AINS)
process. [Ref. 47:p. 17].
c. Organisation Options
The report proposed transferring the Trials Unit, less a proportion to
support Fleet Trials, to the Materiel Division. The unit would then be ideally situated
to form the nucleus of an organisation with responsibility for the coordination and
administration of all trials conducted for and/or by the RAN. It could also form the
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core of the AB, with perhaps the Director being the standing vice president of the
body.
The Materiel Division rebutted this argument with the perception that
an independent audit authority is necessary to maintain production standards. It
appears that there is a belief that if the RAN's trials authority was to be a functional
unit of the Materiel Division, then the head of the Division would be able to
influence trials results. The report contends that this argument appears to point to a
management problem rather than a structural issue, but in any case it did nothing to
counter the argument that the RANTAU Trials Unit is not an appropriate component
of the Operations Sub-program of the PMBS (i.e., the Maritime Command). A
solution to this problem would be to return the Trials Unit to the Executive Sub-
program (i.e.. Navy Office). However, it recognised that the service provided by the
trials authority was also largely unrelated to that sub-program. The report then
considered the impact of HQADF, who occasionally tasks RANTAU in support of
projects for the development of the maritime component of the ADF.
The report recognised that this seemingly simple organisation of
RANTAU was, in fact, complex due to the variety of tasks imposed upon the unit
by a number of masters on a day to day basis. It concluded that as a single unit,
RANTAU does not rest comfortably with the current arrangement and nor does it
with any other Navy Sub-program for budgeting and management purposes.
d. An "Audti" Function
The report states that RANTAU served an apparent independent audit
function for the Materiel Command, and that:
this function was something that had evolved over time rather than in response
to any specific need. It was beyond the scope of the original purpose for the
organisation which became RANTAU, and the absolute need for such an audit
service in the era of PMBS and tight fiscal control is questioned. An audit
124
service for the Materiel Division does not seem an appropriate sub-component
for the Combat Forces sub-program.
The report concluded that, other than for a small trials unit to conduct
trials in support of units assigned to the fleet, it is inappropriate for the Maritime
Commander to have functional and administrative control of a Trials Unit which
largely serves the Materiel Division. The options appeared to be the transfer of the
Trials Unit to the either the DCNS or Materiel Divisions.
e. The OT&E Function
The report, however, failed to recognise that RANTAU was the OT&E
authority. As such, the "audit" work apparently done for the Materiel Command was
really done on behalf of the sponsor (i.e., HQADF) and the user (i.e., the Maritime
Command), as OT&E is the final feedback that the item produced by the Materiel
Command meets the user requirement.
/ Current Trials Organisation
Following the release of this report, and due to the RAN's decision not
to adequately staff and fund RANTAU as an independent unit, the functional tasks
of RANTAU were incorporated within the framework of the Maritime Headquarters
[Ref. 48]. The current placement of the former Trials Unit, now known as
Commander Test and Evaluation, within the Maritime Command is shown in Figure
19. Of note is that the OT&E authority is now responsible to the Maritime




























Figure 19: Commander Test and Evaluation Organisation
J. SUMMARY
1. Importance of OT&E
The importance of T&E in general is recognised in the acquisition process,
to identify problem areas, to allow timely corrective action to be taken, and to reduce
technical risk. As Australia has a policy of procuring low risk, operationally proven
systems, which may be constructed locally, rather than higher risk local
development, the RAN concentrates on post delivery testing, rather than testing to
support a production or purchase decision. The importance of OT&E to the
acquisition process, however, is not adequately appreciated. The RAN appears to
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have its focus on PAT&E to meet technical and fleet standards, rather than an
assessing operational effectiveness and operational suitability against the user
requirement.
2. OT&E Policy
The lack of emphasis given to OT&E within the RAN is possibly due to the
lack of clear guidance on OT&E in the T&E policy documentation. The decision to
subject an acquisition to T&E will initially be decided by the Sponsor and detailed
in the Capability Proposal, however, the Sponsor and other acquisition managers
require clear guidance on T&E to enable them to make effective decisions. The
categories of ship T&E used in the Australian DoD have been derived from the U.S.
DoD instructions, but interpreted to accord with Australian Requirements. During
this interpretation there has been a "blurring" of the types of T&E, resulting in a lack
of clear delineation between the T&E types. This problem was further compounded
by the adoption of the PAT&E based, USN Total Ship Test Program system, and
modifying it to include DT&E and OT&E components.
3. RAN OT&E Organisation
The RAN and DoD have reorganised over the past five years to create a
more effective and efficient user requirements organisation, and to better accord
with Program Management and Budgeting principles. However, as a result, the
RAN has no T&E, or OT&E policy maker and overseer, no OT&E coordinator
within Navy Office, and the RAN's OT&E authority is buried within the in-service
engineering management area of the Maritime Command.
4. Understanding of OT&E
As a result of incomplete, contradictory and confusing T&E policy
documentation, emphasis on PAT&E and the "blurring" of T&E types, the lack of
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true OT&E actually conducted and few personnel experienced in OT&E, the
understanding of OT&E within the RAN is poor. As a consequence, the philosophy,
methodology, and benefits to the RAN of OT&E are not adequately recognised.
5. Summary
The demise of the RAN's independent OT&E authority, RANTAU, and its
subsequent integration within Maritime Headquarters as the Commander, Test and
Evaluation (CTE), was the latest in a series of reorganisations that has significantly
reduced the capability and authority of the OT&E community. The new combatants
currently under construction for the RAN, although relatively low risk by USN
standards, are a higher operational risk than previous RAN ship programs. Although
using proven technologies, both the ANZAC ships and Collins class submarines
have unique weapon and sensor fits, not currently in service with large parent navies.
The conduct of PAT&E only, is not considered sufficient to measure the operational
effectiveness and suitability of these new combatants to determine, with confidence,
that they meet the user requirement. This can be achieved by the conduct of an
effective OT&E program.
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V. USN / RAN OT&E COMPARISON
This chapter compares the characteristics of the USN and RAN OT&E systems
and highlights significant differences.
A. DEFENCE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The Defence system acquisition life cycle of both nations consists of
progressive development phases separated by major decision milestones.
Milestones are periodic formal program reviews for authorisation to advance to the
next stage. The two systems are compared in Figure 20. With a policy to maintain
world leadership in key Defence technologies, the U.S. places priority on
development programs. The major decision point is centred on the decision to
proceed beyond Milestone IIIA - Low Rate Initial Production , when the large
dollars in an acquisition program are due to be spent in the production phase.
Passing a formal, independent OPEVAL is its major criterion for approval to Full
Rate Production.
Although the decision to produce or purchase a new system is important, the
Australian DoD prefers lower risk, proven technologies for the majority of new
Defence acquisitions. In many cases, systems with the fundamental capabilities
required by the ADF are available overseas, however, some of these systems require
additional development, adaptation or integration to meet Australian specific
requirements. The Australian system, therefore, places a high priority on the post
production phase with the three milestones of Preliminary Acceptance (PA),
Acceptance into Naval Service (AINS) and Operational Acceptance (OA).
However, Australia is now buying far less "off the shelf" from overseas, and
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systems are increasingly being designed and built in Australia, or at least adapted
from overseas designs.
U.S PROCESS
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Figure 20: Comparison of U.S. and Australian Acquisition Processes
B. T&E DEFINITIONS
Definitions and terminology form the basis of a T&E system. As the categories
of ship T&E used in the Australian DoD have been derived from the U.S. DoD
instructions, both Navies recognise three types of T&E:
130
• Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
• Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
• Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
The categories within these types of T&E, however, have been interpreted by
the RAN to accord with Australian requirements [Ref. 38:p. 14-1]. This
interpretation leads to some subtle, but significant, differences in T&E definitions
between the two Navies.
1. Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
DT&E is conducted to assist the engineering design and development
process and to verify attainment of technical performance specifications and
objectives [Ref. 1 l:p. 3]. Both Navies agree that DT&E is conducted in three major
phases. Table 13 compares these DT&E phases. Minor wording differences aside,
the three DT&E phases are essentially identical. The most significant difference is
that the USN recognises PAT&E as a form of DT-3 testing.
TABLE 13: COMPARISON OF DT&E PHASES
USN Description DT RAN Description
Demonstration that all technical risk
areas have been identified & that best
technical approaches have been
accepted.
DT-1 Validation of design concept.
Demonstrate that design meets
specifications.
DT-2 Proving design.
Testing conducted on production items
to ensure compliance with contracted
specifications. PAT&E is a form of
DT-3.
DT-3 Demonstration that production meets
required technical characteristics.
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2. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
Both Navies agree that PAT&E is testing conducted on production items to
ensure systems meet contract specifications and requirements. PAT&E for ships in
the USN is managed under the Total Ship Test Program (TSTP) which includes
seven phases of PAT&E. In recent years the RAN has adopted the TSTP, initially
with the modernisation of the DDGs, and now in the testing of the locally produced
FFG-7 class under the Australian Frigate Project. The adoption of the TSTP by the
RAN included the redefinition of the test phases. A comparison of the PAT&E
phases is provided in Table 14. There are major differences between the two Navies
in these PAT&E categories. The USN system includes only PAT&E, whereas the
RAN includes elements of DT&E and OT&E, in addition to PAT&E, and they are
given PAT designations.
TABLE 14: COMPARISON OF PAT&E PHASES
USN Description PAT&E RAN Description
Not defined in U.S. system PAT-0 Design and engineering development
tests
Material receipt inspection and shop
tests
PAT-1 Production and burn-in tests
Shipboard installation inspections
and tests
PAT-2 Environmental qualification tests
Equipment level operational tests PAT-3 System development tests
Intrasystem tests PAT^ Harbour testing
Intersystem tests PAT-5 Sea testing
Special tests e.g., surveys, rangings PAT-6 Operational and Qualification Trials
(conducted with OT-3)
Trials tests including sea trials,
builders trials, acceptance trials.
PAT-7 Follow on Operational T&E
(conducted with OT-4)
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3. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
Both Navies concur that OT&E is conducted to determine a system's
operational effectiveness and operational suitability, to identify system deficiencies
and the need for potential modifications to meet established OT thresholds, and
develop tactics. They also agree that OT&E has three distinguishing characteristics:
• It is conducted in an operationally representative environment
• It is conducted on production representative equipment using fleet personnel
for operation and maintenance.
• It is conducted against a threat-representative simulated enemy carrying out
threat tactics per the latest threat assessment.
They both use the term "Operational Evaluation", abbreviated as
"OPEVAL" to cover T&E on production representative baseline equipment using
the maintenance and support personnel and equipment for normal operational use
which aims to:
• Demonstrate operational effectiveness and suitability.
• Provide data to assist in the development of tactical aspects of the equipment.
• Verify data, handbooks and documentation covering the operation of the
system.
The USN uses the term OPEVAL as the final stage of OT-II, supporting a
production decision. Although the Australian definition of OT-2 includes an
OPEVAL, the term is not used exclusively for OT-2. It is used in many contexts
from OT-2 to OT-4.
There are also significant differences in the detailed OT&E definitions. The
RAN includes ship Certification / Qualification trials in OT-3, whereas the USN
categorises Certification trials as PAT&E and Ship Qualification Trials (SQT) as
regular in-service PAT&E conducted by the INSURV Board and Type Commander,
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not as OT&E. A comparison of the OT&E phases of the USN and RAN are given in
Table 15.
TABLE 15: COMPARISON OF OT&E PHASES
USN Description OT RAN Description
Early Operational Assessment OT-1 Operational assessment of the
development proposal
OT&E conducted to support a
production decision. Final phase is
termed OPEVAL.
OT-2 Demonstration of achievement of
program requirements for operational
effectiveness and suitability of a
prototype (OPEVAL) to support
proceeding to full production
OT&E conducted on production
system to verify correction of
deficiencies after OPEVAL, and
certification of operational
effectiveness and suitability.
OT-3 Demonstration of achievement of
program requirements for operational
effectiveness and suitability on
production of ship/aircraft/system,
normally in independent operations





Validation of the operational
effectiveness and suitability of
production systems. Usually in
different environments and to assess
integrated operation of system. For
ship programs, is normally conducted
to verify that critical deficiencies have
been identified and to complete any
outstanding OT&E.
OT^ Demonstration of achievement of
program requirements for operational
effectiveness and operational
suitability on production oi~ ship/
aircraft/system using normal Fleet





Not defined in the U.S. System. OT-5 Follow-on OT for assessment after
modernisations, new applications or
defect rectifications after OT-4
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C. T&E IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Both Navies appreciate the importance of T&E in the acquisition process. T&E
results are assessed as part of the milestone reviews. However, the level of
importance of T&E, and OT&E in particular, differs greatly.
1. The Requirement for T&E
The importance of T&E, and OT&E in particular, to the progressive
assessment of programs in the USN is such that its use has been mandated by the
U.S. Congress and incorporated into the laws of the United States. The law includes
the provision of a Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) in the
Department of Defence. The law also addresses specific areas of OT&E reporting
and conduct to ensure the Congress is kept informed, and the testing and reporting
are impartial [Ref. 17]. By including the requirement that a major Defence
acquisition program may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production until initial
OT&E of the program is completed, Congress ensures that OT&E is an integral part
of the acquisition process.
The USN appreciates that, if adequate OT&E is not done, and the weapon
system does not perform satisfactorily in the field, significant changes may be
required. Moreover, the changes will not be limited to a few developmental models,
but may also be applied to items already produced and deployed. The USN also
recognises that, in extreme situations, it also risks deploying systems which cannot
adequately perform significant portions of their missions, thus degrading its
deterrent / defensive capabilities and endangering the safety of military personnel
who operate and maintain the systems.
The need for local T&E is recognised by the Australian Government and
DoD, for both indigenous and overseas systems, however, the importance of OT&E
in particular, is not specifically addressed in any Australian T&E policy document.
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Perhaps this lack of recognition of the importance of OT&E is due to the RAN
procuring low risk, complete ships in the past (e.g., FFG-7 class) with the wealth of
USN DT&E and OT&E behind it. Also the RAN, unlike the USN, has not
experienced the operational situations in recent years which may have highlighted
operational effectiveness and suitability deficiencies in its ships. With the RAN now
buying higher risk, unproven combinations of systems within its ships, it must now
rely on its own OT&E.
2. T&E Contributions At Major Milestones
The USN OT&E system forms an integral part of the acquisition process.
Program advance from one phase to the next is not by the calendar of planned
schedule, but by actual resolution of critical operational issues and achievement of
pre-set thresholds verified by T&E [Ref. 1 l:p. 2]. OT&E in the RAN, on the other
hand, may be conducted during each phase in the acquisition process, but it is not
essential to a local system meeting a development or production milestone, or the
local production or purchase decision of an overseas system. It is however, required
before a system achieves Acceptance into Naval Service or Operational Acceptance.
Figure 21 compares the contributions of T&E to the acquisition milestones for each
Navy.
Although the diagrams appear to be very similar, the RAN OT&E
contributions to the acquisition milestones are by no means definitive. There is no
documented requirement for the conduct of OT-1 and / or OT-2 prior to a production
or purchase decision of major acquisitions. The decision to conduct OT&E being the
responsibility of the Sponsor, Project Manager and the Defence acquisition
committees. RAN T&E policy documentation almost exclusively focuses on the
post production acceptance phases. Even during the acceptance phase, however, the
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requirement for OT-3 is clouded in definition differences between policy documents.
The RAN appears to have its focus on PAT&E.
USN [Ref. 26]
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Figure 21: Comparison of T&E Contributions to Acquisition Milestones
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Of note is that the USN diagram shows separate activities for DT&E and
OT&E related tests, while the RAN diagram groups them all together. This
demonstrates the delineation between DT&E /PAT&E and OT&E evident in the
USN system.
D. OT&E ORGANISATION
The OT&E organisation consists of a number of functions. The authorities
performing these functions in each Navy are listed in Table 16.
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1. OT&E Policy Maker and Overseer
An OT&E policy maker and overseer is employed in the U.S. system
responsible for policy formulation, evaluation and oversight of all OT&E. The
Director of OT& E (DOT&E) is the principal OT&E official in the Department of
Defence and the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defence on OT&E. In addition,
a Director T&E, responsible for developmental testing policy reports, to the
USD(A) in DoD.
There is no clear OT&E, or T&E, policy maker or overseer within the
Australian DoD or the RAN. The Chief of Capital Procurement [Ref. 38] addresses
T&E in general, but more in the form of guidance rather than policy. The former
Director General of Naval Warfare (DGNW) drafted the RAN Test and Evaluation
Policy Defence Instruction [Ref. 44], however after the recent reorganisation, T&E
policy for the RAN is presently in a state of flux, with no office having assumed the
responsibility [Ref. 50].
2. Program Sponsor
The program sponsor is responsible for the development of concepts for
operations for naval warfare systems, and for acquisition program requirements and
related system thresholds. He/She is also responsible for the subsequent trials and
continuing overview to ensure that the equipment meets the requirement. Within the
USN, major warship programs are sponsored by N8 - Warfare Requirements, under
CNO. Under the new USN organisation, increasing importance is given to the Fleet
and Type Commanders in determining requirements and allocating priorities.
Besides generating the user requirement, the sponsor also has a review function in
the OT&E process. [Ref. 20]
The Australian Defence Force has a centralised force development and user
requirements organisation, within HQADF, the Director General Force
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Development (Sea) having sponsorship of major RAN acquisitions. The decision to
subject an acquisition to T&E in the RAN is initially decided by the sponsor and
detailed in the capability proposal [Ref. 44:p. 1].
3. Developing Agency
When a program is approved, a program office is formed to manage the
acquisition of the system. In the case of the USN, this office is established within the
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). The program office is responsible for the
conduct of DT&E in preparation for OT&E. To assist all NAVSEA programs with
T&E matters, NAVSEA have established their own T&E office (SEA 60). Although
primarily a DT&E policy authority, this office also has an input into the OT&E
process by reviewing the TEMP, and by conducting OT&E readiness reviews of
NAVSEA programs.
Within the RAN, the Materiel Division is responsible for acquisition of the
capital equipment to meet the requirement. Similar to the USN, the nature and extent
of the T&E to be conducted is decided by the Project Director in consultation with
the Design Approval Authority and RANTAU. However, the Materiel Division does
not have a T&E office to support Project Directors.
4. OT&E Tester and Evaluator
The Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) is the USN's
sole independent test agency responsible for the planning and conduct of OT&E.
COMOPTEVFOR reports directly to the CNO, and is separate and distinct from the
developing and procuring commands.
The RAN Trials and Assessing Unit (RANTAU) was the RAN's OT&E
authority who also conducted DT&E / PAT&E on behalf of Project Directors and
Ship Qualification Trials for the Maritime Commander. With the disestablishment of
RANTAU in May 1992, these trials functions were transferred to the Commander,
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Test and Evaluation (CTE) under the Chief Staff Officer (Engineering) in the
Maritime Command.
5. User
The Commanding Officer and crew of the ship under test, and his Fleet and
Type Commanders are the ultimate users of the system. The Maritime Commander,
and the individual ships' Commanding Officers and crews are the ultimate users of
a ship. The personal assessment of the Commanding Officer of the ship under test is
sought by OFTEVFOR during the conduct of OT&E [Ref. 15:p. 44]. The
Commanding Officer of a ship under test usually provides CTE with his opinions on
the ship's performance at the conclusion of a trials period.
6. Coordinator
CNO has responsibility for ensuring the adequacy of the Navy's overall test
and evaluation program. T&E policy and guidance are exercised through the
Director, Test, Evaluation and Technology Requirements (N091). This organisation
also acts as a T&E Focal Point and Coordinator, responsible for coordination of
T&E matters in the designated Programs, System Commands and Department of the
Navy. [Ref. 13 :p. 7-5]He also chairs the Test and Evaluation Coordination Group
The RAN currently has no authority with this role, however, the T&E manager
within major projects is responsible for chairing the Test and Evaluation Planning
Group.
7. OT&E Organisation Summary
A comparison of the OT&E organisation structures of both Navies is shown
in Figure 22. The USN OT&E organisation is well structured with comprehensive
responsibilities for each participant, and clearly delineated from the DT&E
structure. COMOPTEVFOR is the truly independent tester and evaluator, being
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separate from developing, production and user agencies, and responsible only for
OT&E. As a Rear Admiral and reporting directly to the CNO, he has authority,
visibility and infl uence. The office of DOT&E provides a layer of oversight on the
OT&E process to ensure objective testing is conducted, giving credible results and
leading to impartial decisions. NAVSEA has its own T&E agency to assist PM's in
DT&E, and in preparation for OT&E. The OT&E process is coordinated from
within CNO's office by the Director, Test, Evaluation and Technology
Requirements.
Following a number of recent reorganisations, the RAN's OT&E structure
is in disarray. The RAN's OT&E authority is now CTE within the Maritime
Command. In addition to OT&E responsibilities, he also conducts some DT&E, and
some functions equivalent to the USN INSURV board, OPTEVFOR and the Type
Commander. Only of Commander rank, he lacks authority, particularly with Project
Directors and, being within the in-service engineering area, he possibly lacks
credibility and influence on operational matters pertaining to OT&E. In developing
programs, the RAN relies on the minimal interface between the centralised sponsor
(DGFD(Sea)) and CTE to ensure appropriate OT&E is considered, since the sponsor
has no agency within his own organisation to provide the necessary advice. Once a
project is established, the Project Director performs the coordinating role through
the TEPG. The Materiel Command, however, has no T&E agency to advise PD's on
this role, and to be the retainers of "lessons learned" from other projects. Finally,
with no clear policy maker for T&E in general, or OT&E in particular, the RAN
















































Figure 22: OT&E Organisation Comparison
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E. OT&E POLICY
USN OT&E policy has its basis in statutes approved by Congress. The RAN has
no such formal basis and its OT&E policy is embedded in the more general T&E
policy. A number of OT&E policies of interest include:
1. OT&E Documentation
USN policy is refined in the DoD acquisition Directives 5000.1[Ref. 25]
and 5000.2 [Ref. 24]. The essential T&E elements in these directives are further
detailed in OPNAV Instruction 3960. IOC [Ref. 11] and other subordinate
instructions. USN OT&E documentation is comprehensive and provides clear,
consistent and non-conflicting policies and guidance to OT&E participants. This
concise documentation establishes the disciplined management approach to OT&E
taken by the USN.
The RAN does not enjoy this sound basis of OT&E policy. Some general
guidance to assist Project Directors in assessing the need for T&E in a project and
to provide guidelines for its conduct is provided in the Capital Equipment
Procurement Manual (CEPMAN l)[Ref. 38]. The top level T&E policy document
for the RAN is the Defence Instruction (Navy) on RAN Test and Evaluation Policy
[Ref. 44], while ABR 1921 [Ref. 41], contains T&E and acceptance policy
applicable to ships building, undergoing modernisation, conversion or extended
refit. These documents provide broad T&E policy only and, other than defining
OT&E, provide little policy as to its conduct.
2. OT& E Requirements
In the USN system, the requirement to conduct OT&E on new major
acquisitions is mandatory. Although the Sponsor initially develops the system
thresholds, the level and extent of OT&E required is delineated in the TEMP and
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approved prior to Milestone I. The appropriate level of OT&E is determined by
COMOPTEVFOR in consultation with the Program Manager, with DOT&E
oversight. This ensures that OT&E planning is conducted and approved early so the
costs of OT&E can be included in project funds.
In the RAN, the decision to subject an acquisition to T&E is initially
decided by the Sponsor and detailed in the Capability Proposal. The nature and
extent of the T&E (no distinction is made in RAN policy between the various types
of T&E) is decided by the Project Director in consultation with the Design Approval
Authority and CTE. Any conflict over the requirement, nature and/or extent of the
proposed T&E is resolved by DCNS and ACMAT-N for operational and design
matters respectively. [Ref. 44:p. 2] The role of DCNS should now rest with
DGFD(Sea) as the Sponsor. The determination of the OT&E required has
traditionally not been achieved early enough in the life of a project, and so project
funding has not included the provision for OT&E.
3. Independence of OT&E Authority
As OT&E is the final exam for an acquisition program, independence is
necessary so that there is no question of impropriety. The USN requires its
independent operational test activity to be separate and independent from the
materiel-developing and procuring agency and the using agency. This ensures that
the testing and reporting agency has nothing to gain or lose by whatever they say. As
major acquisition decisions hinge on the results of OT&E within the USN,
independence is necessary to ensure that the reports on which those decisions are
based are not self serving. [Ref. 19]
Although major acquisition decisions within the RAN are less based on
OT&E, the RAN also maintains the policy that OT&E is to be conducted by an
authority independent of the development and production agencies. With the demise
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of RANTAU and the transfer of OT&E responsibilities to CTE on the staff of the
Maritime Commander, independence from the development and production
agencies is achieved, but not from the end user as in the USN. The implications of
this lack of independence are that the end user may have his own aims and objectives
which may conflict with the total impartiality of OT&E reporting. The politics of
requirements and funding could come into play, as the Maritime Commander
establishes scheduling priorities for his resources, and OT&E may take a low
priority behind operations and training. The Maritime Commander may also not
wish to "stress" the system, in case he perceives that operational deficiencies so
highlighted may be seen as having some reflection on his own organisation.
4. Contractor Involvement in OT&E
To ensure impartiality and credibility of testing, the USN prohibits persons
employed by the contractor for the system being tested being involved in OT&E,
unless contractors are planned to be involved when the system is deployed in
combat.
The RAN requires that during OT&E, a system should be demonstrated
"using normal Fleet Personnel", however, the policy documentation makes no
statement regarding contractor personnel involvement in system operation or
maintenance during OT&E. It has been RAN practice (e.g., in the DDG
Modernisation Project) to have contractors onboard resolving technical problems
during the SQT period, which is included as part of OT-3 in the RAN, thereby
possibly causing test bias.
5. T&E Planning
Both the USN and RAN use the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP)
as the single, executive, long range planning document for T&E in a project. Both
Navies are in agreement that approval of the TEMP constitutes establishment of a
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contract between the requirement-setter and the PM which is essential to formal and
accountable program execution, and between the requirement-setter and the OT
agency, upon which the OT agency will independently evaluate system operational
effectiveness and suitability. The main differences between the two Navies are in the
responsibility and level of approval, and in the timing of the TEMP.
a. TEMP Responsibility
Within the USN, the TEMP is drafted by the PM. COMOPTEVFOR
drafts Part Four on OT&E and provides OT&E resource requirements for Part Five.
The TEMP is then co-submitted by both the Program Manager and
COMOPTEVFOR. It is reviewed by the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
(Surface Warfare), the Director, T&E and Technology Requirements, and the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition). It is
ultimately approved at the DoD level by the Director, OT&E and the Director, Test
and Evaluation.
Within the RAN, the TEMP is the ultimate responsibility of the project
sponsor [Ref. 44:p. 4]. However, during the period when there is a full time Project
Office, TEMP coordination is normally carried out by the T&E Manager in the
Project Office. CTE as the OT&E authority provides the OT&E input. The TEMP
is endorsed by all affected organisations and is released jointly by the Deputy Chief
of Naval Staff (DCNS), and the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff-Materiel (ACMAT-
N), as the Developing Agency. If any issues remain unresolved at this level, the
TEMP will be resolved by the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS). [Ref. 44:pp. 4-5] The
authority for DCNS to release the TEMP was based on his role as Project Sponsor.
With HQADF now assuming this role, the DCNS function in TEMP development
is unclear.
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In the USN, drafting the TEMP is the responsibility of the PM while the
DoD heads of OT&E and DT&E authorities approve the TEMP. In contrast, in the
RAN, the Sponsor has ultimate responsibility, although the TEMP is managed by
the PM, and the TEMP is approved by the heads of the developing agency and the
(former) Sponsor.
b. TEMP Timing
The TEMP is required in the at Milestone I- Concept Demonstration
Approval within the USN, and is updated for each subsequent milestone and when
significant program changes occur. The RAN requires the TEMP to be raised in
draft form as early as practicable, but in actuality the TEMP for major projects is
usually drafted after production approval (Milestone 3).
6. Combined DT&E and OT&E
"Combined testing" refers to a single test program conducted to support
both DT&E and OT&E objectives. The advantages of combined testing is the
shorter time required for testing, and cost savings by eliminating redundant
activities. These need to be weighed against the limitations of the additional
extensive coordination required and the less than optimum environment and
coverage for OT&E that may occur. Early involvement of OT&E personnel during
system development increases their familiarity with the system and permits
identification of operational concerns early in the program.
The USN has a policy that combined DT&E and OT&E testing should be
considered when there are time and cost savings [Ref. 24:p. 8-3]. However, this
combined approach must not compromise either the developmental or operational
test objectives. Also a final independent phase of operational testing and evaluation
is required for beyond low rate initial production decisions [Ref. 24:p. 8-4]. The US
has extensive experience with combined testing, some successful and some
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unsuccessful, and they conclude that it is possible to have combined test teams
involved throughout the testing process. The DT&E and OT&E teams can share
mutually beneficial data, as long as the test program is carefully planned. However,
evaluation and reporting activities must be conducted separately. [Ref. 18:pp. 17-1
- 17-4].
The conduct of combined DT&E, (PAT&E) and OT&E is not addressed in
RAN T&E policy, however, it is implied as being almost a requirement. The T&E
DI(N) [Ref. 44:p. 3] states that OT-3 and OT-4 will incorporate the requirements of
PAT-6 and PAT-7 Inspection Tests and Trials as described in ABR 1921. It also states
that OT-3 will be conducted during Ship Qualification Trials. The RANs "blurring"
of the distinction between the types of T&E leads to DT&E and OT&E often being
conducted over the same period, by the same test team. Although the RAN
recognises, by definition, the difference in objectives and methodology between the
types of T&E, no limitations or guidance as to the possible hazards of this combined
testing approach are addressed.
7. Modeling and Simulation
The use of modeling and simulation can increase the efficiency of the T&E
process, reduce the time and cost, provide otherwise unattainable and
unmeasureable data, and provide more timely and valid results. The USN
encourages the use of simulation and modeling to assist in projecting operational
effectiveness and operational suitability prior to Milestone II - Development
Approval, but limit the use of simulation and modeling in subsequent OT&E to that
of supplementing OT&E test data [Ref. 15: p. 2-37].
The use of models and simulation in OT&E is not addressed by the RAN
documentation, although modeling and simulation performed by the Maritime
Systems Division of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation were used
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by RANTAU to assist the evaluation of the upgraded combat and weapons systems
in the Modernised DDGs.
With the increasing costs of weapons systems, decreasing budgets and the
subsequent need for efficiency in the conduct of OT&E, simulation can be used
during OT&E to extend test results, to improve the statistical sample, or to
determine overlooked or directly unmeasured parameters. This is particularly
relevant to the RAN who lack appropriate ranges and the financial resources for
extensive test programs of expensive weapons. A policy directing the use of models
and simulation in OT&E in the RAN is required.
8. Foreign Weapons Evaluation
The US DoD has a foreign weapons evaluation program which is designed
to support the evaluation of a foreign nation's weapons system, equipment or
technology in terms of its potential to meet a specific U.S. military requirement. The
primary objective of the program is to reduce the costs of research and development,
while leading to the acquisition of foreign equipment for U.S. use [Ref. 18:p. 21-1].
From the OT&E viewpoint, the USN 'try-before-buy policy' is still maintained,
despite the early phases of OT being unable to be achieved. When procurement of a
foreign weapon system is planned, the developing agency and COMOPTEVFOR
may be directed to assess the adequacy of any previously conducted DT&E and
OT&E and to provide recommendations on the need for additional T&E prior to
procurement [Ref. 15:p. 2-34].
Despite the most recent Australian Government "White Paper" on Defence
Policy [Ref. 6:p. 70] requiring the need to be able to determine the performance in
the Australian environment of equipment of both overseas and local origin, no DoD
or RAN T&E policy specifically addresses the evaluation of foreign systems. Prior
to a major acquisition, project teams review possible contractors' proposals and
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evaluate them against the user requirement. OT&E personnel may be part of these
teams, however, there is no policy as to the OT&E authority's role in foreign
weapons evaluation within the RAN.
9. OT&E Funding
OT&E is an expensive process and generally occurs late in the life of a
project when money is usually tight. Within the USN, funding associated with T&E
(including instrumentation, targets and simulations) are identified in the system
acquisition cost estimates, acquisition plans and the TEMP [Ref. 18:p. 18-1 1]. The
Program Manager plans, programs, budgets and funds the costs of all resources
identified in the approved TEMP for all T&E through OT-III. Funds required to
conduct OT&E are programmed and budgeted by OPTEVFOR and advised to the
Program Manager. OT&E costs include test articles, expendables, targets, data
collection and reduction and OPTEVFOR program related costs. The Program
Manager does not fund fleet operating costs for T&E support, which includes fuel
and aircraft, These costs for OT-II and III, and all costs for OT-IV, except
procurement costs and OPTEVFOR costs, are funded by the Fleet CINCs.[Ref.
1 l:p. 21] The RAN employs a similar funding arrangement where OT&E is funded
separately within a project and is estimated and bid for by CTE.[Ref. 44:p. 6]
The essential difference is that the USN develops the TEMP, and hence
identify the resources required and their costs, earlier in a project's life than does the
RAN, thus enabling the project to include these requirements in project funding.
10. Land Based Test Sites
A Land Based Test Site (LBTS) is a facility that duplicates, simulates or
stimulates the employment of a system's planned operational installation and
utilisation. Used primarily for the purpose of conducting DT&E, it is sometimes
used to test system integration and overall performance. The USN often use LBTS
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for the conduct of initial OT&E to gain an estimation of potential operational
effectiveness and suitability, primarily to support Milestone IIIA (Low Rate Initial
Production) decisions and not the more stringent Milestone IIIB (Full Rate
Production).
RAN guidance for OT&E using land based test sites includes a statement
that system centres and simulators will be employed for early stages of OT&E if
available [Ref. 44:p. 4], and that OT-2 may be conducted at a land-based test site
[Ref. 44:p. 3]. Although LBTS are being developed for both the ANZAC frigate and
COLLINS submarine projects, OT-2 in support of production decisions will not be
conducted. The use of these LBTS for later OT&E was not planned in the original
project schedules, and so is subject to them being used on a non-interfering basis to
the contractor.
The USN has demonstrated that early OT&E on LBTS can give an
estimation of potential operational effectiveness and suitability, and hence identify
potential operational problems early and minimising operational risk. Their use for
OT&E during the ANZAC frigate and COLLINS submarine projects would appear
to offer similar advantages to the RAN.
*e«*
11. Ship OT&E
Both the USN and RAN recognise that ship acquisition projects will be
treated differently to others in so far as protracted construction time usually
precludes T&E of a prototype before the decision to proceed to production. Because
the development and construction period for a major ship in the USN, normally
precludes completion of initial OT&E on the lead ship prior to the production
decision for follow-on ships, successive phases of OT&E are accomplished as soon
as practicable to reduce risk and minimise the need for modification to follow-on
units. Ship acquisition programs, therefore, usually have OT&E between Milestones
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II and III, which consist of individual weapon systems testing and system integration
at land based test sites.
With the construction of lower risk, proven overseas ships adapted to
Australian requirements, the RAN assessed the degree of technical risk as low.
OT&E between Milestones II and III in the RAN was, therefore, not considered
necessary.
F. SHIP ACCEPTANCE
Both Navies have similar policies and procedures for acceptance of ships from
contractors and then into service. However, only the USN states the purpose of ship
acceptance which is "to ensure delivery to the Fleet of complete ships, free from
both contractor and government responsible deficiencies" [Ref. 35:p. 1].
Each Navy uses similar terminology, but these have different meanings which
can create confusion. A comparison of terms applicable to ship acceptance is given
in Table 17.
1. Ship Acceptance Policy
Ship acceptance and Fleet Introduction within the USN has traditionally
been based only on the successful completion of PAT&E and material inspections.
However, with the treatment of ships as complete systems, as for the DDG-51, Fleet
Introduction is now based also on OT&E results.
The RAN has also placed emphasis on PAT&E leading to Acceptance into
Naval Service (AINS), although OT-3 has been included in the trials program
leading to AINS. However, these trials conducted as OT-3, are really PAT&E /
DT&E with minimal true OT&E.
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TABLE 17: COMPARISON OF ACCEPTANCE TERMINOLOGY
USN Term USN Definition RAN Term RAN Definition
Acceptance The legal act of accepting
custody of a new construction
ship by the Navy upon delivery
by a private shipbuilder.
Delivery When the ship is contractually
delivered from the
contractor's ownership to the
Government.
Delivery The actual assumption of
custodv bv the Navv incident
to acceptance. The date ol'
delivery from a private





Determination that the ship has
reached both material and
support status sufficient to
safely and effectively proceed




Approval by SECNAV that a
ship class meets the
operational effectiveness,
operational suitability, safety






Acceptance of the ship by CNS
as a fully operational unit of
the Fleet, based on operational
performance and support




Carried out only of first of
class to supplement the AINS
assessment using additional
operational and support
experience with the Fleet to
refine the vessel and Naval
Requirements.
2. Ship Acceptance Procedure
The procedure for USN ship acceptance and introduction to the Fleet as
used for the DDG-51 program is outlined in Figure 23. A noteworthy aspect of the
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Figure 23: USN Ship Acceptance Schedule and Milestones
The Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) conducts Acceptance Trials
and Final Contract Trials for each individual new ship to provide independent
verification of readiness of ships for acceptance in the USN. Based upon its findings,
the Board recommends acceptance or final settlement of the contract. The Board
identifies material conditions which represent departures from the USN General
Specifications and deficiencies that substantially reduce the ship's fitness for naval
service or degrade its ability to perform its primary mission. [Ref. 34:p. 1] On
successful trials completion, NAVSEA accepts the ship from the contractor.
For comparison, the RAN ship acceptance schedule, as used for the
















Figure 24: RAN Ship Acceptance Schedule and Milestones
Of note in this schedule is the combined PAT&E / OT&E period supporting
an AINS decision, and the OT-4 phase leading to OA. OT-4 is not an exclusive T&E
phase, but is integrated with the normal fleet operations of the ship. AINS is the most
significant post delivery milestone as it represents acceptance of the ship into the
RAN and that the project has met it's responsibilities.
In the RAN, Delivery (contractual acceptance) of the ship to the
Government is a contractual matter and is managed by the Project Director. CTE's
responsibility is to conduct the Acceptance Trials and report the results. An
Acceptance Board (AB) is established to provide an assessment of the ship and
submit recommendations upon which CNS can base his acceptance decision,
however the AB is quite different from the INSURV Board. The AB is usually
established for each new ship type and only for first of class. The President, Vice-
President and Board members serve on the Board part time. The AB's sole function
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is to advise CNS on acceptance matters, This is achieved by assessing the adequacy
of the trials plans, examining the inspection and trials reports, attending trials where
necessary and then providing an overall assessment of the adequacy of the ship
against the user requirement. The Acceptance Board does not conduct tests, trials or
inspections, and is essentially a board of review.
Acceptance into Naval Service is essentially the transfer/acceptance of the
ship from the acquisition part of the Navy (ACMAT-N) to the inservice operations
and support areas, as having met the user requirement. Post delivery trials leading to
AINS includes the SQT period, with harbour and sea phases.
For the first of class, it will normally not be possible to trial and evaluate all
aspects of the operational performance and maintainability prior to AINS. This OT-
4 period is conducted following AINS and is compiled by RANTAU in consultation
with the Naval and Maritime Headquarters Staff. It comprises a series of trials and
evaluations to assess operational effectiveness and operational suitability. [Ref.
41 :p. 15.14] Typically, the Follow-on T&E program will last from 12-24 months,
depending on the class of ship. At the end of this period RANTAU compiles a report
in consultation with Maritime Headquarters Staff. The AB assesses the results and
provides the overview to ensure the program is comprehensive. This assessment
serves to confirm or modify the assessment at AINS.
3. Ship Acceptance Summary
Both Navies now include OT&E in their post-delivery trials of the first of
class to ensure that the ship is assessed operationally against the User Requirement.
However the RAN OT-3 period is not true OT&E, but consists mostly of DT&E and
PAT&E with some OT&E elements. The USN INSURV Board conducts acceptance
trials on every ship but looks at materiel items only, which is different to the RAN
AB, which is a board of specialists who review the trials and results of the first of
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class. OT-3 within the RAN needs to be separated from the DT&E /PAT&E post
delivery events, and should consist of true OT&E. This would enable the
Acceptance Board to use its knowledge and experience in assessing the results of
OT&E against the user requirement, instead of assuming a quality control function
over what is essentially PAT&E testing.
G. OT&E PROCEDURES
This section discusses the procedures adopted by the two Navies in
implementing OT&E policy.
1. User Requirement to OT&E Test Plan
To this concruence between OT&E test documentation and the user
requirement, both Navies generate a series of documents through the acquisition
process. Although the documents between Navies have different titles, they have
similar functions. A comparison of the progression of documentation leading from
the user requirement to the OT&E test plans is given in Table 18.
Both Navies can trace a requirement from the capability need through the
refining requirements documentation to specific a objective in the TEMP, to the test
plan and ultimately to the final OT&E report
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2. Assessment of Operational Effectiveness
The RAN has found it difficult to define exactly what is required to assess
operational effectiveness. The RANTAU guidance on the conduct of OT&E [Ref.
53] recognises that the user requirement is the bench mark for determining the
degree to which a product is effective. Also that operational effectiveness is best
assessed by a performance demonstration by normal operating personnel in the
normal or given environment. But otherwise provides very little guidance on the
assessment of operational effectiveness. Past techniques employed involve
analyzing each COI and employing modified Ship Qualification Trial and Fleet
Exercise Program techniques to evaluate them. Use has also been made of
simulation, weapon analysis and exercise analysis. The lack of suitable range
facilities has also limited the assessment of operational effectiveness.
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The USN, by comparison, has a more effective method of assessing
operational effectiveness. As do the RAN, the USN examines each COI and related
operational effectiveness objective, and decides what needs to be known to enable
each objective to be assessed [Ref. 15:p. 9-1]. They ensure that the appropriate
environments, threats, etc. are included and that sufficient data will be generated to
address the COI and objectives. They focus on achieving statistical relevance where
possible, and making the tests as objective as possible. DOT&E works closely with
the USN to help determine how many test assets are required to achieve a certain
degree of confidence that the results are correct. A test may need to be repeated a
number of times to gain statistical relevance. However, if this is not possible, or the
direct proving of an ability is not possible (as in the surface warfare example), then
the test needs to be designed so that what is observed in the test program is projected
to be what would be observed in reality. [Ref. 19][Ref. 21] These situations require
expertise and judgement, and compromise between the authorities involved, to
make the tests as objective as possible.
3. Assessment of Operational Suitability
The principles of operational suitability are common between the USN and
RAN, and similar aspects are assessed. Within the USN, COMOPTEVFOR reviews
the Integrated Logistic Support Plan (ILSP) against the user requirement. Following
this review, COMOPTEVFOR determines the suitability tests required based on
expected reliability, degree of confidence, thresholds, etc. required to be achieved.
These determine the scope and length of the assessment. Reliability, maintainability
and availability (RM&A) data is collected and sent to the normal inservice analyst
of RM&A data, the Naval Weapons Analysis Centre (NWAC) for analysis.
Specialist analysts within OPTEVFOR design the tests and determine measures of
suitability. They also evaluate and analyse the adequacy of logistic supportability.
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However, OPTEVFOR also relies on operational personnel to use their experience
and knowledge of the system to identify inadequate logistic support.
The assessment of operational suitability in the RAN has been
controversial, particularly the assessment of supportability. Before 1987, the
assessment of operational suitability, and ILS in particular, was rather subjective and
often controversial. A new approach was taken in 1987 and has continued to be
refined. The assessment of ILS is now conducted in two phases:
• ILS Structural Review
• ILS Operational Review
The ILS Plan is reviewed and discussions with the functional areas
handling the support.conducted prior to operational testing. During the operational
testing period, the ship's ILS related documentation and records are reviewed,
maintainability demonstrations are performed and a supportability assessment is
conducted. The RAN is currently developing a routine in-service RM&A data
collection and analysis system, however, until that is operational, the data is
collected and analysed on an 'as required' basis by the Trials Authority.
In summary, the principles of operational suitability assessment are
common between the USN and RAN. Although assessments by the RAN have
become less objective and more subjective over recent years, the assessment of
RM&A is still in its infancy. Both Navies recognise the importance of data
collection, however, the RAN needs experienced personnel to design tests and
analyse results.
4. OT&E Coordination
The USN recognises the importance of coordination between authorities in
the successful achievement of T&E. The USN T&E coordinator is responsible to the
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Director, Test, Evaluation and Technology Requirements (N091). They are
essentially the OPNAV Staff coordinator for Navy T&E, providing a primary
contact point for all parties and setting up T&E briefings and meetings. Their
responsibilities include the chairmanship of the Test and Evaluation Coordination
Group (TECG) for each major program. [Ref. 37] TECGs are used for complex,
multifaceted programs which require extensive T&E coordination. Membership of
a TECG includes the Program Manager, the Sponsor, COMOPTEVFOR, a logistics
coordinator and others as appropriate (such as a PREINSURV representative).
TECG recommendations are considered for inclusion in the TEMP. [Ref. 1 l:p. 15]
Some of the functions of a TECG are the early definition of terms, measures of
effectiveness and how these are to be measured, and the criteria for acceptable or not
acceptable. Of note is the formation of a TECG does not imply a joint test team
approach. Each T&E agency remains fully and solely responsible for conducting
and reporting the types and phases of T&E for which it is accountable.
In the RAN, a T&E Planning Group (TEPG) is formed prior to TEMP
development under the leadership of the T&E manager for the project. Foundation
members of the TEPG are the Project Director, Project Sponsor, the Design
Approval Authority and RANTAU, with other parties seconded/called upon as
required. [Ref. 44:p. 5] The TEPG analyses T&E requirements and estimates
resources required to meet the requirements.
The function of these groups is similar, however, the USN TECG is led by
the Director, Test, Evaluation and Technology Requirements (N091) under the
CNO, whereas the RAN TEPG is led by each individual Project Director through
this T&E manager. Despite their best intentions. Project Directors are essentially
driven by cost and schedule considerations, not the overall T&E adequacy of their
project. To be truly objective, each TEPG should be chaired by the authority
responsible for ensuring the adequacy of the RAN's overall T&E program.
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5. OT&E Reporting
Reports provide the OT&E authority's conclusions regarding a system's
operational effectiveness and suitability, and his recommendations regarding the
systems future, i.e., acceptance, further development, additional OT&E, etc. The
USN system has three basic principles for OT&E reports:
• Impartial
• Complete and Thorough
• Sole Reporter
The conduct of OT&E must be impartial and not influenced by the program
manager or contractors during testing and analysis. COMOPTEVFOR's
conclusions are based on a complete and thorough analysis. A report covers a
complete OT&E phase (e.g., OT-IIIA), relating the test results to the COIs and
addressing the objectives stated in the TEMP. Quick-look and interim reports are
usually sent only if the testing could not be completed or when directed by the CNO.
Although the final report may be a surprise to other authorities. OT&E results and
analysis are reported through one authority only. Comments from the Commanding
Officer of the ship under test ship, for example, are sent only to COMOPTEVFOR.
All operational test data is considered to be the owned by COMOPTEVFOR until
the final report is signed.
Within the RAN, the OT&E Authority coordinates the issue of trials
reports, however, they are issued on completion of each segment of OT&E e.g., o/c
ASW phase of OT-3 etc. Quicklook reports are also routinely sent on completion of
each week's testing. The ship under test also often provides a report, however, it is
usually forwarded to their operational authority and the Project in addition to the
Trials Authority. For the results of PAT&E, rapid feedback is necessary to ensure
timely rectification of defects. However, OT&E results may indicate system
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deficiencies against user requirements rather than equipment defects, so the results
need to be fully analysed and the implications assessed before being reported to a
wider audience. The RAN practice of OT&E reporting probably stems again from
the lack of delineation between types of T&E and the combined PAT&E / OT&E
nature of the RAN's OT-3 testing
.
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6. OT&E Personnel Selection and Training
OT&E is a specialised discipline, with its own philosophy and
methodology, and so requires a specialist approach with knowledge and experience
to make it effective.
a. Selection
The U.S. community involved with ship OT&E select and conduct
limited training for their military personnel. Although there are no special selection
requirements for detailing military personnel for service as Test Directors in
OPTEVFOR, broad ship operations experience and combat system knowledge are
preferred. For particular programs, OPTEVFOR make use of subject area experts,
either resident or borrowed from a non-interested party. Military personnel required
by DOT&E are selected by background and expertise, preferably war college
graduates with joint experience.
No special selection criteria is involved for posting OT&E personnel
within the RAN, although like the USN, broad ship operations experience and
combat system knowledge are preferred. Very few personnel have had any T&E
experience prior to joining the OT&E authority. Also currently the OT&E authority
is viewed by some as not being career enhancing for warfare personnel.
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b. Training
COMOPTEVFOR conducts a four day Operational Test Director's
(OTD) overview course covering the major areas of OT&E. Further details of this
course are included in Appendix A. They also run adhoc segment courses which
provide acquaints or updates on OT&E subjects e.g., analysis, test plan development
and threat updates. To assist their personnel in managing OT&E, OPTEVFOR
publishes the OT&E Director's Guide which documents their philosophy and
methodology. [Ref. 21] Other authorities involved with OT&E also send personnel
to attend this course. Although DOT&E does not conduct courses for new staff, a
one month handover is usually required.
The RAN has no training courses on OT&E, or on T&E in general. A
number of officers have completed the USN Operational Test Directors Course in
recent years which has improved the knowledge and understanding of OT&E within
CTE's organisation considerably. These courses have been arranged on an ad-hoc
basis through overseas visit submissions rather than as pre-requisite courses for
particular billets. For guidance of trials personnel and other authorities, CTE has
developed a number of Standard Operating Procedures addressing certain aspects of
OT&E.
c. Career Path
Although some personnel may develop into OT&E specialists, no
career path in OT&E is consciously provided in the USN, and no naval personnel
currently serving in DOT&E have served previously in OPTEVFOR. Similarly in
the RAN, no career path in T&E is provided.
To be effective, OT&E ideally requires current, experienced,
knowledgable personnel with high professional credibility within their field of
expertise. To achieve this, selection of suitable personnel, adequate training and
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good guidance documentation is required, and preferably a career path where OT&E
is seen as suitable career progression by such capable personnel.
H. OT&E IMPLEMENTATION
Recent ship projects illustrate how these policies and procedures are
implemented. The USN DDG-51 program employs a new hull with a new,
evolutionary combat system. Noteworthy aspects of DDG-51 OT&E included OT-
II on both combat and propulsion systems LBTS to gain an early indication of
potential operational effectiveness and suitability which supported the decision to
approve the DDG-51 to go beyond Low Rate Initial Production. Another
characteristic of the DDG-51 program was "Whole Ship" OT&E where the whole
ship is viewed as an integrated warfare system, rather than as a platform for
individual warfare systems. OT-3 was conducted in a dedicated period following
CSSQT and Final Contract Trials (but before the workup) to support a Fleet
Introduction decision. It consisted of fully assessed, free play multi-threat scenarios
with the emphasis on operational realism.
The implementation of OT&E policy within the RAN is best demonstrated by
reviewing examples of ship OT&E conducted to date, and that planned for ships due
to enter service in the near future.
The three RAN DDGs underwent a major modernisation and refit over the
period 1987-1991. The major modernisation occurred with the ships' combat
system, command and control system, sensors and weapons, with the aim of
increasing the *supportability' of the systems rather than increasing the ships'
capability. As a low operational risk project, the OT&E followed the established
RAN policy, however, it was the first to actually implement an OT-4 period to more
fully assess operational effectiveness and operational suitability leading to OA.
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Two US FFG-7 class frigates, known as Australian Frigates (AF), are being
built in Australia. The AF is a low operational risk project, except for the addition
of the Mulloka sonar. The OT&E followed the established RAN policy, however, it
failed to plan an OT-4 period to more fully assess operational effectiveness and
operational suitability of the Mulloka sonar.
Australia and New Zealand are cooperating in the building of the ANZAC
frigate. Essentially a MEKO 200 design incorporating a combination of European
and US equipment, the design is classified as low risk, although modifications to the
design were necessary to meet RAN requirements. Although only in the early
stages, the planned OT&E for the ANZAC ship follows the established RAN policy,
with the OT-3 period combined with the SQT, being conducted prior to AINS. The
ship class has a higher operational risk than either the modernised DDG or the AF.
The RAN is building six boats, known as the Collins class, to the Swedish
Kockums Type 471 design. They will be the first submarines to be constructed in
Australia and will have a unique equipment fit These submarines possibly have the
highest operational risk of all current major RAN combatant projects. Consequently
the increased need for OT&E has been recognised. The planned OT&E program
demonstrates a departure from the usual RAN OT&E policy, and reflects a growing
awareness of the need to separate DT and OT activities, and to include a dedicated
OT-3 period after the usual SQT and ORE.
These examples of RAN implementation of ship OT&E policy illustrates a
number of key issues. The operational risk of ship projects within the RAN is
increasing, leading to a growing awareness for the increased need for ship OT&E.
Significant differences in OT&E implementation between the USN and RAN
are, first, that the RAN does not generally conduct OT&E to support the production
or purchase decision of ships. Second, the RAN has relied on the results of a
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combined SQT and OT-3 period to provide a basis for AINS, whereas the USN
conduct a "whole ship" dedicated OT-3 phase to support Fleet Introduction.
L SUMMARY
The USN and RAN have similar acquisition systems and similar fundamental
definitions of T&E. However, the OT&E systems differ in a number of significant
areas. Both Navies appreciate the importance of T&E in the acquisition process,
however, the level of importance of T&E, and OT&E in particular, differs greatly.
The USN recognises that without OT&E, it risks deploying systems which cannot
adequately perform significant portions of their missions, thus degrading its
deterrent/defensive capabilities and endangering the safety of military personnel
who operate and maintain the systems. The importance of OT&E within the RAN is
not specifically addressed in any T&E policy document. The USN places emphasis
on OT&E leading to full scale production where the majority of a project's funding
is spent. In contrast, the RAN system places a high priority on the post production
phase.
The RAN has adapted the more detailed USN T&E definitions to suit its own
requirements. During this process, the RAN has lost the distinction between the
types of T&E and often confuses OT&E with PAT&E / DT&E. USN OT&E policy
has its basis in statutes approved by Congress. The RAN has no such formal basis
and its OT&E policy is embedded in the more general T&E policy.
The USN OT&E organisation is well structured with comprehensive
responsibilities for each participant, and clearly delineated from the DT&E
structure. Following a number of recent reorganisations, the RAN's OT&E structure
is in disarray, with no clear policy maker for T&E in general, or OT&E in particular,
lacks functional authorities with T&E knowledge to advise Project Directors, and its
OT&E authority is buried in the in-service area of the Maritime Command.
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Both Navies have similar policies and procedures for acceptance of ships from
contractors and then into service. Each Navy uses similar terminology, but these
have different meanings. OT&E results in the USN is now having a greater input on
ship acceptance. Although the RAN has traditionally included OT&E in support of
AINS, the nature of the testing has really been more DT&E / PAT&E rather than true
OT&E.
The USN OT&E system has, by necessity, developed into a well organised,
well documented and effective system. The RAN system, on the other hand, suffers
from confusing T&E policy documentation, a weak OT&E organisation structure
and a general lack of OT&E knowledge and appreciation. The determination of the
OT&E required has traditionally not been achieved early enough in the life of a
project, and so project funding has not included the provision for OT&E. However,
OT&E awareness and knowledge within the RAN is growing as evidenced by the
proposed Collins class post delivery trials.
The RAN OT&E system, although originally based on USN OT&E philosophy,
now differs in the importance, interpretation, application and focus of OT&E As a
result of organisation changes, it now lacks the ability to effectively manage overall
T&E, let alone OT&E, within the RAN. To achieve efficient and effective trials and
acceptance of the new higher risk combatants currently under construction, the RAN
OT&E system needs to be revised to fully support the acquisition process.
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VI. A MODEL FOR OT&E IN THE RAN
This chapter proposes a model for the OT&E system in the RAN. The OT&E
principles derived from the USN system are used to develop a system to suit RAN
requirements.
A. TEST & EVALUATION DEFINITIONS
The basis for the OT&E system are clear definitions of the types and phases of
T&E. The RAN should continue to recognise the three types ofT&E associated with
ships. The current definitions listed in the CPO Manual [Ref. 38] should be amended
to better suit the Australian Defence environment.
1. Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
The DT&E definition remains unchanged as follows:
DT&E is conducted to assist the engineering design and development process,
and to verify attainment of technical performance specifications and
objectives.
The proposed phases of DT&E are detailed in Table 19. The three phases
TABLE 19: PROPOSED PHASES OF DT&E
Current RAN Description DT Proposed RAN Description
Validation of design concept. DT-1 Validation of design concept.




DT-3 Demonstration that production meets required
technical characteristics or establish standards for
first of class. PAT&E is a form of DT-3.
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are retained, however, the DT-2 definition is amended to clarify the meaning of
"proving design", and the DT-3 phase now recognises that PAT&E is a form of
DT&E.
2. Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation (PAT&E)
The definition of PAT&E is revised to recognise that it is conducted not
only during the contract period, but also during subsequent RAN testing:
PAT&E is conducted on production items to ensure systems meet technical
specifications and requirements, and is a type ofDT&E.
The proposed phases of PAT&E are listed in Table 20. Phases PAT-0 to PAT-
5 remain unchanged. PAT-6 is amended to delete any connection with OT-3, as under
the proposed model OT-3 will now be conducted separately. The PAT-7 phase is
deleted as no PAT&E is conducted during the OT-4 phase of testing.
TABLE 20: PROPOSED PHASES OF PAT&E
Current RAN Description PAT&E Proposed RAN Description
Design and engineering
development tests
PAT-0 Design and engineering
development tests
Production and burn-in tests PAT-1 Production and burn-in tests
Environmental qualification tests PAT-2 Environmental qualification tests
System development tests PAT-3 System development tests
Harbour testing PAT^ Harbour testing
Sea testing PAT-5 Sea testing
Operational and Qualification Tnals
(conducted with OT-3)
PAT-6 Certification and Qualification
Tnals




3. Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
The definition of OT&E is revised along USN lines, so that it more
accurately describes the purpose and nature of OT&E:
OT&E is conducted to determine a system's operational effectiveness and
operational suitability, identify system deficiencies and the needfor potential
modifications to meet established OT thresholds, and develop tactics. OT&E
has three distinguishing characteristics:
• // is conducted in an operationally representative environment.
• It is conducted on production representative equipment using fleet personnel
for operation and maintenance.
• It is conducted against a threat-representative simulated enemy carrying out
threat tactics per the latest threat assessment.
The proposed phases of OT&E are described in Table 21. These amended
definitions include reference to the acquisition milestones they support. The
reference to OPEVAL in the OT-2 phase has been deleted, as the RAN uses the term
OPEVAL as an abbreviation for an operational evaluation in any OT phase. The
reference to a prototype in OT-2 has also been deleted as OT-2 may also be
conducted in a LBTS, or on a sample system if the proposed purchase is "off the
shelf. The OT-3 phase is revised to delete the Certification /Qualification Trials as
they are now recognised as PAT&E. The definition of OT&E includes the use of
normal fleet personnel so this wording has been deleted from the phase definitions.
The OT-5 phase is amended to cover all in-service OT&E which could be conducted
to assess new applications, new tactics, revised threat, etc. Reference to defect
rectification is deleted also as it is a sub-phase of OT-4, and the assessments of
modernisations and modifications are deleted as they would be new OT-2 or OT-3
phases.
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TABLE 21: PROPOSED PHASES OF OT&E
Current RAJS Description OT Proposed RAN Description
Operational assessment of the
development proposal
OT-1 Operational assessment of the
development proposal to support Full
Scale Engineering Development
approval.
Demonstration of achievement of
program requirements for operational
effectiveness and suitability of a
prototype (OPEVAL) to support
proceeding to full production
OT-2 Demonstration of achievement of
program requirements for operational
effectiveness and suitability to support
a production or purchase decision.
Demonstration of achievement of
program requirements for operational
effectiveness and suitability on
production of ship/aircraft/system,
normally in independent operations





OT-3 Demonstration of achievement of
program requirements for operational
effectiveness and operational
suitability on production of ship/
aircraft/system to support Acceptance




Demonstration of achievement of
program requirements for operational
effectiveness and operational
suitability on production of ship/
aircraft/system using normal Fleet





OT4 Demonstration of achievement of
program requirements for operational
effectiveness and operational
suitability on production of ship/
aircraft/system in a multi-force, multi-
threat environment to support
Operational Acceptance. Includes
detailed reliability, maintainability,
availability and logistic supportability
assessments.
Follow-on OT for assessment after
modernisations, new applications or
defect rectifications after OT-4.
OT-5 In-service OT&E, which could include
new applications, new tactics, revised
threat, etc.
173
4. T&E Types in Total Ship Test Program
The Total Ship Test Program (TSTP) concept is now well established in
RAN shipbuilding projects, although modified from the U.S. system. These refined
T&E phases can be incorporated into an amended TSTR However, instead of being
grouped together as in the current TSTP, the DT&E and OT&E events are separate
categories of testing. Because these separate DT&E, PAT&E and OT&E events are
integrated within the TSTP, these trials are termed collectively as "Integrated Tests
and Trials", which is an extension of the current RAN application of this term. The
proposed categories of ITT are listed in Table 22.
TABLE 22: CATEGORIES OF ITT
ITT Part ITT Category T&E Type Description
ITT Part 1 ITT-O* PAT-0 Design and engineering development tests
ITT-1 PAT-1 Production and burn-in tests
ITT-2 * PAT-2 Environmental qualification tests
ITT-3* PAT-3 System development tests
riT-4 PAT-4 Harbour testing
ITT-5 PAT-5 Sea testing
ITT Part 2 ITT-6 DT-3 / PAT-6 Certification and Qualification Trials
ITT-7* OT-3 Operational T&E
ITT Part 3 ITT-8* OTA Follow on Operational T&E
Note: * Only performed on first of class
The Certification and Qualification trials (ITT-6) are classified as DT&E for
the first of class only, as standards of performance are established. For follow-on
ships these trials are classed as PAT&E, as the standards established by the first of
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class become the benchmark to be achieved by follow-on ships. ITT-0, ITT-2, ITT-
3 and ITT-7 tests are performed only on the first of class. ITT-8 testing would only
be performed once for a ship class, but may be conducted progressively on any ship
of the class.
B. T&E IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
To ensure the progressive assessment of operational effectiveness and
operational suitability during the acquisition process, OT&E is scheduled towards
the end of each acquisition phase, usually after the DT phase. The proposed T&E
schedule is shown in Figure 25. No change is suggested to the current relationship
between OT&E phases and acquisition milestones, however, the figure separates
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Figure 25: Proposed Test and Evaluation in the Acquisition Process
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As the construction of proven overseas ship designs adapted to RAN
requirements, does not require the conduct of OT-2 prior to a production or purchase
decision, the first opportunity to evaluate potential operational effectiveness and
operational suitability may be in a LBTS after the production decision has been
made. To ensure consistency of terminology, this testing should not be termed OT-
2 as it does not support a production or purchase decision. It should be classified as
the first phase of OT-3.
C. RAN OT&E ORGANISATION
The objective of an OT&E organisation structure is to provide effective OT&E
to support the acquisition process, and hence the combat effectiveness of the RAN.



























Figure 26: Proposed RAN OT&E Organisation
176
can be achieved by devoting appropriate resources of both personnel and funding,
by considering the requirements of all functional areas concerned with OT&E, and
by coordinating these different functions.
1. Policy Maker and Overseer
An authority is required to formulate OT&E policy, and to evaluate and
oversee the OT&E process. OT&E policy should come from an operational, not
technical, functional area. HQADF now contains the centralised force development
and user requirements organisation. As OT&E is the feedback of the performance of
the final product against the user requirement, then ideally, the head policy maker
and overseer of OT&E should be within HQADF or DoD, along the lines of the U.S.
system.
A shorter term, RAN-only, solution would be to include the overseer and
policy maker function within the revised Director General Naval Policy and Warfare
(DGNPW) organisation under DCNS. Although this area has recently been reduced,
DGNPW still retains the responsibility for naval warfare information and expertise.
The Director of Naval Warfare (DNW), under DGNPW, provides an information
brokerage service to senior level management. He currently has a secondary
function of providing naval warfare input to the Defence Capability Proposals
developed by HQADF, and providing advice on naval warfare operations,
equipment and personnel aspects. [Ref. 55:p. A-4] The responsibility of providing
advice and input on OT&E matters, as part of the OT&E policy maker and overseer
function for the RAN, is seen as a natural extension to these current responsibilities.
2. Sponsor
The Sponsor of major naval acquisitions is DGFD(Sea) within HQADF.
Traditionally in the RAN, it has been the Sponsor's responsibility to initially
determine the T&E requirements in an acquisition program and to detail those
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requirements in the capability proposal. To be able to determine the appropriate
nature and extent of OT&E required, the Sponsor needs access to OT&E knowledge
and experience. A close relationship needs to be maintained by DGFD(Sea) with the
OT&E policy maker and the OT&E authority (Note dotted line).
3. Developing Agency
The Materiel Division under ACMAT-N, performs the Developing Agency
function within the RAN. Currently major combatant projects establish a T&E
manager, with the larger ones also establishing a manager exclusively for post
delivery trials. For example, the Australian Frigate Project has a Post Delivery Test
and Trials manager, and the New Submarine Project has just established a
Submarine Project Transition and AINS manager. However, ACMAT-N does not
have a central T&E policy authority to advise these T&E managers. Although the
Director of Naval Equipment Production (DNEP) has responsibility for providing
specialist technical advice on technical/engineering activities, which includes trials
and acceptance of equipment [Ref. 64], he specialises more in advice for contract
management than for post delivery T&E.
To assist all RAN projects with T&E matters, an authority is required
within the Materiel Division whose responsibilities would include assisting Project
Directors in complying with policies, incorporating lessons learned from previous
projects and reviewing the T&E aspects of projects at major milestones. Although
primarily a DT&E policy authority, this office would also have an input into the
OT&E process by reviewing the TEMP, and by advising projects how to prepare for
OT&E. The Director General Naval Engineering Requirements (DGNER) is
currently responsible for the design, development, acceptance into service and
through life support of ships. This engineering policy directorate appears to be well
suited to the DT&E policy and review function.
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4. OT&E Tester & Evaluator
Ideally, the OT&E Tester & Evaluator should be independent and focus
exclusively on OT&E. He should also have operational credibility and influence in
operational matters relating to OT&E. The current OT&E Tester and Evaluator,
Commander, Test and Evaluation (CTE), within the Maritime Command is
independent from developing and production agencies, but is responsible to the end
user of the system. This arrangement has advantages to CTE of access to
knowledgeable and experienced fleet staff warfare officers and fleet planners for
assistance in trials planning and assessment. However, there are possible
disadvantages to this lack of independence from the end user. The Maritime
Commander may have aims and objectives which could conflict with the total
impartiality of OT&E reporting. As the Maritime Commander establishes
scheduling priorities for his resources, priority given to OT&E is subject to the
politics of requirements and funding. OT&E may take a low priority behind
operations and training. The Maritime Commander may also not wish to "stress" the
system during OT&E, in case he perceives that operational deficiencies so
highlighted may be seen as having some reflection on his own organisation.
CTE is currently multifunctional, conducting DT&E and PAT&E in
addition to OT&E. This results in a lack of differentiation within CTE's organisation
between DT&E/PAT&E and OT&E. Also being placed under the inservice
engineering area of the Maritime Command, he lacks visibility and influence within
the warfare community and hence credibility in operational matters critical to
OT&E. CTE's OT&E responsibilities are overshadowed by his DT&E/PAT&E
duties.
To achieve the advantages of DT&E and OT&E separation, a revised
organisation is proposed, similar to that outlined by the former RANTAU in
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Reference 63. All CTE's current DT&E/PAT&E responsibilities, and those already
the responsibility of CSO(E), would remain with an in-service trials team under
CSO(E). This trials team, headed by an engineering branch officer, would be formed
from the current CTE technical personnel, and could also conduct certifications,
Light Off Examinations, and the technical aspects of Ship Qualification Trials. The
team would provide technical assistance and advice to a separate OT&E trials team.
CTE's OT&E duties would be removed and managed by a separate group,
Commander, OT&E (COT&E), working under an operational authority. There are
two such authorities within the Maritime Command; the Chief Staff Officer
(Operations) (CSO(O)) who is responsible for plans and operations, and
Commodore Flotillas (COMFLOT) who is responsible for Fleet readiness. As
OT&E is the assessment of operational effectiveness and suitability, COT&E should
be responsible to COMFLOT. Headed by a Warfare branch officer, COT&E would
manage the post delivery trials period for all ships from the MHQ perspective. He
would still manage the SQT, which, although not true OT&E, still has some
operational input which could not be met by the in-service trials team under
CSO(E). He would be the OT&E authority with responsibilities to manage all RAN
OT&E including OT-3,which is now only conducted on first of class.
5. OT&E Organisation Summary
This proposed reorganisation achieves the aim of DT&E/OT&E separation
with some concessions necessary due to manpower constraints. Also, by including
OT&E under COMFLOT and managed by a Warfare Officer, OT&E could achieve
the visibility, credibility and influence necessary within the RAN.
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D. RAN OT&E POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
1. OT&E Policy Documentation
RAN T&E documentation needs to be clear, concise and comprehensive so
that is serves as a valid reference and guide for all personnel involved with T&E. To
correct the current inconsistent and out of date documentation, a major rewrite,
rather than just updating is required. This rewrite ofT&E documentation could be
the vehicle by which the T&E system within the RAN is overhauled. Before the
documentation is revised, T&E definitions and terminology need to agreed within
the RAN and DoD. Then the OT&E and DT&E organisations within the RAN need
to be resolved, and the appropriate policies decided. This could be achieved by the
development of a revised RAN T&E DI(N), followed by ABR 1921 which would be
firmly based on the T&E DI(N).
2. Independence of OT&E Agency
Given that the proposed COT&E is organisationally independent from the
developing and production agencies, his procedural independence should also be
achieved to ensure impartiality and validity of testing. When OT&E is conducted, it
should not be influenced by the Project or DAA. No Project or DAA personnel
should be present during testing. A final report only should be issued by the
Maritime Commander, with no progress or interim report (unless the testing is
unusually lengthy), to allow full analysis and evaluation of the test results. This
applies to OT&E conduct and reporting only. As the SQT period is classified as
PAT&E it should continue to be conducted with the cooperation and assistance of
Project authorities. Similarly, to ensure test validity and impartiality, contractors
should not be present during OT&E.
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3. T&E Planning
The RAN has embraced the U.S. TEMP concept as the single executive
document for the management of T&E for major acquisitions. Although required
early in a project, recent TEMPs have not been raised until after project funding has
been approved. TEMPS need to be approved earlier to enable inclusion of post
delivery PAT&E/DT&E and OT-3 in the Project Budget, and OT-4 in MHQ budget.
The authority for DCNS to release the TEMP was based on his role as Project
Sponsor. With HQADF now assuming this role, the DCNS function in TEMP
development is unclear. The TEMP review process should be reviewed as part of the
proposed OT&E system.
A T&E Planning Group (TEPG) is currently formed prior to TEMP
development under the leadership of the T&E manager for the project to analyse
T&E requirements and estimate resources required. The TEPG is similar to the USN
TECG with one significant difference. The USN TECG is led by the Director, Test,
Evaluation and Technology Requirements (N091) under the CNO, whereas the
RAN TEPG is led by each individual Project Director through this T&E manager.
Despite their best intentions. Project Directors are essentially driven by cost and
schedule considerations, not the overall T&E adequacy of their project. To be truly
objective, each TEPG should be chaired by the authority responsible for ensuring
the adequacy of the RAN's overall T&E program. The proposed RAN OT&E policy
maker and overseer, DGNPW's organisation, may best be suited to the chairmanship
of each TEPG.
4. Combined DT&E and OT&E
With the recognition of the differences between DT&E/PAT&E and OT&E
the RAN can now appreciate the advantages and difficulties of combined DT&E/
PAT&E and OT&E. By classifying SQT as PAT&E, and conducting a separate OT-
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3 period for first of class, the conduct of combined and/or concurrent DT&E/PAT&E
and OT&E can be addressed on the requirements of each individual trial.
5. Foreign Weapons Evaluation
Despite the most recent Australian Government "White Paper" on Defence
Policy [Ref. 6:p. 70] requiring the need to be able to determine the performance in
the Australian environment of equipment of both overseas and local origin, no DoD
or RAN T&E policy specifically addresses the evaluation of foreign systems. The
proposed revision of the OT&E system, and consequent DT&E revision, would
result in a more credible and useful organisation. Policies could then be developed
regarding OT&E and DT&E in the evaluation of foreign weapons systems. The
current process of evaluations of foreign weapons by adhoc Project Teams could be
modified to include greater formal involvement by T&E authorities.
6. Land Based Test Sites
LBTS can be used to highlight problems of operational effectiveness and
suitability early in system development. Although LBTS are part of both recent
major RAN combatant projects, the conduct of OT&E in these sites is planned to be
limited to a non-interference basis with system development and integration. OT&E
needs to be conducted during a dedicated period in the LBTS following successful
DT&E, to gain an estimate of the potential operational effectiveness and suitability
of the system. Again, the need for early planning to include OT&E in schedules and
funding is highlighted.
7. Whole Ship Testing
The current OT&E to support an Acceptance into Naval Service (AINS)
decision (OT-3) is little more than an extended SQT period where DT&E/PAT&E is
conducted with some operational assessment. It is not considered to be adequate to
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assess the first of a new ship class against the user requirement. To assess the
operational effectiveness and suitability of a ship against the user requirement with
the degree of confidence required for the Acceptance Board to support an AINS
decision, a dedicated, free play, scenario based, OT-3 period is required. The
proposed Delivery to AINS trials schedule, which is based on that currently
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Figure 27: Proposed Delivery to AINS Trials Schedule
OT-3 should be conducted after the ship has completed the SQT and
Operational Readiness Evaluation to ensure that the testing is conducted on a
worked up and materially proven ship. To be effective the testing should be
conducted of the overall ship as a complete weapons system. The recent USN
innovation of "whole ship testing" provides a good example of the testing proposed.
Whole ship testing includes engineering and technical problems combined with
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combat system activity. It emphasises operational realism by testing the ship as
though in war, and is designed to provide a realistic threat in an operational
environment, and an element of surprise to provide realistic tests to support
completion of the OT&E objectives and resolutions of the COIs.
The OT-4 period leading to Operational Acceptance (OA) proposed in this
OT&E model is also based on the schedule currently proposed by CTE for HMAS
COLLINS. An example of an AINS to OA trials schedule is shown in Figure 28.
Figure 28: Proposed AINS to OA Trials Schedule
It includes a long term RM&A and ILS evaluation, further testing to
achieve statistically significant results in critical areas and the assessment of the
operational effectiveness and operational suitability of the ship in a major exercise
and on deployment.
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E. RAN SHIP ACCEPTANCE
The Acceptance Board, with its broader experience and knowledge than Trials
Authority, is generally agreed within the RAN as being successful as a board of
review of the planning and results of T&E for individual projects, and
recommending PA and AINS. As an ad-hoc organisation consisting of various
functional specialists brought together part time, however, the AB suffers from a
number of problems.
The AB requires guidance as to its role and functions, T&E philosophy and the
procedures of the acceptance process. Although the AB attempts to obtain sufficient
guidance from the T&E documentation, it has found this documentation to be
unclear and conflicting. To enable AB consistency and development, the Board
needs an administrator, or permanent VP. RANTAU was the administrator and
provided guidance to the Board, with CTE now assuming this role. However, the
AB should be independent from the T&E authority as it assesses the trials planned
and conducted by that authority.
With only DT&E/PAT&E and the minimal operational aspects of the previous
OT-3 testing conducted by the RAN, the AB have tended to focus on materiel
deficiencies. With a more comprehensive OT-3 period proposed to be conducted,
the AB members could more effectively use their knowledge and experience in
assessing the results of OT&E against the user requirement rather than on
workmanship and materiel deficiencies.
The AB should be convened for the first of class only, providing the specialist
expertise to interpret requirements and determine the level of acceptability required
for AINS. The AB consists of Naval Officers drawn part-time from their normal
jobs, and so the cost appears to be minimal. The AB, however, has a high
opportunity cost, which is the value of the next best alternative on which the
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members could be working instead of serving on the Board. Once the first of class
is accepted the Board's task is complete. The interpretations and levels of
acceptability established by the AB then guide the trials authority in recommending
acceptance of each of the remaining ships.
F. RAN OT&E PROCEDURES
1. Assessment of Operational Effectiveness
With the proposed inclusion of a dedicated OT-3 period, the OT&E
authority will need to develop tests for a free play, scenario based environment
specifically designed to assess the COIs against the User Requirements. This could
be achieved along USN lines where each COI and its related operational
effectiveness objective is examined and the information needed to be known to
enable each objective to be assessed is determined. The test design would have to
take into consideration data collection methods and range considerations. The
analysis of these tests may be different from the weapons analysis currently
performed. Current weapons analysis focuses on individual weapon system
performance, usually from "fire push" to "weapon destruct", whereas whole ship
testing in a free play environment would require a broader analysis. An increased of
use modeling & simulation may also be required to assess some systems in a cost
effective manner. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate these
requirements, however, close liaison between the OT&E authority and the RAN's
current analysis groups will be required to achieve valid testing and subsequent
analysis.
2. Assessment of Operational Suitability
The current operational suitability areas now assessed are considered valid.
These are listed in Table 23.
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Integrated Logistic Support including:
Maintenance Planning
Supply Support
Support and Test Equipment
Technical Data and Documentation
Manpower and Personnel
Training and Training Devices
Facilities
Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transport
Computer Support
Configuration Control
The assessment of operational suitability, especially for the RAN's current
combatant projects, should focus on interoperability and compatibility as these
present the highest risks with the integration of proven equipment in a unique
combination in a ship platform.
The assessment of ILS should continue to be conducted in two phases:
• ILS Structural Review. Conducted prior to operational testing, this review
assesses if the ILS intended to provided will support the ILS policy of the
Project.
• ILS Operational Review. During the operational testing period, the ship's
ILS related documentation and records are reviewed, maintainability
demonstrations are performed and a supportability assessment is conducted.
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RM&A data is collected and analysed during OT-3 to give an indication of
performance prior to AINS, and then continued for 12 months during the OT-4
phase. The data should continue to be collected and analysed on an "as required",
vice continuous, basis by the Trials Authority until the RAN develops its routine in-
service RM&A data collection and analysis system. The analysis of RM&A data is
a specialist task, currently outside the experience of most uniformed personnel. To
achieve significant and valid results, an RM&A analysis capability needs to be
established, possibly within the Maritime Command's weapons assessing area.
3. OT&E Personnel, Training and Career Management
An effective OT&E system is dependent on knowledgable and experienced
personnel. OT&E is a specialised discipline, with its own philosophy and
methodology, however, very few personnel have had any T&E experience
knowledge prior to joining the OT&E authority. This makes training important, but
the RAN has no training courses on OT&E, or on T&E in general. A number of
officers have completed the USN Operational Test Directors Course in recent years
which has proved beneficial to the knowledge and understanding of OT&E within
CTE. This course should be a pre-requisite for key billets within the OT&E authority
until the RAN develops enough knowledge and expertise to develop its own course.
Although the USN OTD course is only of a weeks' duration, it is understood that the
USN is investigating a more comprehensive course. Other authorities also require
training in OT&E. The OT&E authority needs to develop acquaint courses for other
personnel with a need to understand OT&E e.g., Project T&E managers and
capability requirements developers. Also to increase the awareness of OT&E in the
RAN, the OT&E authority needs to deliver presentations regularly to Project
Directors Courses, the ILS Management and Acquisition Course (ILSMAC),
Defence management courses, and other appropriate acquisition courses.
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Although some personnel may develop into OT&E specialists, no career
path in OT&E is provided in the RAN. The warfare officer functional heads within
the OT&E authority cannot currently aspire to command of the authority as that
position is currently a Weapons Electrical Engineer's billet. The proposed change of
the head of the OT&E authority to a Warfare Officer as COT&E should provide a
career path within the authority. As the credibility of OT&E increases, the
knowledge and experience gained by warfare officers in this area will be seen to be
of more benefit in future warfare related positions, thus enabling a longer term career
path. The proposed employment of COT&E under COMFLOT should also be more
career enhancing for operations personnel than the current arrangement under
CSO(E).
The professionalism and knowledge of T&E personnel could be enhanced
by membership in a related professional organisation. The International Test and
Evaluation Association (ITEA) is one such professional organisation.
Headquartered in the U.S. with a chapter in Australia, the association encourages the
development and exchange of technical information in the field of test and
evaluation. The corporate membership of a suitable professional organisation may
be worthwhile to the RAN.
G. OT&E MODEL SUMMARY
The basis for this OT&E model are clear definitions of the types and phases of
T&E. The current definitions are amended and phases of T&E are refined to better
suit the Australian Defence environment. These refined T&E phases are
incorporated into an amended TSTP, termed collectively as "Integrated Tests and
Trials", which recognises the delineation between DT&E and OT&E. No change is
suggested to the current relationship between OT&E phases and acquisition
milestones.
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The current OT&E organisation structure is modified to enable effective OT&E
to support the acquisition process. It provides for authorities responsible for the
management, policy making and oversight, and specification of OT&E. This
proposed reorganisation closely achieves the aim of DT&E/OT&E separation.
The model proposes the inclusion of a dedicated OT-3 period in a free play,
scenario based environment. The assessment of operational effectiveness is
specifically designed to assess the COIs against the User Requirements and will
require a different approach to analysis. The assessment of operational suitability
focuses on interoperability and compatibility, and the assessment of ILS is achieved
using current methods, but with improved RM&A analysis. This enhanced OT&E
and minor modifications to the AB should provide CNS with a more comprehensive
and thorough recommendation for AINS.
To be effective, OT&E ideally requires current, experienced, knowledgable
personnel with high professional credibility within their field of expertise. To
achieve this, the model includes adequate training, good guidance documentation,
and a career path where OT&E is seen as career progression by capable personnel.
This OT&E model for the RAN uses principles derived from the USN system.
By taking consideration of resource limitations, characteristics and culture of the
RAN, it establishes an effective OT&E organisation which is important to the




The USN OT&E system has, by necessity, developed into a well organised,
well documented and effective, if complex, system. The RAN system, on the other
hand, suffers from conflicting and confusing T&E policy documentation, a weak
OT&E organisation structure and a general lack of OT&E knowledge and
appreciation. The determination of OT&E required has traditionally not been
achieved early enough in the life of a project, and so project funding has not included
the provision for OT&E. The RAN OT&E system, although originally based on
USN OT&E philosophy, now differs in the importance, interpretation, application
and focus of OT&E. As a result of organisation changes, it now lacks the ability to
effectively manage overall T&E, let alone OT&E, at a time when the operational
risk of ship projects is increasing. To achieve efficient and effective trials and
acceptance of the new higher risk warships currently under construction, the RAN
OT&E system needs to be revised.
R SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
1. OT&E in the Acquisition Process
Australia's Defence strategy has progressed from a position of dependence
on allies, to a positive acceptance of both self-reliance and regional influence. To
achieve its Defence goals, however, Australia devotes much less of its resources and
places less priority on R&D than does the U.S. The need for local T&E is recognised
by the Australian Government and DoD, for both indigenous and overseas systems,
however, the importance of OT&E in particular, is not specifically addressed in any
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Australian T&E policy document. This lack of recognition of the importance of
OT&E is perhaps due to the RAN procuring low risk, complete ships in the past
(e.g., FFG-7 class) with the wealth of USN DT&E and OT&E behind it.
U.S. OT&E is viewed as being more important as a basis for a decision to
proceed beyond Low Rate Initial Production, than on the introduction into service
of the final production item. This is because the "big bucks" of most Defence
acquisitions are spent during the production phase. OT&E, however, has started to
play an important role also in the assessment of first of class systems for introduction
into the USN Fleet.
2. OT&E Organisation
The RAN and Australian DoD have reorganised over the past five years to
create a more effective and efficient user requirements organisation, and to better
accord with Program Management and Budgeting principles. However, as a result,
the RAN has no T&E, or OT&E policy maker and overseer, no OT&E coordinator
within Navy Office, and the RAN's OT&E authority is buried within the in-service
engineering management area of the Maritime Command.
3. OT&E Policy
Where USN OT&E policy has its basis in the statutes approved by
Congress, the RAN has no such formal basis and its OT&E policy is embedded in
the more general T&E policy. The RAN has adapted the more detailed USN T&E
definitions to suit its own requirements. During this process, however, the RAN lost
the distinction between the types of T&E, and often confuses OT&E with PAT&E/
DT&E. Overall, RAN T&E documentation is not comprehensive, inconsistent and
fails to provide adequate guidance.
The Commander, Test and Evaluation (CTE), on the staff of the Maritime
Commander, is independent from the development and production agencies, but not
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from the end user, as in the USN. The implications of this lack of independence is
that the end user may have his own aims and objectives which conflict with the total
impartiality of OT&E conduct and reporting.
Despite the most recent Australian Government "White Paper" on Defence
Policy requiring the need to be able to determine the performance in the Australian
environment of equipment of both overseas and local origin, no DoD or RAN T&E
policy specifically addresses the evaluation of foreign systems.
Although used primarily for the purpose of conducting DT&E, the USN has
demonstrated that early OT&E on Land Based Test Sites (LBTS) can give an
estimation of potential operational effectiveness and suitability, and hence identify
potential operational problems early and minimise operational risk. Although LBTS
are being developed for both the ANZAC frigate and Collins submarine projects, the
use of these LBTS for early OT-3 was not planned in the original project schedules,
and so is now subject to them being used on a non-interfering basis to the contractor.
The RAN does not clearly differentiate between the types of T&E, which
leads to DT&E and OT&E often being conducted over the same period, by the same
test team. Although the RAN recognises, by definition, the difference in objectives
and methodology between the types of T&E, no limitations or guidance as to the
possible hazards of this combined testing approach are addressed.
4. Ship Acceptance
As an ad-hoc organisation consisting of various functional specialists
brought together part time, the Acceptance Board (AB) suffers from a number of
problems. It requires guidance as to its role and functions, T&E philosophy and the
procedures of the acceptance process. Although the AB attempts to obtain sufficient
guidance from the T&E documentation, it has found this documentation to be
unclear and conflicting. With only DT&E/PAT&E and the minimal operational
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aspects of the OT-3 testing conducted by the RAN, the AB has tended to focus on
materiel deficiencies, rather than the performance of the first of class against the user
requirement.
5. OT&E Procedures
The RAN recognises that the user requirement is the bench mark for
determining the degree to which a system is effective, and also that operational
effectiveness is best assessed by a performance demonstration by normal operating
personnel in the normal or given environment. Assessing operational effectiveness
has involved analyzing each Critical Operational Issue and then employing modified
Ship Qualification Trial or Fleet Exercise Program techniques to evaluate them. The
RAN has very little guidance on the assessment of operational effectiveness.
The principles of operational suitability assessment are common between
the USN and RAN. Although assessments by the RAN have become more
subjective over recent years, the assessment of RM&A is still in its infancy. The
RAN requires experienced personnel to design suitability tests and analyse results.
The authority for the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS) to release the
Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) was based on his role as Project Sponsor.
Now with HQADF assuming this role, the DCNS function in TEMP development is
unclear. The TEMP approval process requires review.
The RAN Test and Evaluation Planning Group (TEPG) for each major
project is chaired by each individual Project Director through his T&E manager.
Despite their best intentions, Project Directors are essentially driven by cost and
schedule considerations, not the overall T&E adequacy of their project. To be truly
objective, each TEPG should be chaired by the authority responsible for ensuring
the adequacy of the RAN's overall T&E program.
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The early dissemination of OT&E results, before a full analysis is complete
and the implications assessed, can lead to other authorities taking hasty action on
incomplete information, and can prejudice the OT&E authority's final conclusions
and recommendations. OT&E results should indicate system deficiencies against
user requirements rather than equipment defects, so the results need to be fully
analysed and the implications assessed before being reported to a wider audience.
Within the RAN, the current OT&E to support an AINS decision (OT-3) is
little more than an extended SQT period where DT&E/PAT&E is conducted with
some operational assessment. It is not considered to be adequate to assess the first
of a new ship class against the user requirement.
To be effective, OT&E requires experienced and knowledgable personnel
with high professional credibility within their field of expertise. To achieve this
requires selection of suitable personnel, adequate training and good guidance
documentation, and preferably a career path where serving in the OT&E Authority
is seen as career progression by such capable personnel.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
The OT&E model recommended for the RAN uses principles derived from the
USN system. By taking consideration of resource limitations, and the characteristics
and culture of the RAN, it establishes an effective OT&E organisation which is
important to the testing, evaluation and subsequent acceptance decision of the new
combatants.
A. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the proposed OT&E model be reviewed, evaluated and
implemented in the RAN to achieve an effective OT&E system to support the




It is recommended that:
a. the current definitions and phases of ship T&E be amended to better suit
the Australian Defence environment.
b. the current TSTP be revised to show DT&E and OT&E events as
separate categories of testing, and these trials be termed collectively as
Integrated Tests and Trials (ITT).
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2. OT&E Documentation
It is recommended that:
a. the RAN T&E DI(N) and ABR 1921 be revised to achieve
comprehensive and consistent T&E policy guidance.
3. OT&E in the Acquisition Process
It is recommended that:
a. OT&E be conducted, where possible, prior to the production or
purchase decision in the acquisition process to minimise risk.
b. OT-3 be separated from the DT&E /PAT&E post delivery trials.
c. OT-3 be conducted as a dedicated, free play, scenario based period after
the completion of SQT and ORE to ensure testing is conducted on a
worked up and materially proven ship.
d. OT-3 of the overall ship be conducted as a complete weapons system.
4. OT&E Organisation
It is recommended that:
a. the appointment of a DoD OT&E policy maker and overseer within
HQADF be investigated.
b. DGNPW be appointed as the OT&E policy maker and overseer within
the RAN.
c. a close working relationship on T&E matters be required between
DGFD(Sea), DGNPW and the OT&E authority.
d. DGNER be appointed as the Materiel Division T&E agency to assist
Project Directors in complying with policies, incorporate lessons
learned from previous projects, review the T&E aspects of projects at
major milestones, and advise projects how to prepare for OT&E.
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e. the current CTE organisation be disestablished.
f. an "In-service Trials" team be established under CSO(E) to conduct
CTE's current DT&E/PAT&E responsibilities, and those already the
responsibility of CSO(E).
g. Commander, OT&E (COT&E) be established as the RAN's OT&E
authority under COMFLOT, to manage OT&E and the post delivery
trials period for all ships from the MHQ perspective.
5. OT&E Policy
It is recommended that:
a. policy be developed to enable the performance in the Australian
environment of foreign equipment to be evaluated efficiently,
effectively and consistently.
b. the TEMP approval process be reviewed to ensure appropriate
authorities are consulted and approve the TEMP.
c. the TEPG be chaired by DGNPW as the authority appointed to ensure
the adequacy of the RAN's overall T&E program.
d. OT&E not be influenced by the Project or DAA, and that Project or
DAA personnel not be present during testing.
e. contractors not be present during OT&E.
f. TEMPs for non-development projects be approved before production
approval to enable inclusion of post delivery PAT&E/DT&E and OT-3
in the Project Budget, and OT-4 in MHQ budget.
g. OT&E be conducted during a dedicated period in the LBTS following
successful DT&E, to gain an estimate of the potential operational
effectiveness and suitability of the system.
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6. Ship Acceptance
It is recommended that:
a. the Acceptance Board remain as a board of review.
b. the Acceptance Board be convened for the first of class only.
7. OT&E Procedures
It is recommended that:
a. The OT&E authority develop tests for a free play, scenario based
environment specifically designed to assess the COIs against the user
requirement.
b. analysis requirements of these tests be assessed, as they may be
different from the weapons analysis currently performed.
c. experienced personnel assist in designing suitability tests and analysing
results.
d. interoperability and compatibility be a major focus during the
assessment of operational suitability, especially for the RAN's current
combatant projects.
e. an improved RM&A analysis capability be established.
f. RM&A data continue to be collected and analysed on an 'as required'
basis until the RAN develops its routine in-service RM&A data
collection and analysis system
g. OT&E reports be made solely by the OT&E authority.
h. OT&E phase reports be issued only, with no progress or interim reports,
to allow full analysis and evaluation of the test results.
i. the USN Operational Test Director type course be a prerequisite for key
billets within the OT&E authority until the RAN develops enough
knowledge and expertise to develop its own course.
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j. the OT&E authority develop acquaint courses for other personnel with
a need to understand OT&E.
k. the OT&E authority deliver presentations regularly to Project Directors
Courses, the ILS Management and Acquisition Course (ILSMAC).
Defence management courses, and other appropriate acquisition
courses, so to increase the awareness of OT&E in the RAN.
1. a Warfare Officer be appointed to head the OT&E authority,
m. establishing corporate membership of a suitable professional T&E
organisation be investigated.
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APPENDIX A: USN OT&E COURSE SYLLABUS
The Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR)
conducts a four day Operational Test Directors (OTD) course designed to acquaint
prospective Operational Test Directors and other interested personnel with the
fundamentals of OT&E philosophy, terminology, policy and procedures. This
course covers the following subject areas:
Acquisition Program Overview

















Chief of Naval Operations Perspectives
Program Manager Perspectives
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Australian Book of Reference (RAN)
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Development)
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Materiel)
Australian Defence Force (RAN)
Australian Frigate (RAN)
Acceptance into Naval Service (RAN)
Acceptance Management Plan (RAN)




Chief of Capital Procurement (RAN)
Capital Equipment Procurement Manual (RAN)
Close-in Weapons System
Chief of Naval Operations (USN)
Chief of Naval Staff (RAN)



























Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (USN)
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation
Force (USN)
Capital Procurement Organisation (RAN)
Combat System Evaluation (RAN)
Chief Staff Officer (Engineering) (RAN)
Chief Staff Officer (Operations) (RAN)
Combat System Ship Qualification Trial (RAN)
Combat System Trainer (RAN)
Commander Test and Evaluation (RAN)
Design Approval Authority (RAN)
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (RAN)
Guided Missile Destroyer
Defence Force Capability Proposal (RAN)
Director General Force Development (Sea) (RAN)
Director General Naval Policy and Warfare (RAN)
Director General Naval Warfare (RAN)
Defence Instruction (Navy) (RAN)
Defence Logistics Studies Information Exchange
(USN)
Director of Naval User Requirements (RAN)




























Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (USN)
Defence Systems Management College (USN)




Final Contract Trials (USN)
Guided Missile Frigate
Fleet Exercise (USN)
Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (USN)
Full Scale Development (USN)
General Accounting Office (USN)
Gross Domestic Product
Harbour Acceptance Trials (RAN)
Her Majesty's Australian Ship
Headquarters, Australian Defence Force (RAN)
Integrated Logistic Support
Integrated Logistic Support Plan



























Integrated Test Package (RAN)
Inspections, Tests and Trials (RAN)
Land Based Test Site
Low Rate Initial Production (USN)
Maritime Headquarters (RAN)
Mission Need Statement (USN)
Measures of Effectiveness
Naval Sea Systems Command (USN)
Naval Capability Proposal (RAN)
Naval Weapons Analysis Centre (USN)
Operational Acceptance (RAN)
Operational Concept Paper (RAN)
Operational Performance Demonstration (RAN)
Operational Evaluation
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (USN)
Operational Requirements Document (USN)
Operational Readiness Evaluation (RAN)
Office of the Secretary of Defence (USN)
Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (USN)
Operational Test Director (USN)


























Production Acceptance Test (RAN)
Production Acceptance Test and Evaluation
Project Director (RAN)
Post Delivery Availability
Post Delivery Tests and Trials (RAN)
Program Manager (USN)
Program Management and Budgeting System
(RAN)
President, Board of Inspection and Survey (USN)
Post Shakedown Availability (USN)
Research and Development
Royal Australian Navy
RAN Trials and Assessing Unit (RAN)
Refresher Training (USN)
Reliability, Maintainability and Availability
Required Operational Characteristics (RAN)
Sea Acceptance Trials (RAN)
Secretary of Defence
Ship Qualification Trial (RAN)
Strike Warfare (USN)















Supervisor of Shipbuilding (USN)
Test and Evaluation
Test and Evaluation Coordination Group (USN)
Test and Evaluation Master Plan
Test and Evaluation Planning Group (RAN)
Top Level Requirement (USN)
Total Ship Test Program
United States Navy
United States Ship
Weapons Systems Research Laboratory (RAN)
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